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Usernames and passwords form the most widely used method of user authentication on 
the Internet. Yet, users still find compliance with password guidelines difficult. The 
primary objective of this research was to investigate how compliance with password 
guidelines and password quality can be improved. This study investigated how user 
perceptions of passwords and security threats affect compliance with password 
guidelines and explored if altering these perceptions would improve compliance. This 
research also examined if compliance with password guidelines can be sustained over 
time. This study focuses on personal security, particularly factors that influence 
compliance when using personal online accounts. 
The proposed research model is based on the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 
(Rogers, 1975, 1983), a model widely used in information systems security research. 
As studies have failed to consistently confirm the association between perceived 
vulnerability and information security practices, the model was extended to include 
exposure to hacking as a predictor of perceived vulnerability. Experimental research 
was used to test the model from two groups of Internet users, one of which received 
PMT based fear appeals in the form of a password security information and training 
exercise. To examine if password strength was improved by the fear appeals, 
passwords were collected. A password strength analysis tool was developed using 
Shannon’s (2001) formula for calculating entropy and coded in Visual Basic. 
Structural equation modeling was used to test the model. 
The proposed model explains compliance intentions moderately well, with 54% of the 
variance explained by the treatment model and 43% explained by the control group 
model. Overall, the results indicate that efficacy perceptions are a stronger predictor of 




predict user intentions to comply with password guidelines as particularly important. 
These are perceived threat, perceived password effectiveness and password self-
efficacy. The results show no association between perceived vulnerability to a security 
attack and a user’s decision to comply. The results also showed that those who are 
provided with password information and training are significantly more likely to 
comply, and create significantly stronger passwords. However, the fear appeals used in 
this study had no long-term effects on compliance intentions. The results on the long-
term effects of password training on the participants’ ability to remember passwords 
were however promising. The group that received password training with a mnemonic 
training component was twice as likely to remember their passwords over time. 
The results of this research have practical implications for organizations. They 
highlight the need to raise the levels of concern for information systems security 
threats through training in order to improve compliance with security guidelines.  
Communicating to users what security responses are available is important; however, 
whether they implement them is dependent on how effective they feel the security 
responses are in preventing an attack. Regarding passwords, the single most important 
consideration by a user is whether they have the ability to create strong, memorable 
passwords. At the very least, users should be trained on how to create strong 
passwords, with emphasis on memorization strategies. This research found mnemonic 
password training to have some long-term effects on users’ ability to remember 
passwords, which is arguably one of the most vexing challenges associated with 
passwords. Future research should explore the extent to which the effects of PMT 
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Usernames and passwords have been a conventional method of authentication for 
many decades (e.g., Bonneau, 2012; Morris & Thompson, 1979; Taneski, Heričko, & 
Brumen, 2014). Despite the weaknesses associated with passwords and availability of 
other innovative authentication technologies such as tokens and biometrics, usernames 
and passwords are still the preferred method of user authentication (Keith, Shao, & 
Steinbart, 2007; Komanduri et al., 2011; Shay et al., 2012; Stewart, Tittel, & Chapple, 
2008). Organizations view password authentication as a cost effective, easier to 
implement alternative (Tsai, Lee, & Hwang, 2006), yet users view them as 
inconvenient and mostly difficult to remember (Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; Ur et al., 
2012; Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant, 2004). This attitude toward passwords has 
ultimately led to a continued use of weak passwords making users vulnerable to threats 
such as hacking (Florêncio & Herley, 2010; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010).  
Unfortunately, users use weak passwords even when it is in their best interest to use 
strong passwords, such as when protecting medical files (El Emam, Moreau, & Jonker, 
2011) or financial accounts (Florêncio & Herley, 2007). Findings from several large-
scale analysis of thousands to millions of passwords leaked on the internet draw 
attention to how common weak passwords are on the Internet (e.g., BBC, 2013; Calin, 
2009; Coursey, 2011). While some of the leaked passwords were collected through 
social engineering techniques such as phishing, the findings from these studies are 
indicative of how users still find compliance with password guidelines difficult. Users 
still use passwords such as ‘123456’ and ‘password’ on the Internet, including security 




Another poor password practice prevalent amount Internet users is password reuse 
across several websites or recycling passwords from an old password (Florêncio & 
Herley, 2007). Florêncio and Herley (2007) observed password practices of over half a 
million users across websites such as YouTube, PayPal, eBay and Yahoo and found 
that it was common for users to reuse passwords across these websites. A large scale 
study by Zhang, Monrose, and Reiter (2010), demonstrates the extent to which 
password reuse can pose threat to any system. They managed to crack 41% of recycled 
passwords in as little as three seconds.  
A survey of Internet home users conducted by the National Cyber Security Alliance 
(NCSA) (2011) also highlights the prevalence of poor password practices among 
Internet users. Of the 2,300 Internet users surveyed, three quarters had not changed 
their passwords in over six months, with two thirds of them citing difficulty to 
remember and the hassle of changing passwords as their reasons for not changing 
passwords. Their study found that most home users are not concerned about someone 
hacking their non-financial and email accounts. Given the persistent use of weak 
passwords even on sensitive personal accounts, the key challenge to organizations is to 
motivate users to use strong passwords.  
1.2 Research problem 
To improve password strength, users should be guided toward the adoption of 
recommended password policies (Taneski et al., 2014). The conventional method of 
encouraging users to create strong passwords is through password guidelines. 
Password guidelines are a set of password best practices that provide control over the 
quality of passwords used on a system and also serve as a guide to safe password 




found no correlation between provision of password guidelines and the quality of 
passwords users create (Florêncio & Herley, 2010; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; Ur et al., 
2012; Yan et al., 2004). Furthermore, even when additional tools such as a password 
strength meter are used, users’ propensity for using weak passwords is still evident 
(Egelman, Sotirakopoulos, Muslukhov, Beznosov, & Herley, 2013; Ur et al., 2012; 
Vance, Eargle, Ouimet, & Straub, 2013).  
An analysis of the password guidelines of 75 online websites conducted by Florêncio 
and Herley (2010) brings to light why unstandardized password guidelines may be a 
long term issue. They found websites that rely on advertising have a significantly 
lower average password requirement compared with websites that do not. This is 
because advertisement-driven websites have to compete for users in order to generate 
traffic, thus strict password requirements would potentially discourage users (Florêncio 
& Herley, 2010). Although Bonneau and Preibusch (2010) recommend more 
homogenous password guidelines, Florêncio and Herley (2010) argue that variation in 
password guidelines is likely to be a long term issue for as long as websites are driven 
by user traffic.  
Unfortunately, users find it difficult to cope with this variation in password guidelines 
(Inglesant & Sasse, 2010), affecting their attitude and consequently the quality of 
passwords created (Florêncio & Herley, 2010; Komanduri et al., 2011). Whilst 
approaches such as check-off password system (Warkentin, Davis, & Bekkering, 2004) 
and passphrases have shown some promise (Keith, Shao, & Steinbart, 2009), negative 
attitudes among users will continue to affect compliance with password policies. 





Having a solid information systems (IS) security policy and procedures is key to 
ensuring security (Peltier, 2005; Tipton & Hernandez, 2009), however many 
organizations and web services resort to strict password guidelines. When password 
guidelines are too stringent they inadvertently promote poor password management 
practices such as writing them down, or passwords reuse across websites (Inglesant & 
Sasse, 2010; Yan et al., 2004). This is partly because password policies do not always 
create conditions that promote safer password practices (Florêncio & Herley, 2007; 
Herley, 2009; Shay et al., 2010; Yan et al., 2004) or assist users in maintaining 
multiple strong passwords (Helkala & Svendsen, 2012). Instead, users perceive them 
as counterproductive because they lead to passwords that are difficult to remember 
(Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; Yan et al., 2004).  
The key challenge for users is creating and maintaining multiple strong, long 
passwords, that contain a series of random characters with no dictionary or common 
words (Bonneau, 2012; Burr, Dodson, Newton, Pelner, & Polk, 2013; Helkala & 
Svendsen, 2012; Pham, Syed, & Halgamuge, 2011). Remembering strong passwords is 
cited as one of the most challenging aspects of password usage (NCSA-McAfee, 2011; 
Zviran & Haga, 1999). Users’ inability to remember random characters (Yan et al., 
2004; Zviran & Haga, 1993, 1999), an  important characteristic of a strong password is 
also said to contribute to poor password practices (Adams & Sasse, 1999) and a lack of 
motivation to comply with password policies (Bonneau & Preibusch, 2010; Florêncio 
& Herley, 2010; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010). Since the human brain can only memorize a 
sequence of five to nine random objects (Miller, 1956), it is unsurprising that 
remembering passwords is difficult for most users.  
Studies have linked user motivation to how they perceive security threats, such as their 




Low, 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009), and how they perceive security measures such 
as their assessment of the effectiveness of security measures in preventing threats (Lee 
& Larsen, 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009). User security 
perceptions are therefore a key motivator and predictor of security practices.  
As passwords remain the most commonly used method of user authentication it is 
becoming increasingly important to examine ways to promote better password 
practices. Over the years organizations have invested heavily on IS security 
technologies to secure their information assets, and according to the Federal 
Government Cybersecurity Survey (Moyle & Kelley, 2012), lack of information 
security technologies is no longer seen as a challenge to organizations. Yet, most 
organizations spend 10% or less of their IS security budget on security awareness and 
training programs, while users continue to be a threat to information security 
(Richardson, 2011). Regarding user password security, focusing on users is 
particularly important. 
1.3 Purpose of the research 
The study focuses on concepts pertaining to security perceptions, and investigates how 
user perceptions of passwords and security threats affect compliance with guidelines 
and if these perceptions can be altered to improve compliance.  
Several factors have been identified as influencing IS security practices and 
compliance with IS security policies. How users assess the severity of threats drives 
their decision to apply security measures (Siponen, Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2014; 
Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012; Woon et al., 2005) or if they believe the threat is 
imminent (Ifinedo, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). 




perceived effectiveness of the recommended security measures (Lee & Larsen, 2009; 
Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009), assessment their ability to successfully 
implement the security measures (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Woon et al., 2005), 
and a user would also consider the effort it would take to successfully execute the 
security measures (Lee & Larsen, 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008; 
Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Additionally, studies have shown that these perceptions 
can be manipulated to improve compliance with security policies (Jenkins, Grimes, 
Proudfoot, & Lowry, 2013; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a), and to improve password 
quality (Vance et al., 2013).  
The objective of this research is four-fold. Firstly, this study investigates how 
perceptions about severity of password threats and vulnerability to password threats 
affect compliance with password guidelines. Secondly, examines how user perception 
about the effectiveness of passwords guidelines in preventing password threats and 
beliefs about one’s ability to create strong passwords contributes to compliance with 
password guidelines. The research also seeks to investigate if fear appeals or 
persuasive messages can be effectively used to alter these perceptions to improve 
compliance with password guidelines and ultimately password strength. Finally, this 
research explores the extent to which the effects of the fear appeals messages persist 
after a period of time has elapsed. 
The ultimate objective of this research is to provide a better understanding of the 
relationship between user perceptions about passwords and password threats, and the 
impact of these perceptions upon compliance with password guidelines. The research 
attempts to show that these perceptions can be altered to motivate users to comply with 




To achieve the objectives of this research the following research questions are 
addressed: 
1. How do user perceptions about password threats and password efficacy affect 
compliance with password guidelines? 
2. Can these perceptions be altered?  
2a. If so, can altering these perceptions improve compliance with password 
security guidelines?  
2b. Can the effects of altering these perceptions be maintained over time? 
1.4 Research significance 
With a target population of online email account holders, this study aims to provide a 
better understanding of the factors that affect compliance with online password 
policies and how compliance with online password guidelines can be improved using 
fear appeals. Why online email accounts? Online usernames and passwords are 
becoming even more valuable than stolen credit card information. A recent study by 
Ablon, Libicki, and Golay (2014) in conjunction with the RAND Research 
Corporation, found that the economic value of online usernames and passwords is 
surpassing that of credit card details. This, according to Ablon et al. (2014), is partly 
because the value of stolen credit cards information is temporal and depreciates with 
time. However, online passwords including those of social media accounts such as 
Twitter, command a higher price because such personal accounts can lead to other 
valuables and revealing information. Therefore, an individual employee’s risky 
security practices, particularly on a personal online accounts have potentially serious 





While it is important to investigate compliance with password policies within an 
organization, given that online email and social networking accounts are the most 
targeted online accounts by hackers (Goncharov, 2012), the aim of this study is to 
investigate ways to improve online password practices. Therefore, in addition to 
research implications, the findings in this study should have societal and organizational 
implications. 
Many password security researchers have questioned the effectiveness of password 
guidelines in preventing password threats (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Florêncio & Herley, 
2010; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; Yan et al., 2004). Existing password guidelines are 
however challenging and confusing to users and as a result users lack motivation to 
comply with recommended requirements (Bonneau & Preibusch, 2010; Florêncio & 
Herley, 2010; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010). Understanding how to motivate users is 
central to the future success of password based authentication. As studies have linked 
this lack of motivation to how users perceive security threats (Bonneau & Preibusch, 
2010; Woon et al., 2005), it is important to examine the role user perceptions play in 
compliance with password policies and determine if compliance levels can be 
increased by altering these perceptions. The research described in this thesis should 
help organizations to take action to improve password security compliance. 
Designed to ensure passwords meet certain security standards, existing password 
guidelines have failed to prevent password related threats. Further, large websites such 
as Facebook, Google and Twitter implement the least restrictive password policies 
(Florêncio & Herley, 2010), despite the sensitive nature of information kept by users. 
This highlights the need for other strategies for improving compliance with password 
guidelines and password quality. While feedback techniques such as the use of 




evidence shows mixed results (Egelman et al., 2013; Ur et al., 2012; Vance et al., 
2013) on its effectiveness in persuading users to follow the recommended password 
guidelines. The focus should instead be on providing users with knowledge of security 
threats (Adams, Sasse, & Lunt, 1997) therefore enhancing user knowledge about 
password security threats. It is important to investigate how security threats can be 
effectively communicated to users, and if this will in turn improve password strength. 
Implementing effective security awareness and training programs is key to motivating 
users to practice security and to promote realistic user security perceptions  (Adams & 
Sasse, 1999; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010). In addition, IS security training programs 
should include a password security component and instructions on how to create strong 
passwords (Stewart et al., 2008). Given the ubiquitous nature of passwords more 
targeted IS security training incorporating a password security component is of 
increasing importance. The outcomes of this research should also help identify training 
components with the strongest influence on compliance.  
The proposed research model is based on the health-based Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975, 1983) which suggests that how users evaluate health 
risks may increase or decrease their likelihood of complying with protective measures. 
One of the reasons PMT was selected for this study is its usefulness in predicting 
behavioral change using persuasive communication and its extensive application in 
experimental studies (Weinstein, 1993). IS security researchers have shown interest in 
the PMT (Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Siponen et al., 2014; 
Vance et al., 2013; Woon et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008), however only a few 
published works (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Vance et al., 
2013), are experimental studies. None thus far appear to have examined the long term 




While empirical studies (e.g., Bonneau, 2012; Cazier & Medlin, 2006; Dell'Amico, 
Michiardi, & Roudier, 2010; Shay et al., 2010; Weber, Guster, Safonov, & Schmidt, 
2008; Weir, Aggarwal, Collins, & Stern, 2010; Yan et al., 2004; Zhang, Luo, 
Akkaladevi, & Ziegelmayer, 2009; Zhang et al., 2010; Zviran & Haga, 1999) have 
been instrumental to this study in identifying factors affecting password practices, the 
theory grounded research described in this thesis provides insights into the 
relationships between these factors and compliance with password guidelines. In 
particular, the theory based experimental research used in this study provides further 
insight into how IS security training can be designed effectively, as suggested by the 
PMT framework (Rogers, 1975, 1983), to target these key factors and ultimately 
improve security practices. Thus, the findings from this experimental research should 
also contribute to IS security training development, an area where theory based 
research is lacking (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). 
This research also addresses password measurement issues and seeks to examine ways 
to measure password strength. A key challenge in measuring password strength is the 
lack of universal metric for measuring password strength (Bonneau, 2012), coupled 
with the ambiguity of the term password strength (Dell'Amico et al., 2010; Egelman et 
al., 2013). A password analysis tool was therefore developed to measure password 
strength. The goal was to develop a user-friendly password analysis tool that can also 
be used as a research tool or in conjunction with password security training within an 
organization 
1.5 Research approach 
To achieve the objectives described in this thesis, a model based on the health-related 




attention among IS security researchers and has been shown to be a helpful model for 
predicting IS security behavior (e.g. Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010a; Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Courtney, & Bennett, 2011; Vance et al., 2012; Woon 
et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008; Zhang & McDowell, 2009). As a persuasive 
communications theory (Rogers, 1975, 1983), PMT has also been shown to be a useful 
framework for designing IS security persuasive messages (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013; 
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Vance et al., 2013). 
This research focuses on password practices on the Internet. As such, the target 
population was Internet users who have at least one Internet email account. Data was 
collected through an online questionnaire. To ensure the respondents held at least one 
online email account participants were recruited through email invitations. One of the 
research questions addressed in this study seeks to explain how perceptions about 
password threats and password efficacy affect password practices. To address this 
question the model developed for this study was used to explain password behavior.  
Another research question addressed in this study seeks to examine if these perceptions 
can be changed with the ultimate goal of enhancing the level of compliance with 
password guidelines. To address this question, PMT was used as a framework for 
designing persuasive communication and as suggested by Leventhal (1970) an 
experimental design where one group is exposed to fear appeals and another is not, 
was conducted. As such, data was collected from two separate groups using two 
separate survey instruments, where one contained the fear appeal messages. 
As a follow-up to the second research question, this study investigates if the effects of 
altering user perceptions can be sustained over time. To address this question, a 
follow-up study was conducted where data was collected from the same pool of 




The model was tested using structural equation modeling (SEM) and to examine 
behavioral change. Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted. 
1.6 Overview of chapters 
This thesis is presented in seven key chapters. The first chapter provided an overview 
of the proposed research, with emphasis on issues pertaining to the use and 
management of text-based passwords. It also presented the rationale for this study, and 
the objectives and research questions addressed in this study. 
The rest of this thesis is presented as follows. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature and 
is organized into three major sections. The first is centered on concepts pertaining to 
security perceptions. This is followed by a review of competing theories commonly 
used to explain preventative behaviors, including background, core components, 
limitations and applicability of the theories to this study.  Lastly, it presents a review of 
literature relating to passwords and key challenges related to their usage. 
In Chapter 3 the research questions and supporting literature are presented. The chapter 
also describes the theoretical framework on which the proposed research model is 
based. Lastly, the hypotheses developed for this study are presented alongside the 
proposed research model and definitions of the constructs used. 
Chapter 4 is organized as follows. First, a detailed description of the study design is 
presented. This is followed by a description of the participants, the method by which 
they were recruited, and a description of the data collection procedure. The study 
materials, which include fear appeal messages and survey instruments, are then 
described. The survey instruments used in the follow-up study and data collection 




SEM, the primary data analysis techniques elected for this study and the procedure 
used to validate the measurement model and to test the structural model are presented.  
In Chapter 5, the analysis and results of this study are presented in four major sections, 
as follows. The first is a description of the demographic and computer background data 
about the participants. The results of the measurement model assessment and 
validation are then presented, followed by a section presenting results of the structural 
model testing. The final section presents the results of each hypothesis. 
Chapter 6 discusses the results presented in Chapter 5. It discusses the key findings of 
this study with reference to relevant research and discusses shortcomings of this 
research requiring further consideration. 
Finally, the implications for future research based on the results and limitations of this 
study are discussed in Chapter 7. Also building on the results of this research, this 





2 Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
This study is centered on concepts pertaining to security perceptions, and investigates 
how user perceptions of passwords and security threats affect compliance with 
password guidelines. The question of whether these perceptions can be altered in order 
to improve compliance is also addressed in this research.  
This chapter contains three major sections. Section 2.2 provides background 
information on user perceptions of IS security, and particularly how these perceptions 
are formed, which is important to this study for a better understanding of how to alter 
these perceptions. Section 2.3 presents four competing theories used for predicting 
preventative behaviors in a variety of research domains and reviews previous research 
attempting to explain IS security behaviors. Lastly, Section 2.4 provides an overview 
of user challenges related to text-based password authentication on the Internet.  
Historically, IS security research was focused primarily on technology as a solution to 
security issues (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Hitchings, 1995). It, however, became clear 
technology alone is insufficient to guarantee security, thus the prevailing view took a 
turn, and humans were considered key players in security breaches (Hitchings, 1995). 
Organizations and researchers began to view users as the weakest link (Adams & 
Sasse, 1999; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001), which led to a shift in focus from 
technology to social-behavioral research (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Woon et al., 
2005; Workman et al., 2008). The notion of the weakest link originated partly from 
how authentication mechanisms, designed to prevent unauthorized access to protected 
information, are largely dependent on a user’s input (Adams & Sasse, 1999). As 




human error (Hitchings, 1995), focus on human factors is important. However, some 
argue that users are only partly to blame and that a lack of guidance such as awareness 
training and motivation play a significant role in undesirable security practices (Adams 
& Sasse, 1999; Sasse et al., 2001; Winkler, 2009). The research described in this thesis 
takes this position, and based on the premise that users can be guided towards 
engaging in recommended security measures. 
2.2 Information security perceptions 
Security recommendations ensure users maintain a certain level of security. However, 
studies show that users lack the motivation to comply, even when the recommended 
measures are aimed to protect personal financial information (e.g., El Emam et al., 
2011; Florêncio & Herley, 2007). This failure to follow security recommendations has 
led to numerous studies seeking to understand what motivates users to adopt security 
measures.  
The literature generally associates motivation to comply with security 
recommendations with perceptions about security threats and perceptions of the 
security mechanisms. These perceptions play a significant role in motivating users to 
perform security measures in an organizational setting (Ifinedo, 2012; Siponen et al., 
2014; Vance et al., 2012) as well as in a personal computing environment (Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010a; LaRose, Rifon, & Enbody, 2008; Woon et al., 2005). Further, 
several studies have shown that users’ overall security perception is shaped by their 
awareness of computer security threats (e.g., Adams et al., 1997; Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, 
& Benbasat, 2010; Huang, Patrick Rau, Salvendy, Gao, & Zhou, 2011) and awareness 
of the available security measures (e.g., Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006; Furnell, 




and a lack of knowledge of how to implement the available security measures can in 
turn lead to poor security practices. It is therefore important to understand how security 
perceptions are developed (Goodhue & Straub, 1991) and particularly important in this 
study which seeks to investigate how these perceptions can be modified to improve 
password security.  
 Awareness of security threats 2.2.1
As Goodhue and Straub (1991) suggest, in order to raise the level of concern for 
security, an appropriate level of awareness must also be reached. Woon et al. (2005) 
also view awareness issues as key triggers of poor security practices. They argued that 
if security knowledge is made accessible, users would more likely be motivated to 
practice security. Awareness of threats and particularly, their severity and prevalence is 
key to improving compliance with security policies (Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 
2010).  
Several studies have demonstrated how lack of awareness (Adams & Sasse, 1999; 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2008) could lead to poor security 
practices. For example, Adams and Sasse (1999) found a link between a lack of 
sufficient security threat awareness and misconceptions about what data should be 
classified as sensitive or confidential. The participants in their study rated personal 
files as sensitive while customer and financial data as less sensitive. Without guidance 
from the organization, users form their own perceptions that led to the users perceiving 
organizational security threat as low. (Adams & Sasse, 1999).  
Results from an exploratory study by Huang et al. (2008) investigating IS security 
perceptions that different people hold, also suggest a link between awareness and 




users, perceived security threats such as hackers and malware such as worms and 
viruses as most dangerous, however they rated threats such as spam significantly 
lower. They found that the level of awareness of the possible impact, severity and 
likelihood of occurrence of security threats and knowledge of threats significantly 
influenced the overall security perceptions. Consistent with Adams and Sasse (1999), 
their study also demonstrates the misconception about what is harmful and what is not. 
For example, although spam was shown to play a significant role in the spread of 
malware such as viruses in a study Kanich et al. (2008) conducted around the same 
period, participants in the study by Huang et al. (2008) rated spam as a significantly 
lower threat than malware such as viruses (Huang et al., 2008). 
As a follow-up to their earlier study, Huang et al. (2011) conducted an experiment to 
investigate if risk perceptions can be adjusted to improve intentions to adopt security 
measures. Their experiment involved two groups of participants from a university in 
China, where one group received security information about e-banking security threats. 
This group formed different (higher levels) perceptions of threat, and was more likely 
to adopt e-banking security measures.  
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) also has similar findings concerning how risk beliefs are 
formed. Their study, which was based on the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
(Ajzen, 1991), investigated how security awareness impacts on outcome beliefs about 
consequences of compliance or non-compliance. Based on a sample size of 464 
employees from different organizations they found that awareness plays a significant 
role in shaping beliefs such as perceived vulnerability of threat, harmfulness of threat, 
and beliefs that compliance would effectively prevent security potential threats. Based 
on their findings, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) noted that IS security awareness programs 




 Awareness of security mechanisms 2.2.2
The findings of the studies discussed in Section 2.2.1 provide qualitative, exploratory, 
experimental, and theory grounded support for a link between security awareness, 
security perceptions and users’ decisions to carry out security recommendations. 
Furthermore, the experimental study by Huang et al. (2011) provides additional insight 
into this relationship and shows how security perceptions can be adjusted to ultimately 
improve adoption of security measures. Users’ decision to adopt security measures is 
also associated with perceived effectiveness of the security measures (Lee & Larsen, 
2009; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009), and whether users believe they 
can successfully execute the required security features (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; 
Woon et al., 2005). Users are however uninformed about existing security technology 
(Dhamija et al., 2006; Furnell, 2007; Furnell et al., 2007; Woon et al., 2005). 
Unfortunately a lack of understanding of the security technologies may sometimes lead 
to reliance on the only security options the users are familiar with (Chen, Paik, & 
McCabe, 2014). 
Awareness of security technologies is particularly important because it plays a 
significant role in shaping how users perceived the available security measures 
(Dhamija et al., 2006; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Woon et al., 2005). Awareness of security 
technologies can determine whether users pay attention to the existence of important 
security features.  For example, Dhamija et al. (2006), who analyzed large scale dataset 
on phishing attacks, found that users who lack basic knowledge of browser features are 
more likely to ignore browser warnings or security indicators such as HTTPS, which, 
led to successful phishing attacks.  
The link between awareness and security behaviors is also shown in theory grounded 




(2005) who used the PMT model to explain factors that motivate users to apply 
wireless security features on their home computers, found those with low security 
knowledge and awareness of available wireless security options showed a low level of 
confidence in applying security measures and were also less likely to follow security 
recommendations. Likewise, those who applied wireless security features showed a 
high level of confidence in their ability to implement security measures. Consistent 
with Woon et al. (2005), Using a sample size of 332 IS professionals and students to 
test their model based on the technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis, 1989) and 
TPB (Ajzen, 1991), they found awareness to be highly correlated with factors such as 
perceptions about the usefulness of the security technology and a user’s confidence in 
using the system, referred to as self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982). Thus, their study also 
demonstrates how awareness informs key perceptions about security technologies and 
how this leads to improved intentions to adopt security technology.  
 The role of security awareness training 2.2.3
The studies discussed in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, associate awareness of security 
threats and awareness of security technologies, with user IS security perceptions and 
behavior. Of interest to this study is how to alter these perceptions to improve 
password security. To improve security practices, awareness of the full range of 
security measures is important, and one approach is to provide security awareness 
training to compensate for a lack of adequate security knowledge (Straub & Welke, 
1998). Thus, this study considers security awareness training as a strategy for 
improving compliance with password security recommendations. 
Users can be made aware of security threats and security mechanism through a security 
awareness training approach (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010) and also by 




adjustments (Choi, Kim, Goo, & Whitmore, 2008; Herath & Rao, 2009). For example, 
in their experimental study Yan et al. (2004) found that training improves password 
recall and password strength Yan et al. (2004). The challenge is, IS security training is 
fundamentally different from other types of training in that it is persuasive in nature 
(Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011). For example, university education is typically 
descriptive and cognitive, where scientific concepts are explained with no intentions of 
influencing behaviors (Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011), while persuasive 
communication targets individuals’ beliefs in an attempt to persuade them to take a 
specific course of action (Fishbein, 2008; Fishbein & Cappella, 2006; Rogers, 1983). 
As such, for IT security training to be effective, a sound theory based understanding of 
how to design security training is important (Karjalainen & Siponen, 2011).  
A study by Johnston and Warkentin (2010a) demonstrated how theory grounded 
persuasive communication can be mapped into IS security training, and effectively 
enhance users security perceptions, and in turn improve compliance intentions. Based 
on PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983), Johnston and Warkentin (2010a) designed persuasive 
messages highlighting, among others, the dangers of spyware and potential 
consequences, and found that user intentions can be influenced by using persuasive 
messages. Similarly, Jenkins et al. (2013) also used PMT based persuasive messages 
that warned users against reusing passwords and highlighted the high risk of hacking 
associated with password reuse. This improved perceptions about the probability of a 
threat occurrence and their perceptions about the effectiveness of the recommended 
response, which significantly influenced their password choices. These studies 
illustrate how IS security perceptions can be shaped using theory grounded persuasive 




Based on works discussed in Section 2.1, the research described in this thesis is 
centered on security perceptions as a key predictor of security behavior and is based on 
the premise that these perceptions can be altered using training that incorporates 
information on existing security threats and preventative measures. 
2.3 Theoretical background 
This section reviews several competing theories considered prior to selecting a 
theoretical framework for this study. Examining behavioral change is of importance to 
this study, therefore an established theory that can enable experimental verification 
was sought. The following section presents background information, key components, 
limitations and applicability of theories relevant to this study. 
 Competing theories 2.3.1
Four widely used and comprehensive protective behavior theories, as reviewed by 
Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1986) and Weinstein (1993), were initially considered for 
this study. The Health Belief Model (HBM) (Janz & Becker, 1984; Rosenstock, 1974), 
the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model (Ronis, 1992), the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and the PMT model 
(Rogers, 1975, 1983). These models have been used to explain protective behaviors 
from a perceived threat and threat severity perspective (Weinstein, 1993), although the 
specific variables considered in the models vary.   
2.3.1.1 Health belief model 
Developed out of frustration over a lack of participation in a free disease screening 
program, the HBM (Janz & Becker, 1984; Rosenstock, 1974) was established as a 
framework for explaining why people lacked motivation to take a free screening test 




peoples motivation to take precautions against a disease is dependent upon their 
perceived susceptibility to an illness and their perception of the severity of the illness. 
An individual would also weigh whether undertaking the precautions is beneficial, and 
assess the barriers associated with taking the precautions. At a later stage, HBM was 
extended to incorporate self-efficacy beliefs (Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1988), 
thus accounting for how an individual’s belief about the ability to successfully execute 
the recommended precautions influences their preventative behavior.  
Although HBM has been applied in the IS security domain (e.g., Claar, 2011; Ng, 
Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009), one drawback is that evidence supporting its usefulness in 
predicting IS security behavior is lacking. By drawing similarities between 
preventative behavior related to health threats and preventative behavior related to 
computer security threats, Ng et al. (2009) proposed a HBM model to investigate 
factors that motivate employees to take precautions as a preventative measure against 
email threats. Using 134 part-time working students as a surrogate for employees, they 
only found perceived susceptibility, perceived benefit, and self-efficacy, to be 
associated with motivation to take email precautions. Likewise, the thesis by Claar 
(2011) examining factors that drive home users to implement security software, found 
support for relationships between perceived susceptibility, self-efficacy, perceived 
barrier, and user intentions to implement security software.  
Another drawback is while HBM is useful for predicting correlational relationships 
between variables, how these variables could be manipulated to elicit behavioral 
change is unclear (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). Thus, it is limited in its 
ability to provide experimental verification (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986). Given 
that the research described in this thesis seeks to investigate factors that influence 




engender change in compliance with password guidelines, HBM was deemed 
unsuitable for this study. 
2.3.1.2 Subjective expected utility 
Another model considered for this study is the SEU model (Ronis, 1992). SEU is an 
mathematical framework that was originally developed to explain why people would 
choose to risk a sum of money in a flip coin game with infinite odds (Schoemaker, 
1982). SEU holds that when people face a risk related decision they assess the 
desirability (expected utility) of all available alternate actions, and chose the action 
with the most desirability. For example, the benefits of taking health precautions, that 
is reduced chance of an illness, would be considered desirable. As the action with the 
most desirability would be chosen, perceived benefit would increase the likelihood of 
taking precautions (Ronis, 1992).  
The SEU has two notable drawbacks relevant to this study. One is that SEU does not 
explicitly describe which beliefs are applicable to a given decision (Weinstein, 1993), 
and therefore works better as an integrated model (Ronis, 1992). For example, SEU 
can be integrated with theories such as HBM that are more specific about what risk 
beliefs are relevant to preventative health behavior (e.g., Ronis, 1992), or as was the 
case in the IS security study by Peace, Galletta, and Thong (2003) it can be integrated 
with TRA/TPB and Deterrence Theory. It, therefore, appears that by itself, SEU lacks 
a strong basis for predicting IS security behavior. Furthermore, as suggested by 
Mathieson (1991), when a model does not specify the relevant variables, a costly 
implementation process of identifying relevant variables may be needed, and therefore 




2.3.1.3 Theory of reasoned action 
The development of the TRA model came about as a result of a lack of consensus on 
the structure and role of attitudes in explaining human behavior (Ajzen, 2012). This 
was partly due to weak correlations observed in numerous studies between attitudes 
and behavior, suggesting that perhaps attitudes was not the main driver of behavior. 
The prevailing viewpoint was that attitude is a multidimensional construct, represented 
by different aspects of beliefs. However, Fishbein argued that attitude is a 
unidimensional independent construct that is determined by beliefs. Subsequently, 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) teamed up and developed a framework for explaining 
human behavior, and a model that also provides a better understanding of the role of 
attitudes.  
They started with the assumption that an individual’s intentions determine behavior, 
making intention the primary predictor of behavior. They identified two independent 
constructs, attitudes towards behavior and subjective norm, as the key determinants of 
intentions. TRA, shown in dotted lines in Table 2.1, suggests that outcome beliefs such 
as evaluations of whether the outcomes of the behavior will be of benefit, is what 
shapes people’s attitudes, this in turn informs their intentions. Likewise, normative 
beliefs such as social pressure to perform the behavior shapes subjective norm that in 
turn influences people’s intentions. 
















One limitation of TRA is it does not account for when people have limited control over 
a behavior in question, such as lack of resources or skills to perform the behavior. 
Consequently, TRA was extended to address this limitation by incorporating the 
concept of self-efficacy, based on Bandura’s work on self-efficacy expectancy 
(Bandura, 1977). In the extended TRA, named the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
(Ajzen, 1991) self-efficacy was represented as perceived behavioral control (PBC) and 
was incorporated in the model as a third independent construct. Control beliefs, such as 
perceived obstacles, available resources or difficulty in undertaking a given course of 
action determine an individual’s PBC. Ajzen (1991) proposed that in addition to 
determining behavioral intentions, PBC also plays an active role in influencing human 
behavior. Thus, PBC is the only belief factor not mediated by attitudes, and is 
purported to have a direct impact on intentions and behavior as well. In this review, the 
two models are represented as TRA/TPB (see Table 2.1).  
While studies have successfully used TRA/TPB to explain adoption of IT technologies 
and IS security behaviors, the model carries two notable limitations of interest to this 
study. The first is partly attributable to its generality, as a model for explaining a wide 
range of human behaviors (Mathieson, 1991). TRA/TPB was originally developed to 
explain general behaviors (Weinstein, 1993). In fact, in its inception the model was 
tested by investigating the association between beliefs and attitudes towards African 
American people (Ajzen, 2012), and the first application of the complete TRA model 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1981) was used to explain voting behavior. TRA/TPB can, 
nonetheless, be used to explain health-related preventative behaviors (Fishbein, 2008). 
However, TRA/TPB omits relevant beliefs, such as perceived effectiveness of the 
recommended preventative measures (Weinstein, 1993), which play a significant role 




explicitly defined, are considered an individual difference variable with indirect effect 
on behavioral intentions (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein, 2008).  
Nonetheless, TRA/TPB has been successfully used to explain behavior related to IS 
security, however without the relevant risk and response variables, on its own the 
model may require a costly implementation process such as the need for a pilot test to 
identify belief outcomes, relevant normative beliefs or control factors (Mathieson, 
1991). Thus, IS security studies (e.g., Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Ifinedo, 2012; 
Siponen et al., 2014; Siponen et al., 2010; Zhang, Reithel, & Li, 2009) have had to 
incorporate risk based theories.  
In IS security research (e.g., Dinev & Hu, 2007; Herath et al., 2014; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010b; Lee & Kozar, 2008; Lee & Larsen, 2009), TRA/TPB has also been 
integrated with technology adoption models such as the TAM (Davis, 1989). Based on 
TRA, Davis (1989) developed TAM to better understand factors that influence 
technology adoption. However, as factors considered when contemplating adopting 
security protective technologies such as anti-spyware differ from those considered in 
the adoption of technologies such as productivity software, traditional technology 
adoption theories are inadequate in explaining IS security behaviors (Liang & Xue, 
2009). It is of interest to note that, although TAM is said to be a better predictor of 
technology acceptance than TRA/TPB (Mathieson, 1991), TAM was not considered in 
this study because it is more useful in explaining technology acceptance (Mathieson, 
1991), as opposed to explaining use of protective technology which involves a threat 
element (Dinev & Hu, 2007). 
The second limitation relates to persuasive communication, which can be applied 
within the TRA/TPB framework as a strategy for behavioral change (Fishbein & 




messages can be used to target specific beliefs (Fishbein, 2008; Fishbein & Cappella, 
2006). Because of this limitation, Fishbein and Cappella (2006) suggested that a theory 
grounded in communication theory would be more appropriate for designing 
persuasive communication. Therefore, PMT was chosen for this study. The following 
sections provide the rationale for selecting PMT and a detailed description of the PMT 
model and its applicability to this study. 
 Protection motivation theory 2.3.2
PMT was chosen not under the assumption that it is the best protective behavioral 
theory available. Rather, PMT was selected as it is a useful tool for examining 
behavioral change using persuasive communication (Weinstein, 1993), and describing 
how persuasive communication can be effectively designed (Rogers, 1975, 1983).  
PMT was developed as a model for predicting behavioral change through persuasive 
communication, also referred to as fear appeals (Rogers, 1975, 1983). Early research 
viewed fear appeals as a composite construct and as a result, the operationalization of 
fear appeals varied. This made it difficult to compare experimental studies, and to 
determine what component produced the observed behavioral change. As such, Rogers 
(1975) established a comprehensive fear appeals framework and identified key 
stimulus variables that facilitate behavioral change. He concluded that fear appeals are 
a multidimensional construct consisting of independent stimulus variables that can be 
distinctively framed within a fear appeals message to target specific perceptions.  
Rogers (1975) identified three independent stimulus variables: magnitude of 
noxiousness, probability of threat occurrence and efficacy of available recommended 
response. An individual’s perceived severity of threat, perceived susceptibility to threat 




mediational process that involves appraisal of the information about magnitude of 
noxiousness, probability of occurrence and efficacy of the response. In turn, these 
perceptions have an impact on protection motivation. In PMT, protection motivation is 
synonymous with, and measured as, behavioral intentions (Rogers, 1983). 
Excluded from the earlier persuasive communications theories (Rogers, 1983) is the 
concept of self-efficacy, described as the belief that one is capable of carrying out the 
recommended response. Leventhal (1970) proposed a similar concept, although it was 
not referred to as self-efficacy at the time. Leventhal proposed that persuasive 
communication should incorporate instructions on how to execute a behavior in 
question. Bandura (1977, 1982) suggested that self-efficacy can be developed through 
vicarious experiences such as finding out how others perform or actually performing 
the activity. Persuasion such as suggestions aimed to persuade individuals to believe 
that they are capable of performing a given task can also shape an individual’s self-
efficacy beliefs. Ultimately, an individual’s perceived self-efficacy is influenced by the 
interpretation of the persuasive information (Bandura, 1977, 1982). 
Following Bandura’s work on self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1982), Rogers (1983)  
explored the possibility of extending PMT to incorporate self-efficacy. Rogers teamed 
up with Maddux (Maddux & Rogers, 1983) to verify the role of self-efficacy by 
experimentally manipulating self-efficacy using fear appeals and found self-efficacy to 
have a significant influence on behavioral intentions. They therefore included self-
efficacy as a key PMT variable. In addition, the revised PMT was intended to provide 
a more comprehensive model (Rogers, 1983), including additional variables such as 
perceived rewards and costs associated with the recommended response. Figure 2.2 is 









































2.3.2.1 Threat appraisal: applicability to this study 
Two independent constructs predict protective behavior: threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal. Threat appraisal refers to an individual’s appraisal of the magnitude of 
noxiousness and probability of threat occurrence, following fear appeals 
communication, which leads to form beliefs about the consequences of the threat, 
represented as perceived severity and beliefs about the likelihood of occurrence, 
represented as perceived vulnerability (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986).  
The impact of perceived severity and perceived vulnerability on behavioral intentions 
is further mediated by an intervening variable, fear, described as an emotional feeling 
toward threat (Rogers, 1983). However, fear, often described as fear arousal, is 
purported to have an indirect impact on intention. Thus, PMT assumes that fear can 
produce change in attitudes and behavioral intention but only indirectly through 
perceived severity and perceived vulnerability. Fear was therefore incorporated in the 
revised PMT model but as an indirect determinant of protection motivation, but as a 
function of perceived severity and perceived vulnerability. Therefore, this study 
considers fear as a function of perceived severity and perceived vulnerability that in 




2.3.2.2 Fear arousal: applicability to this study 
In other key persuasion theories, the role of fear as purported varies slightly (Rogers, 
1983). For example, the Drive Model (Janis, 1967) suggests that rather than having a 
direct influence on behavior, fear drives people to reduce emotional feeling towards 
threat. It is from this reduced emotional state that behavioral change is experienced. 
However, the key difference between the Drive Model and other persuasion theories 
(Rogers, 1983), is the hypothesized inverted-U-shaped association with behavior. Janis 
(1967) suggests that fear arousal has a positive effect up to a certain point: the top of 
the inverted-U. This is the optimum arousal point where maximum motivation is 
experienced. Exceeding this point of fear arousal, according to Janis (1967), decreases 
the effects of fear on behavior. However, there has been little data supporting the 
inverted-U relationship and thus the model has been widely rejected (Rogers, 1983). 
Another opposing view on the role of fear is that proposed by the Parallel Process 
Model (PPM) (Leventhal, 1970) whereby fear control (emotional response to threat) 
and threat control (cognitive response to threat) are viewed as completely independent. 
While PPM suggests that behavior is predicted solely by cognitive response to threat, 
the revised PMT (Rogers, 1983) assumes that both emotional and cognitive response to 
threat play a significant role in predicting behavior. However, Roger’s (1975) original 
position supports this viewpoint, and therefore excluded fear as a key variable, until 
later when it was incorporated into the revised PMT (Witte, 1992). 
Motivation through fear arousal has received some support, and while some studies 
(e.g., Liang & Xue, 2010; Zhang & McDowell, 2009)  have found a direct link, results 
in other studies (e.g., Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; Witte, 1994) 
reveal an indirect link. Further, Witte (1992) investigated the possibility of redefining 




Following a study conducted to validate the proposed EPPM (Witte, 1994), the 
findings revealed an indirect relationship between fear and intentions, as well as fear 
and behavior, as purported in the PMT model. It is of interest to note that, while EPPM 
borrows, in part, from the original PMT (Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011), it also 
incorporates a message rejection component intended to explain how individuals 
control fear. As message rejection is not the focus of this study, Witte’s EPPM (1994) 
was not considered in this study. 
Though limited, some evidence (e.g., Liang & Xue, 2010; Zhang & McDowell, 2009) 
suggest that fear may also have a direct influence on behavioral intentions, and as 
recommended by Johnston and Warkentin (2010a) this link should be explored more in 
IS security studies. Thus, this study also considers the role of fear on compliance with 
password guidelines.  
2.3.2.3 Coping appraisal: applicability to this study 
Coping appraisal represents an individual’s assessment of the information on the 
efficacy of the recommended response and appraisal of the ability to perform the 
recommended response. This in turn develops into perceptions about the effectiveness 
of the recommended measures, represented as response efficacy and perceptions about 
an individual’s ability to perform the response, referred to as self-efficacy.  
While response efficacy and self-efficacy increase behavioral intentions, response cost 
is purported to decrease the likelihood that an individual will carry out the 
recommended response. Response cost, which follows an individual’s assessment of 
the costs associated with the available preventative measures, relates to beliefs about 
the difficultly, inconvenience, unpleasantness, or the amount of effort needed to 
implement the recommended response (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986; Rogers, 1983). 




intentions (e.g., Floyd et al., 2000; Milne & Milne, 2000). Therefore, this study 
considers the role of all three coping appraisal factors in predicting compliance with 
password guidelines. 
2.3.2.4 Rewards: applicability to this study 
Rewards, was incorporated in the revised PMT model (Rogers, 1983) to account for 
beliefs about the benefits of ignoring the recommended behavior and is purported to 
decrease the likelihood of adoption.  However only a few health-related studies have 
exclusively tested rewards (Norman, Boer, & Seydel, 2005; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 
1997). There have also been only a few IS security studies that have considered 
rewards (Siponen et al., 2014; e.g., Siponen et al., 2010; Vance et al., 2012), and these 
have examined the role of rewards in an organizational setting.  
This may be attributable to the similarity between the two constructs. Rewards and 
response cost are two independent constructs where the benefits, that is the pleasure of 
disregarding a given preventative measure has a negative effect on behavior, while the 
costs associated with a given preventative response are also said to have detrimental 
effects on behavior. Abraham, Sheeran, Abrams, and Spears (1994) suggested that the 
two variables could be operationalized as a single construct. For example, that the 
measures of the construct rewards be morphed into response cost by rewording from 
“increased pleasure” to “reduced benefit” (response cost). Given the possible similarity 
between the two constructs, this study did not consider the role of rewards. 
 Applications of PMT in health-related research 2.3.3
Originally developed as a model for predicting health-related protective behaviors, 
PMT is useful in predicting correlational relationships between key variables and 




communication, PMT is also useful in experimental research (Prentice-Dunn & 
Rogers, 1986). Correspondingly, PMT studies have taken either an experimental or 
correlational approach to predicting behaviors (Norman et al., 2005). Experimental 
studies typically involve the use of fear appeals to manipulate key PMT variables, 
examining effectiveness in facilitating behavioral change, and also testing correlational 
relationships using experimental data. Correlational studies involve testing 
correlational relationships in a proposed PMT model or an extended version of the 
PMT model using survey data.  
In the health domain, PMT has been applied to a variety of health-related conditions in 
the areas of disease detection and screenings (e.g., de Nooijer, Lechner, Candel, & de 
Vries, 2004; Hodgkins & Orbell, 1998; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987) or prevention 
techniques such as exercising or vaccination (e.g., Abraham et al., 1994; Brewer et al., 
2007; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Milne, Orbell, & Sheeran, 2002; Norman et al., 2005; 
Plotnikoff & Higginbotham, 2002; Wurtele & Maddux, 1987). Health-related PMT 
research can also be categorized as experimental (de Nooijer et al., 2004; Maddux & 
Rogers, 1983; Milne et al., 2002; Norman et al., 2005; Oenema, Tan, & Brug, 2005), 
or correlational (Abraham et al., 1994; Hodgkins & Orbell, 1998). Although the PMT 
model does not provide a utility for predicting future behavior (Milne & Milne, 2000), 
some studies (e.g., de Nooijer et al., 2004; Milne et al., 2002; Norman et al., 2005; 
Oenema et al., 2005; Wurtele & Maddux, 1987) have managed to successfully predict 
behavioral intentions and behaviors in longitudinal studies. 
 Applications of PMT in IS security research 2.3.4
By drawing similarities between preventative behavior related to health threats and 
preventative behavior related to computer security threats, PMT has been successfully 




within an organizational setting (e.g., Crossler, Long, Loraas, & Trinkle, 2014; Herath 
& Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Siponen et al., 2014; Siponen et al., 
2010; Vance et al., 2012) or in relation to personal IS security such as home computer 
protection or online password security (e.g., Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Crossler, 
2010; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Liang & Xue, 2010; Milne, Labrecque, & 
Cromer, 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Table 2.1 summarizes 






Table 2.1: Applications of the Protection Motivation Theory in IS security research 





















Purpose: Investigate ways to discourage password reuse 
Strategy: Used Fear Appeals to manipulate all PMT variables except self-
efficacy 
Findings: Their data revealed that 88% of those who received fear appeals 
created unique passwords, compared with only 4.5% of those who did not  
135 university 
students  
2 study groups 
Vance et 










Purpose: Examine if fear appeals can improve password strength and 
effectiveness of interactive fear appeals 
Strategy: Used Fear Appeals to manipulate perceived severity and 
vulnerability, self-efficacy, response efficacy 
Findings: Fear appeals have an impact on password strength. Further, 
those who received interactive fear appeals created significantly stronger 
passwords 
354 web users from 
65 countries 










Intentions Purpose: Investigate if fear appeals do influence user intentions to comply 
with recommended security measures 
Strategy: Used Fear Appeals to manipulate perceived severity and 
vulnerability, self-efficacy, response efficacy 
Findings: Fear appeals successfully elicited change in perceptions that 
ultimately influenced intentions to apply anti-spyware security measures.   
275 university staff 
and students 
3 study groups 
Herath et 





Intentions Purpose: Examines factors that drive users to use an email authentication 
service, after a 2 month trial period 
186 at time1; 134 at 














Purpose of study and key findings related to PMT variables Sample (valid) 
TAM service; online 
email services 
Strategy: Provided a 2 month training 
Findings: User intention to adopt email authentication service is predicted 
by email-related risk perceptions, self-efficacy and attitudes towards the 
email service 
Undergraduates 















Intentions Purpose: Investigate ways to motivate internet users to take personal 
responsibility and take internet safely measures 
Strategy: Used persuasive messages to manipulate personal responsibility 
Findings: Personal responsibility, response efficacy and self-efficacy were 
found to be the best predictors of online security behavior 
206 students 
4 study groups 
Correlational studies 
Crossler et 
al. (2014)  







coded as 1/0 
binary) 
Purpose: Investigate factors that influence employees’ decisions to comply 
with BYOD policies 
Findings: Only self-efficacy and response efficacy had a significant impact 
on intentions.  
250, accounting and 
non-accounting 










Purpose: Examine factors that drive users to back up data on their own 
personal computers 
Findings: response efficacy and self-efficacy increases the frequency of 
data backups. Interestingly, perceived severity and perceived vulnerability 
were found to have a negative impact on intentions. 
112,  small business 
employees, 
graduate students 














Purpose: To explain factors that motivate users to secure their own 
computers and the internet at their home. 
Findings: Concern for security threats, response efficacy and self-efficacy 
influences attitude towards security measures. Favorable attitude towards 
security measures increase adoption intentions 








Intentions Purpose: Examine factors that influence IS security compliance and the 
role of habit in shaping these factors. Habit is based on PMT's assumption 
210 participants 














Purpose of study and key findings related to PMT variables Sample (valid) 




that prior experience is an antecedent to threat and coping appraisals  
Findings: Prior habit was found to be influence all threat and coping 
appraisal factors. All hypothesized relationships were supported with the 















Purpose: Develop an integrated theory to explain adherence to 
information security policies 
Findings: Perceived severity, perceive vulnerability and self-efficacy are 
associated with compliance intentions. The link between intentions and 
actual compliance was very highly correlated. 

















Purpose: Proposed an integrated model for explaining factors that drive 
employee to follow security policies.  
Findings: Threat appraisal, operationalized as a single construct consisting 
of perceived severity and vulnerability items, intentions to comply. Self-
efficacy also plays a significant role 














Purpose: To test a previously developed PMT based TTAT model, a 
framework for testing avoidance of malicious technology.  
Findings: Perceived threat is a function of both perceived severity and 
perceived vulnerability. Perceived threat has positive impact on 
motivation. No direct link between perceived severity and perceived 
vulnerability and motivation, but their effect is mediated by perceived 
threat. Coping appraisals play a significant role on motivation. 
152 business 
students from a 
major US university 
Woon et al. 
(2005) 








Purpose: Use PMT to examine factors that predict adoption of wireless 
security measures on home computers 
Findings: Their study found support for all hypothesized direct 
relationships except for the relationship between perceived vulnerability 
and adaption of recommended behavior. 
189 home computer 
users who own a 
wireless network at 
their home, 








Intentions Purpose: Investigate factors influencing intentions to comply with 
organizational IS security policies 















Purpose of study and key findings related to PMT variables Sample (valid) 
organizational Findings: All PMT variables with the exception of response cost had a 
significant impact on intentions. However, perceived severity had a 
significant but negative impact on intentions. Contrary to numerous other 













Purpose: Conduct a field study of employee intentions to comply with 
security policies. Similar to Woon et al. (2005), proposes no direct link 
between threat severity and threat probability to intentions. Proposes that 
attitudes mediate the effects of threat concern, self-efficacy, Response 
efficacy and response cost on intentions 
Findings: Threat concern is a function of threat severity and threat 
probability. Although threat concern, self-efficacy, response efficacy and 
response cost all had a significant impact on attitudes towards 
organizational security policy, attitude has no direct impact on intentions. 
312 participants 
from 78 
organizations in the 
western areas of 














Purpose: Investigate factors that influence SMB executives’ decision to 
adopt anti-malware software. Also examines if those in IT intensive 
industries differ from those in non-IT intensive industry 
Findings: All PMT variables that is threat appraisal and coping appraisal 
factors play a significant role in SMB executives’ decision to adopt anti-
malware software. However, effect of perceived vulnerability was weak. IS 
experts are influenced more by threat appraisal, while non-IS experts are 
influenced by coping appraisal.  
























computer logs of 
e.g. password 
changes etc.) 
Purpose: Test a proposed, PMT based, Threat Control model. To explain 
why users, who are familiar with IS security policies, choose to omit 
security precautions. Proposes a cost/benefit measure of response cost. 
Findings: Higher levels of perceived severity and vulnerability, self-efficacy 
and response efficacy significantly reduce the likelihood of non-compliance 
with security recommendations. Those who perceive that the benefits 
associated with compliance outweigh the cost are also less likely to ignore 
security recommendations 
To recruit those who 
are familiar with IS 
security policies, 

















Purpose of study and key findings related to PMT variables Sample (valid) 














Purpose: Investigate factors that motivate insiders (employees) to protect 
their organization's information assets. Also, proposes fear as a predictor 
of protection motivation in an organizational setting. 
Findings: Intrinsic rewards and coping appraisals significantly influence 
insiders’ protection motivation. Response efficacy is the strongest 
predictor. Coping appraisal is a better predictor than threat appraisals. 
Fear is a function of perceived severity and perceived vulnerability, but has 
no significant influence on employees' decision to protect their 
organization's information assets. 
380 insiders from 
various 
organizations and 
industries in the US 
















Purpose: Examine factors that drive online consumer to take action that 
either put them at risk or action that protects their information. In 
particular, the degree to which threat perceptions and self-efficacy 
contribute to online consumers' Internet security practices. 
Findings: Risky behavior was not impacted by perception of online threat 
or perceived likelihood of online threats. Protective behavior was not 
impacted by perceived likelihood of online threats, though the effect was 
reported as weak at p<0.1. Self-efficacy did decrease the likelihood of risky 
behavior and also had a positive impact on protective behavior.  
449 online shoppers 





PMT Intentions to use 
strong password; 
variety of online 
accounts 
(e.g. email, social 
networking 
accounts) 
Intentions Purpose: To test a PMT based model adapted to explaining online 
password security. Self-efficacy was excluded from the model 
Findings: Coping appraisal factors, response efficacy and response cost 
were found to have a significant impact on intentions. Fear, also has a 
significant impact on intentions to create strong passwords.  
182 students from 
three universities in 
southern US 
PMT = Protection Motivation Theory; TTAT = Technology Threat Avoidance Theory; TAM = Technology Acceptance Model; SCT = Social Cognitive Theory ; ELM = Elaboration 
Likelihood Model; TPB = Theory of Planned Behavior; CET = Cognitive Evaluation Theory; GDT = General Deterrence Theory; IDF = Innovation Diffusion Theory; DT = 




   
In several experimental studies (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010a; Vance et al., 2013), PMT is shown to be useful in designing IS security fear 
appeals communication. These studies have also shown how persuasive 
communication can be mapped into a security awareness communication by targeting 
specific IS threat perceptions and efficacy perceptions, and found fear appeals to be 
effective in enhancing security practices. However, theory based IS security training 
research is limited (Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). Therefore, this research should 
contribute to a growing but much needed body theory grounded work on the efficacy 
of fear appeals in IS security research.  
The applications of the PMT model in IS security research, can also be categorized as 
either experimental or correlational, with most studies being of a correlational design 
(see Table 2.1). The following section is therefore divided into two major sections. 
Section 2.3.4.1, reviews experimental studies involving a direct manipulation of all or 
part of the key PMT variables. Section 2.3.4.2, focuses primarily on correlational 
studies involving part or all of the key variables described in the PMT model. 
2.3.4.1 Experimental studies 
According to Rogers (1983), for persuasive communication to be effective, all four key 
components must be addressed in a fear appeals message. While only a few IS security 
applications of PMT have used an experimental design, only Johnston and Warkentin 
(2010a), one of the works that has influenced this research, used fear appeals directed 
at all four key variables. Further, although the research by Herath et al. (2014) and 
LaRose et al. (2008) are experimental studies (see Table 2.1), they were omitted in this 
review as they are unrelated to PMT based fear appeals. For example, the study by 
LaRose et al. (2008) used persuasive messages with emphasis on personal 
responsibility, as described in the Social Cognitive Theory, while the study by Herath 
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et al. (2014) did not involve any group treatments or manipulation of the PMT 
variables. While the literature on fear appeals in IS security is lacking, as evidenced by 
the PMT studies summarized in Table 2.1, some evidence support their applicability in 
IS security training and their effectiveness in improving compliance with security 
recommendation. 
Jenkins et al. (2013), for example, examined if fear appeals could be used to improve 
password security using messages intended to dissuade users from reusing passwords. 
They asked 135 participants to create an account and a password of their choice on a 
website designed specifically for their study. The participants were then required to 
create a new password, with some randomly assigned to a treatment group with fear 
appeals set to appear on the screen as they typed their new passwords. They designed 
an algorithm to detect reused password and triggers a fear appeals message, warning 
the participants against reusing passwords. Targeting perceived severity and 
vulnerability, the message warned of the high risk of hacking. The message also 
provided a recommendation to choose a unique password as a way of protecting their 
account, hence targeting response efficacy. Interestingly, the message excluded self-
efficacy statements, such as suggesting how to create multiple passwords that are 
unique, strong and easy to remember. This was a critical omission as users are 
typically expected to create passwords for other websites (Helkala & Svendsen, 2012), 
and as noted by Jenkins et al. (2013) was a limitation in their study.  
Nevertheless, their results revealed that 88% of those who received fear appeals 
created unique passwords, compared with only 4.5% of those who did not. They also 
examined the effects of fear appeals on perceptions about severity, vulnerability, 
response efficacy and self-efficacy. Considering that the fear appeals message omitted 
the self-efficacy component, it is unsurprising that the fear appeals messages had no 
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impact on the participants’ self-efficacy. Jenkins et al. (2013) suggest that adding 
statements about techniques for creating unique passwords would have possibly 
influenced self-efficacy. Thus, although they successfully thwarted attempts to reuse 
passwords by significantly decreasing the potential numbers of reused passwords, it is 
unclear if this outcome would apply in other websites. 
In addition, their study omitted a measure of password strength, which as Jenkins et al. 
(2013) indicated, was another notable limitation in their study where the effects of fear 
appeals on password strength are unknown. Conversely, in another experimental study 
by Vance et al. (2013), which included measures of password strength, fear appeals 
were shown to have an impact on password strength. In their study, they also 
investigated whether the effectiveness of fear appeals differed when presented as 
interactive messages or as static messages. They randomly assigned 354 web users 
from 65 countries to a control group that received only a password strength meter and 
two treatment groups, one which received interactive and another which received static 
fear appeals. While, the group that received interactive fear appeals created 
significantly stronger passwords, the results showed no difference in password strength 
between the group that received static fear appeals and the control group. This suggests 
that the interactive fear appeals were significantly more effective than the static fear 
appeal messages.  
This finding contradicts the position of Jenkins, Durcikova, and Burns (2012) that 
static IS security training can significantly improve password practices. They 
conducted a study to compare the effectiveness of media rich training materials 
containing a narrated video, and the efficacy of static training materials. The static 
training materials had a significant impact on password practices. One advantage of 
using static training materials, as Jenkins, Durcikova, and Burns (2012) suggest, is that 
 
43 
   
they do not cognitively overload the user. As persuasive communication is already 
initiating a process of cognitive assessment of the information at hand (Rogers, 1983), 
it would seem more logical to use static training material.  
A notable omission in the study by Vance et al. (2013), is they failed to indicate if the 
fear appeal messages had any impact on the individual PMT variables. Although the 
study also aimed to manipulate the four key PMT variables using fear appeals, there 
seems to be no explanation of the effects of the fear appeals on the levels of threat 
severity, vulnerability, response efficacy and self-efficacy perceptions. This 
information, as alluded in Roger’s (1983) reference to the importance of manipulating 
all four key components of fear appeals, may have been useful in identifying what 
component of the static fear appeals was problematic.  
 Johnston and Warkentin (2010a) provided empirical data from 275 university staff 
and students supporting the use of fear appeals, in static format. They supplied fear 
appeals to users who were largely responsible for applying security measures on their 
university computers, and examined if the fear appeals messages would influence their 
severity and vulnerability perceptions, response efficacy and self-efficacy perceptions, 
and explored the effect on security practices. The fear appeals contained information 
on: the potential consequences of spyware, such as identity theft; statistics alluding to a 
prevalence of spyware threats; statements supporting the effectiveness of anti-spyware 
software; and information regarding the effort needed install the software thus 
pertaining to the efficacy of the participants. They found that fear appeals can elicit 
change in perceptions and intentions to apply anti-spyware security measures.   
Though the evidence is limited, the studies reviewed in this section provide some 
experimental evidence supporting the use of fear appeals within the IS security 
domain. However, the drawback is that the available evidence supports only the 
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immediate effects of the fear appeals, while the long-term effects are unknown. As 
such, future research should explore the extent to which the effects of fear appeals 
persist. In fact, as Shepherd, Mejias, and Klein (2014) show the effects of persuasive 
communication can decline over time, particularly when mild messages are used.  
A longitudinal study by  Shepherd et al. (2014), where a form of persuasive 
communication was used in an attempt to reduce Internet abuse by employees, 
revealed that when mild acceptable use policies (AUP) messages were used, the effects 
were maintained for a brief period of time. Their study also examined the effectiveness 
of more severe deterrence theory-based AUP messages that emphasized the severity of 
sanctions. The severe AUP messages were more effective over a longer period 
compared with the mild AUP messages. While their study used a different theoretical 
approach from the research proposed in this thesis, the findings indicate that while 
persuasive communication can be effective, a follow-up study can provide further 
insight into the effectiveness of these messages in the long term.   
Based on the findings in the studies reviewed in this section, static fear appeals were 
used in this study and as proposed by Rogers (1983), all four key PMT variable were 
manipulated. Furthermore, to address the research question relating to whether the 
effects of fear appeals are long term, a follow-up study was conducted. 
2.3.4.2 Correlational studies 
This section reviews correlational studies involving either part or all of the key 
variables described in the PMT model. Overall, the review revealed a consensus that 
perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, response efficacy, response cost and self-
efficacy play a significant role in security behavior. However, the literature suggests 
no consensus on the exact relationship between these factors and behavioral intentions. 
Further, two distinct viewpoints were revealed. The first considers attitude as a 
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mediating role in the relationship between these factors and behavioral intentions. The 
second and most commonly agreed upon viewpoint is that these factors have a direct 
influence on behavioral intentions.  
According to Anderson and Agarwal (2010) and Herath and Rao (2009), users’ 
decision to apply security measures is dependent upon whether they have a favorable 
or unfavorable attitude towards the security measure, thus attitudes play a key role. 
Based on PMT and TPB, the study conducted by Anderson and Agarwal (2010) 
examined factors that motivate users to secure their home computing environment. 
Results from 594 home computer users suggest, attitude is the immediate predictor of 
security behavior. As proposed by TPB, their study also found that users develop their 
attitudes from their perceptions about security threats, effectiveness of security 
measures and self-efficacy. However, their proposition differed from PMT’s view that 
these perceptions have a direct influence on behavioral intentions. 
Similarly, results from a survey of 312 employees from 78 organizations conducted by 
Herath and Rao (2009) show a link between attitudes towards organizational security 
policy, and threat and efficacy perception. Yet, contrary to Anderson and Agarwal 
(2010), attitude was found to have no direct impact on compliance intentions. 
Interestingly, self-efficacy also had a direct impact on compliance intentions, 
suggesting that a direct link may have provided better insights into the role of the PMT 
variables on intentions. Given the inconsistent findings and the limited evidence 
supporting this viewpoint, the purported mediational role of attitudes was not 
considered in this study.  
The prevailing view is that threat appraisal and coping appraisal factors have an 
independent and direct impact on users’ IS security behavioral intentions. However, 
the interpretation of the PMT model, particularly on the structure of the threat 
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appraisal component, varies greatly from study to study. This makes comparing results 
across studies a challenging task. For example, Siponen et al. (2010) views threat 
appraisal factors as a single independent variable, while some (e.g., Liang & Xue, 
2010; Posey et al., 2011) propose that fear is a function of perceived severity and 
perceived vulnerability, although Liang and Xue’s (2010) position on the role of 
perceived severity and vulnerability differs from that of Posey et al. (2011).  
Siponen et al. (2010), who based their research model on PMT, General Deterrence 
Theory, TRA and Innovation Diffusion Theory proposed an integrated model to 
explain factors that drive users to follow security policies within an organizational 
setting. They conceptualized threat appraisal as a single construct, measured using 
items related to both severity (e.g., “security breach would be a serious problem”) and 
vulnerability to threats (e.g., “I could be subjected to a serious security threat”). One 
limitation with this approach is that an individual may perceive a threat as severe, yet 
not necessarily feel that the threat is imminent (Liang & Xue, 2010). In fact, following 
a field survey of 917 employees from several Finnish organizations Siponen et al. 
(2010) found threat appraisal to have a significant but weak impact on the employees’ 
compliance intentions. Thus, the study proposed in this research considered perceived 
severity and perceived vulnerability as two independent constructs. 
The nature of the association between fear and behavioral change is somewhat unclear. 
It is of interest to note that some studies represent the variable fear as perceived threat. 
For example Liang and Xue (2010) described their variable as perceived threat, 
however the items that describe the concept of fear of threat as described in PMT. 
Therefore, in this review, the term fear is synonymous with perceived threat.  
Fear is excluded from the original PMT model as a key construct, however given that 
the revised PMT (Rogers, 1983) and works such as that of Witte (1992) sought to 
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redefine the role of fear, suggests that fear should be explored. As proposed in PMT, 
some available evidence (e.g., Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; 
Witte, 1994)  suggests that fear has an indirect impact on behavior. However results 
from IS security research, though limited, reveal some inconsistencies. For example, 
some findings (e.g., Liang & Xue, 2010; Zhang & McDowell, 2009) suggest a direct 
link between fear and IS security behavior, while results from studies such as that of 
Posey et al. (2011) show no such link.  
To investigate users’ motivation to avoid malicious technology, and test their 
previously proposed PMT based Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) (Liang & Xue, 
2009), Liang and Xue (2010) hypothesized that of the three threat appraisal factors, 
only perceived threat, described in their study as the feeling of being threatened, would 
have a direct impact on behavior. They proposed that the effects of perceived severity 
and perceived vulnerability on protection motivation are indirect. Using a sample of 
152 university business students, they found no direct links found between perceived 
severity, perceived vulnerability and security behavior. This finding is in contrast to 
the PMT, which proposes that perceived threat (fear) has an indirect influence on 
intentions, while perceived severity and perceived vulnerability have a direct impact 
on intentions. Interestingly, results from a study by Zhang and McDowell (2009) 
investigating factors that motivate users to apply online password protection, also 
contradict PMT’s position. Their survey of 182 students from a univerity in the United 
States found no direct link between perceived severity and perceived vulnerability and 
password practices. Yet, their study found that fear had a direct positive impact on 
motivation to implement online password protection. 
A notable similarity between the two studies, in addition to the direct link found 
between fear and behavior, is that both studies examined behaviors related to personal 
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protection. Interestingly, the only other study that explicitly incorporated fear in their 
model was in an organizational setting, and found no link between fear and security 
behavior. This was a survey of 380 employees from various organizations and 
industries in the US in which fear was found to have no significant impact on 
intentions to protect the organizations’ information assets (Posey et al., 2011). Posey et 
al. (2011) suggested these findings may possibly be an indication that fear is a 
predictor of intentions, but only in the context of personal protection. While the 
available evidence is limited, this rationale is consistent with the results in the studies 
by Zhang and McDowell (2009)  and Liang and Xue (2010), and corroborates the 
findings by Adams and Sasse (1999) whose study revealed that users worry more 
about their personal information as opposed to others’ or an organization’s.  
Given the limited number of studies explaining fear arousal, it is clear that the role of 
fear arousal has been largely overlooked in the IS security literature. Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010a) indicated that discounting the role of fear in their study may have 
impacted the predictive ability of their proposed model, and thus suggested that more 
research into how propensity to fear may impact security practices. Therefore, to 
provide further insight into the role of fear, particularly in the context of personal 
password security, fear was considered a key variable in this study. 
In contrast to the view that perceived severity and perceived vulnerability indirectly 
affect compliance intentions, most researchers propose a direct link between threat 
appraisal factors and IS security behavioral intention, and also a direct path between 
coping appraisal factors and security behavior. While support for the role of coping 
appraisal has been relatively consistent, the findings concerning the threat appraisal 
component, particularly on the role of perceived vulnerability are not universal. 
However, the available results supporting the direct impact of threat appraisal factors 
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appear to be more consistent in the context of organizational protection than in the 
context of personal protection.  
For example, Lee and Larsen (2009) who investigated factors that influence small and 
midsize business (SMB) executives’ adoption of anti-malware software found support 
for all hypothesized relationships in their model which was based on PMT and TAM 
(Davis, 1989). However, their results revealed only a weak relationship between 
perceived vulnerability and adoption intentions. Similarly, results from Workman et al. 
(2008) who investigated why users with considerable security knowledge would ignore 
security recommendations, also found support for all hypothesized relationships. Using 
a Threat Control model based on PMT and data from a field study of 588 employees 
from several technology oriented organizations, all key PMT variables (perceived 
severity of threats and vulnerability, and self-efficacy, response efficacy and response 
cost) were found to have a significant and direct impact on compliance with security 
policies.  
While support for coping appraisal has mostly been consistent, the results reported by 
Siponen et al. (2014) are somewhat atypical, where threat appraisal was shown to be a 
better predictor of behavior than coping appraisal. In their study, an integrated model 
drawn from PMT, TRA and the Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) (Ryan, 1982), was 
proposed to explain employee adherence to security policies. Data from a field survey 
of 669 employees from four organizations in Finland support the hypothesized 
relationships between perceived severity, perceive vulnerability, self-efficacy and 
compliance intentions. Response efficacy was however unrelated to compliance 
intentions, while self-efficacy was found to be a weak predictor of intentions to 
comply with organizational security policies.  
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Similar to Siponen et al. (2014), Ifinedo (2012) also provides some support for the role 
of threat appraisal, but mixed support for coping appraisal factors. Using an integrated 
model based on PMT and TPB to explain compliance with organizational IS security 
policies, and a sample of 124 IS professionals and business managers, his study found 
support for the roles of all PMT variables with the exception of perceived severity and 
response cost. Consistent with the results reported by Siponen et al. (2014), self-
efficacy was found to have the weakest influence on intentions. However, this is 
contrary to numerous other studies (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Woon et al., 2005) and 
meta-analytic findings (e.g., Floyd et al., 2000; Milne & Milne, 2000) that suggest that 
self-efficacy may be the most robust predictor of protection behavior. 
Based on the results in these studies (e.g., Ifinedo, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Siponen 
et al., 2014; Workman et al., 2008), the role of threat appraisal in influencing IS 
security behavior has received some support. Yet, other applications of PMT (e.g., 
Crossler et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2011; Vance et al., 2012) represent a growing 
number of PMT related IS security studies that have found no direct link between 
threat appraisal factors and compliance with security policies. For example, Vance et 
al. (2012) found no association beteen perceived vulnerability and employee intentions 
to comply with IS security policies. They proposed an integrated PMT model with 
Habit Theory (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003), describing habit as routine behavior or an 
action an individual is accustomed to performing. Results from 210 employees of a 
municipality in Finland, suggest that habit influences all PMT variables including 
perceived vulnerability. However, the results supported all hypothesized relationships 
except a direct link between perceived vulnerability and compliance intentions. 
Although habit influences perceived vulnerability, the employees’ perceptions of the 




   
Following this trend, Crossler et al. (2014) also reported mixed findings on the 
relationship between perceived severity, perceived vulnerability and intentions to 
comply with Bring your own Device (BYOD) policies in an organizational setting. 
They proposed that compliance with BYOD policy would differ between non-
accounting and accounting professionals who handle sensitive information and 
examined if the model operates different between the two groups of participant. While 
the results related to coping appraisal factors were consistent for both groups, the 
results related to threat appraisal factors differed between the two groups. Self-efficacy 
and response efficacy influenced compliance in both groups. Perceived severity was 
significant but only for accountants, suggesting that those in industries that deal with 
sensitive information are likely to be more sensitive to threats against data security 
hence more likely to comply with BYOD policies (Crossler et al., 2014). However, for 
either group perceived vulnerability did not influence their decision to comply 
regardless of whether the individuals are aware of security threats or not.  
Overall, the finding on the effects of self-efficacy, response efficacy and response cost 
on IS security behavior, have been consistent, with fewer studies finding weak or no 
support compared with support for threat appraisal factors.  
In the context of organizational security, perceived vulnerability has received some 
support. However, in the context of personal protection, the findings appear to be more 
conclusive, albeit contrary to Roger’s (1975, 1983) position that perceived 
vulnerability has a direct influence on behavioral intentions. All studies reviewed (i.e., 
Crossler, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010; Milne et al., 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & 
McDowell, 2009), found no support for a direct relationship between threat 
vulnerability and intentions, in the context of personal protection. Weinstein (1984) 
has argued that people have an unrealistically low perception about their susceptibility 
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to threats, and that this intrinsically reduced perceived vulnerability may have a 
negative effect on preventative behaviors. As users tend to think that a hacker would 
not target their data (Sasse et al., 2001), it is unsurprising that many studies have failed 
to show that perceived vulnerability explains personal protection (in Crossler, 2010; 
Liang & Xue, 2010; Milne et al., 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009). 
Interestingly, users do perceive their data as important to them (Adams & Sasse, 
1999), just not important enough to others as shown by Sasse et al. (2001). Thus it is 
expected that in the context of personal protection perceived severity has received 
more support than perceived vulnerability such as in the study by Woon et al. (2005), 
who investigated factors that influence users’ decision to apply wireless security 
features on their home computers. In a survey of 189 home computer users who own a 
wireless network at their home, their study found support for all proposed relationships 
except the relationship between perceived vulnerability and intentions to implement 
wireless security measures. Consistent with Weinstein (1984), Woon et al. (2005) also 
observed that the participants in their study did not believe that they were vulnerable to 
security threats prompting a suggestion that communicating to users about the severity 
of a security threat may be more effective than educating them about the probability of 
experiencing a computer attack.  
Another study by Milne et al. (2009) also adds to the mixed findings on the role of 
threat perceptions in IS security practices. They examined factors that affect adaptive 
behaviors, where adaptive relates to taking security action, while they also examined 
factors that lead to maladaptive behavior such as avoiding online shopping altogether. 
Following a survey of 449 online shoppers from the US, their study found that 
perceived online threats had no impact on shoppers’ security practices, but were more 
likely to lead users to skip online shopping all together. Their study also found that 
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perception of online threats and perceived vulnerability had no impact on behaviors, 
and that users were more likely to perform risky Internet practices such as saving 
passwords on a browser regardless of perceived threats or their perceived vulnerability.  
Adding to the number of studies that have found no support for perceived vulnerability 
in predicting IS related behavior, is a study by Crossler (2010) who examined factors 
that motivate users to back up their personal data. With a sample size of 112 
participants consisting of employees from small businesses, graduate students and 
private citizens, the study found self-efficacy and response efficacy to be significant 
motivating factors in users’ decision to back up their personal data. The results found 
no evidence supporting direct relationships between perceived severity and perceived 
vulnerability, and users’ intentions to back up their information.  
Like Crossler (2010), Zhang and McDowell (2009), also found no support for the role 
of either perceived severity and perceived vulnerability in explaining IS security 
behavioral intentions. Zhang and McDowell (2009) examined factors that influence 
user intention to use strong passwords on personal online web accounts. Results from 
182 university students from the United States revealed that there was no relationship 
between either perceived severity or perceived vulnerability and user intention to 
protect their personal online web account. 
Given that the research proposed in this study is in the context of personal protection, 
and following the overwhelming results pointing to a non-significant relationship 
between perceived vulnerability and personal protection motivation, finding more 
insight into the link between perceived vulnerability and IS security behavioral 
intentions is particularly important in this study. 
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2.4 Password security literature 
With the ubiquity of online services that require password authentication and reliance 
on emails or social media as a personal and organizational communication, users face 
several password related challenges. Firstly, the existing online password guidelines 
vary greatly from website to website (Bonneau & Preibusch, 2010; Florêncio & 
Herley, 2010), which has made it difficult to determine the ideal minimum password 
strength (Egelman et al., 2013). Another challenge relates to the number of accounts 
users manage on a daily basis, which has also been associated with poor security 
practices such as reusing passwords across different websites (Adams & Sasse, 1999; 
Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010). Lastly, and perhaps the most 
important contributor of poor password practices (Yan et al., 2004; Zviran & Haga, 
1999), is that users struggle to remember passwords.  
The following section reviews literature pertaining to these challenges and how they 
relate to this study. 
 The existing password guidelines problem 2.4.1
Aimed at providing some control over password quality and password behavior 
(Florêncio & Herley, 2010), password guidelines are typically presented as a set of 
rules pertaining to password quality such as minimum allowable password length, 
character composition, or restrictions on behavior such as reusing passwords. Online 
password guidelines occasionally come with an additional feedback mechanism such 
as a password strength meter designed to visually guide users to create stronger 
passwords (Egelman et al., 2013; Ur et al., 2012). However, password guidelines have 
little impact on password strength (Florêncio & Herley, 2010; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; 
Ur et al., 2012; Yan et al., 2004).  
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The existing password guidelines have two notable problems. Table 2.2 summarizes 
password guidelines used on the 20 websites in the US as reported by quantcast.com. 
The table also reveals a wide variation as to what the ideal minimum password length 
or character composition is, which as Bonneau and Preibusch (2010) suggest, can 
inadvertently impede security, particularly that of high security websites. Bonneau and 
Preibusch (2010) also found that websites with less restrictive password requirements 
lead users to choose weak passwords. Given that users have a tendency to reuse 
passwords across websites (Ives et al., 2004; Jenkins et al., 2013), this may 
inadvertently compromise the security of high-security websites.  
Secondly, it appears likely that password guidelines alone are ineffective in persuading 
users to create strong passwords or to comply with the recommended guidelines (Vu et 
al., 2007; Yan et al., 2004). Straub and Welke (1998) argues that deterrent measures 
such as information security guidelines do not have an active role in influencing a user 
to comply. However, strategies such as incorporating techniques for creating strong 
memorable passwords (Helkala & Svendsen, 2012; Vu et al., 2007; Yan et al., 2004), 
or persuasive messages (Jenkins et al., 2013), have been shown to be more effective in 
deterring users from insecure password practices.  
Furthermore, the results of studies on the effectiveness of password strength meters 
have been mixed, with some showing mixed results (Ur et al., 2012), minimal effect 
(Egelman et al., 2013), or no effect (Vance et al., 2013) on password quality, whereas 
active strategies such as mnemonic training and persuasive communication have found 
more consistent support (e.g., Hampstead et al., 2012; Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010a; Kuo, Romanosky, & Cranor, 2006; Nelson & Kim-Phuong, 2009; 
Vance et al., 2013; Yan et al., 2004). 
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Table 2.2: Existing recommendation on password selection varies as follows 
Existing password guidelines for commonly used websites  
Top 20* Ranked Websites in the US 
Web service Min length Min Char type Password†: 23549988 Feedback Password†: Communication Feedback 
Google** 8 1 Accepted Strong Accepted Fair 
Facebook 6 1 Accepted Medium Accepted Medium 
Microsoft** 8 2 Rejected Must contain all character types Accepted  NA 
Twitter  6 1 Accepted Could be more secure Accepted Password is ok 
Yahoo!** 8 3 Rejected Must contain uppercase Rejected Must contain a number 
Amazon 6 1 Accepted NA Accepted NA 
Yelp 6 1 Accepted NA Accepted NA 
eBay 6 2 Rejected Invalid Accepted Weak 
Buzzfeed 6 1 Accepted NA Accepted NA 
Pinterest 6 1 Accepted NA Accepted NA 
LinkedIn 6 1 Accepted Weak Accepted fair 
Wikipedia 1 1 Accepted NA Accepted NA 
CraigsList 8 2 Rejected Must contain two character types Accepted NA 
Playbuzz 1 1 Accepted NA Accepted NA 
PayPal 8 3 Rejected Weak Rejected Weak 
Adobe*** 6 1 Accepted NA Accepted NA 
AOL 6 1 Accepted Weak  Accepted Strong 
Weather 6 1 Accepted NA Accepted NA 
ASK*** 6 1 Accepted NA Accepted NA 
Norton*** 6 1 Accepted Weak Accepted Strong 
†The passwords were arbitrarily selected for demonstration only;*Ranking as of July-31-2014 as reported by www.quantcast.com;**Also used to access email and other 
services; ***The password '123456' was also accepted; Min length = minimum allowed number of characters; Min char = minimum number of character type actually enforced;  
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 The password strength problem 2.4.2
As Table 2.2 illustrates, the consensus on what constitutes acceptable minimum 
password strength remains unclear. For example, Google.com considers the password 
‘23549988’ as strong, yet PayPal.com considered the same password as weak. 
Likewise, Yahoo.com rejected the password ‘Communication’ while Norton.com 
considers the same password as strong. Surprisingly, websites such as Amazon.com 
and Norton accept 123456 as a valid password. Without a clear definition of password 
strength, improving password security will remain a challenge (Mazurek et al., 2013). 
The literature (e.g., McDowell, Rafail, & Hernan, 2009; Scarfone & Souppaya, 2009; 
Tipton & Hernandez, 2009; Weir et al., 2010; Yan et al., 2004) seems to agree that a 
strong password is lengthy; contains a combination of numbers, upper and lower case 
letters, and symbols; and is free of dictionary words, common name or personal 
information. However, the precise definition of password strength is still elusive 
(Dell'Amico et al., 2010; Egelman et al., 2013).  
Further, studies analyzing password strength seem to follow one of two techniques, 
which may also help clarify what the ideal password strength is. The first technique 
involves password cracking tools (Cazier & Medlin, 2006; Mazurek et al., 2013; 
Stone-Gross et al., 2009; Vu et al., 2007; Weber et al., 2008) while the second 
technique employs an entropy calculation, which estimates password unpredictability 
usually measured in bits (e.g., Burr, Dodson, & Polk, 2006; Egelman et al., 2013; 
Florêncio & Herley, 2007; Komanduri et al., 2011). These approaches differ, entropy 
calculations determines password strength by its length and character variation only 
(Burr et al., 2013; Egelman et al., 2013), whereas password cracking tools consider the 
length, character variation and information contained in a password such as dictionary 
words. While entropy calculations overlook dictionary words, entropy computations 
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consider character unpredictability a key determinant of the overall guessability of a 
password. Therefore, in both approaches password strength is a function of length, 
character variation and unpredictability of a password, which corroborates the general 
definition of a strong password.  
Interestingly, it appears that users are capable of maintaining a higher than minimum 
required password length (Shay et al., 2010), however they struggle with the use of 
character variations and the type of information contained within their passwords is 
generally predictable (Bonneau, 2012; Burr et al., 2013; Pham et al., 2011). For 
example, as reported by Cazier and Medlin (2006) in their analysis of passwords used 
on an e-commerce website, the average password length was between 7 and 8 
characters long, yet less than 2% of these passwords contained special characters. 
Using a dictionary attack, they were able to crack 90% of the passwords in less than a 
minute. Likewise, Calin (2009) who performed a statistical analysis on 10,000 leaked 
Hotmail passwords, found that even without enforcement, 69% of the passwords were 
between 6 and 9 characters. Yet, as the results showed, the top 20 most commonly 
used passwords contained names, sequential numbers and dictionary words, making 
them vulnerable to dictionary attacks. 
 The password reuse problem 2.4.3
Concerning password length, users are inclined use relatively long passwords. 
However, as studies have shown, the real challenge is using strong passwords, which is 
expected given that on average users manage anywhere between 6 (Grawemeyer & 
Johnson, 2011) to 7 (Florêncio & Herley, 2007) distinct passwords in a given day. 
Unfortunately, users are unable to deal with multiple passwords and thus resort to 
weak passwords (Adams & Sasse, 1999), or reuse passwords across websites (Ives et 
al., 2004). Password reuse can compromise the security of even the most secure 
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systems (Jenkins et al., 2013). Hackers could take advantage of low-security websites 
with less restrictive password requirements, where users are inclined to use weak 
passwords, to access high-security websites (Ives et al., 2004; Jenkins et al., 2013). A 
compromised low-security website, such as a personal web account, can perpetuate 
security threats to individuals and even to organizations (Furnell, 2007; Ives et al., 
2004; Winkler, 2009).  
Personal web accounts usually contain personal information such as names, contact 
details, and occasionally more sensitive information such as date of birth, bank or even 
health-related sensitive information (Beckjord et al., 2007). Thus on the surface, a 
compromised personal account appears to be harmful to personal information leading 
to threats such as identity theft (Jenkins et al., 2013). However, organizations are also 
likely to bear the consequences of an attack on a personal user (Furnell et al., 2007; 
Ives et al., 2004). A notable case (Winkler, 2009), involving an administration assistant 
at Twitter Inc. and a hacked personal email account, demonstrates the extent to which 
the impact of password reuse extends beyond personal harm. The Twitter employee’s 
personal email account which was hacked through a simple reset technique, contained 
a password that was used on her other sites which subsequently led the hacker to 
successfully guessing the password to Twitter’s corporate Google Apps account 
(Winkler, 2009). While the personal email account was hacked through a dubious 
password reset technique, the password reuse facilitated the domino effect that lead to 
the hacking of the corporate account. While this demonstrates the impact a low-
security website can have on high-security systems, it shows what role password reuse 
can play in compromising security of a seemingly secure system.  
Unfortunately, users have to deal with multiple unique passwords (Florêncio & Herley, 
2007; Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011), in order to maintain access to a large number of 
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websites on a daily basis. This means each unique password is reused,  across an 
average of 4 websites (Florêncio & Herley, 2007). This prevalence of password reuse 
was also evident in a survey of over 400,000 leaked Yahoo Voices passwords which 
were compared with previously leaked passwords from a Sony breach (Hunt, 2012). 
The analysis revealed a whopping 59% of passwords reused between the two websites. 
That trend is consistent with an empirical study by Grawemeyer and Johnson (2011) 
who examined diary entries by participants from two organizations over a 7 day period 
and found that only 40% of the participants used unique passwords, while 50% reused 
their passwords across four authentication systems.   
To deter users from reusing passwords, Ives et al. (2004) proposed incorporating 
policies that limit reuse of passwords across systems. However, Jenkins et al. (2013) 
tested a method that limits password reuse on a single website in combination with 
persuasive communication. Their study involved monitoring keystrokes as a technique 
for detecting password reuse and persuasive communication as a deterrence strategy. 
To detect reuse, they used an algorithm for calculating time between pressing a key 
and releasing a key and then compared the total time value with a second password. 
While keystrokes analysis detected password reuse with a high accuracy (81%), no 
empirical validation of this method exist thus far and the extent to which keystrokes 
analysis is effective in detecting password reuse across several websites is unknown. 
On the other hand, their deterrence strategy using fear appeals showed more promise, 
resulting in 88% of those who received fear appeals creating unique passwords, thus 




    
 The password memorability problem 2.4.4
One of the limitations of the strategy used by Jenkins et al. (2013) to persuade users to 
create unique passwords is that the users were constrained to one specific password 
creating strategy, that is, creating unique passwords. The drawback is that the strategy 
overlooks their ability to actually create and maintain unique passwords beyond the 
one website. As users are expected to create different passwords for different websites 
(Helkala & Svendsen, 2012), constraining users to a specific password creating 
strategy may inadvertently have a negative impact on the overall password quality 
(Adams & Sasse, 1999; Jenkins et al., 2013). Given that one of the reasons users reuse 
passwords is because of their inability to manage and remember multiple strong 
passwords (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Helkala & Svendsen, 2012; Inglesant & Sasse, 
2010), it is important to also incorporate a password creating strategy that addresses 
management of strong passwords that are also easy to remember. 
Password memorability, which relates to the degree to which a user can remember a 
password, has been associated with the number of password users have to remember 
(Florêncio & Herley, 2007; Vu et al., 2007) coupled with the requirement to use strong 
passwords. Ability to remember passwords has been cited as a key challenge in text-
based password usage (Zviran & Haga, 1999). In particular, users struggle to 
remember a series of random characters or strong passwords, an important requirement 
if passwords are to remain unpredictable or uncrackable (Tam, Glassmana, & 
Vandenwauverb, 2009; Yan et al., 2004).  
Users are also faced with another challenge which relates to the type of information a 
human brain has the natural capacity to hold. It is said that the human brain can only 
memorize about five to nine random objects in the short-term (Miller, 1956). Miller’s 
proposition seems to hold in the context of password memorization, where password 
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related studies (e.g., Calin, 2009; Cazier & Medlin, 2006; Weir et al., 2010), show that 
users are able to create passwords that are on average six to nine characters long, yet 
they appear to be unable to create random passwords. Miller further suggests that, for 
the brain to retain information in the long term, the items to be memorized must have 
some meaning to the individual. Therefore, it is expected that the key challenge for 
users is selecting passwords that contain random characters and avoid common words 
(Tam et al., 2009; Yan et al., 2004).  
It is also unsurprising that research shows that password memorability can be 
improved through methods such as mnemonic training where passwords are created 
using meaningful phrases (Helkala & Svendsen, 2012; Vu et al., 2007; Yan et al., 
2004). Furthermore, Yan et al. (2004) suggest that a password can contain some 
meaningful phrases and still be difficult to guess. In their study involving 288 college 
students, Yan et al. (2004), found that random passwords were significantly more 
difficulty to remember which led users to write them down. Passwords containing 
meaningful phrases were significantly easier to remember yet difficult to guess given 
that the method also involves substituting letters with special characters, thus resulting 
in a random string of characters. In addition, only the group that used the meaningful 
phrase strategy included special characters in their passwords. 
Results reported in a smaller scale study by Vu et al. (2007) also provide support for a 
password creating strategy that incorporates some meaningful information to improve 
password memorability while generating passwords that are also difficult to crack. 
Twenty students created password using the first letter of a sentence of their choosing 
but with at least six words, while another twenty used the same method but also 
included special characters and numbers between any letters. They found that 
incorporating special characters and numbers between any letters, results in passwords 
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that are less susceptible to cracking but also memorable. Thus, Vu et al. (2007) 
concluded that without some type of memorability technique, password guidelines 
alone are inadequate. 
Concerning passwords, the overall findings suggest that Internet users face numerous 
challenges related to passwords, from multiple variations of password guidelines and 
password strength requirements, through to having to memorize multiple strong 
passwords. In developing the study materials for the research described in this thesis, 
the user perceptions considered include their perceived effectiveness of password 
guidelines, their judgment about their ability to create strong passwords and the extent 
to which remembering strong passwords impacts their compliance with password 
guidelines.  
2.5 Chapter overview 
This chapter reviewed the literature related to the research questions addressed in this 
study with emphasis on concepts pertaining to security perceptions, and how user 
perceptions of passwords and security threats influence compliance with password 
guidelines. The literature therefore covered research that provides an understanding of 
how these perceptions are formed thus forming the basis for addressing the question of 
whether these perceptions can be altered in order to improve compliance.  
The literature also looked at four competing theories, that is, HBM, SEU, TRA/TPB, 
and PMT, which have been used to explain protective behaviors from a perceived 
threat perspective. The key components and limitations of these frameworks was 
described and however PMT’s behavioral change component was highlighted as a 
benefit of the PMT framework in explaining and changing IS security behavior. In 
particularly its usefulness in experimental research and the ability to map PMT based 
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fear appeals into IS security awareness communication was noted. Yet this review 
revealed a lack of experimental research in the applications of PMT in IS security 
research and that thus far there appears to be no follow-up studies examining if the 
effects of fear appeals used in IS security have a long term effect on security practices. 
This review also revealed that while the most commonly agreed upon view is that 
threat and coping appraisal play a significant role in security behavior, the applications 
of PMT in IS security research particularly on the structure of threat appraisal factors 
vary greatly from study to study. This review draws attention to the need for a 
consensus to improve the predictability of PMT grounded research models and to 
improve the ability to compare results across studies. This review draws particular 
attention to the overwhelming lack of confirmation for a direct link between perceived 
vulnerability and IS behavior and the need for further research into this link. 
The literature related to text based password and the challenges associated with their 
use on online web accounts were described. This review draws attention to the 
challenges users face as a result of password guidelines that vary greatly across the 
Internet and how the existing password guidelines have failed to persuade users to 
create strong passwords. The use of fear appeals in combination with mnemonic 
training has been shown to be effective in improving compliance with password 
guidelines and more importantly improve password strength. However, the question of 




    
3 Research Model and Hypotheses 
3.1 Introduction 
To achieve the objectives described in this thesis, this study considers the role of user 
perceptions about password threats and password efficacy in motivating users to 
comply with password guidelines. This research also aims to provide insight into 
whether these perceptions can be altered to improve compliance with password 
guidelines and if compliance can be maintained over time. This chapter presents the 
research questions addressed in this study and describes the theoretical framework 
from which the research model is based. The hypotheses and proposed research model 
for this study are then presented.  
3.2 Research questions 
To achieve the objectives of this study, two core research questions are addressed in 
the research described in this thesis. 
The first research question is: 
1. How do user perceptions about password threats and password efficacy affect 
compliance with password guidelines? 
Based on Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 
1975, 1983), this research question seeks to examine the role of password threat 
perceptions and efficacy perceptions in compliance with recommended password 
guidelines. In this study, compliance with password guidelines is examined as 




    
The second research question is: 
2. Can these perceptions be altered?  
Literature about the effectiveness of fear appeals or persuasive messages in IS security 
(e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Vance et al., 2013) suggests 
that threat and efficacy perceptions can be altered using fear appeals, to ultimately 
improve security practices. This research seeks to investigate if fear appeals, which 
take the form of password security training in this study, can be effectively used to 
change threat perceptions and efficacy perceptions.  
As a follow-up to the previous question, two subsidiary research questions are asked. 
The first considers whether changing threat and efficacy perceptions can increase the 
likelihood that an individual will comply with password guidelines:  
2a. If so, can altering these perceptions improve compliance with password 
security guidelines?  
This research question seeks to investigate whether the proposed changes in these 
perceptions will have a positive impact on intentions to comply with password 
guidelines and actual compliance. The second subsidiary question explores whether 
any improved compliance with password guidelines is maintained over time:  
2b. Can the effects of altering these perceptions be maintained over time? 
Many previous studies have reported on effects achieved immediately after fear 
appeals have been used (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; 
Vance et al., 2013). Therefore, this question seeks to examine if the benefits of altering 
these perceptions extend beyond the fear appeals intervention period.  
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3.3 Theoretical framework 
The research model used in this study is drawn from PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; 
Rogers, 1975, 1983), which originated as a model for predicting health-related 
behavior. PMT proposes how an individual assesses threats, referred to as threat 
appraisal, determines the likelihood of follow recommended preventative measures. 
PMT also suggests that the likelihood that an individual will comply with 
recommended measures is dependent upon perceptions about the effectiveness of the 
preventative measures, ability to perform them, and any perceived difficulties 
associated with the preventative measures, referred to as coping appraisal. The PMT 
model (Rogers, 1975) was also originally developed to explain the effects of using 
persuasive messages or fear appeals to influence threat and coping appraisal processes 
and ultimately change behavior.  
The threat appraisal component of PMT includes the constructs (i) perceived severity 
or an individual’s assessment of the severity of a threat, (ii) perceived vulnerability or 
an individual’s assessment of vulnerability to threat and (iii) fear, which is triggered by 
an emotional feeling towards a threat, sometimes referred to as fear arousal. In the 
PMT literature, fear arousal is described and has been measured using adjectives such 
as frightened, worried or nervous (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Milne & Milne, 2000; 
Witte, 1992; Zhang & McDowell, 2009).  
The coping appraisal component of PMT includes the constructs (i) self-efficacy or an 
individual’s assessment of the ability to perform the recommended preventative 
measure, (ii) response efficacy or assessment about the effectiveness of the proposed 
preventative measure and (iii) response cost or an individual’s assessment about how 
inconvenient or difficult a preventative measure would be to undertake. According to 
the revised PMT (1983), self-efficacy and response efficacy are factors that motivate 
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individuals to follow recommended preventative measures, while response cost 
contributes to an individual’s decision to ignore preventative measures, thus has a 
negative effect on behavioral intentions.  
Drawn from PMT’s threat appraisal component, the Threat Perception component of 
the proposed model in this study, relates to an individual’s assessment about the 
severity of password related threat (perceived severity), vulnerability to password 
related threats (perceived vulnerability), and emotions such as worrying about 
password related threats (perceived threat). In this thesis, perceived threat is 
synonymous with fear. The coping appraisal component is represented in this study as 
Efficacy Perceptions, which relates to the assessment about one’s ability to undertake 
recommended password guidelines (password self-efficacy), perceived effectiveness of 
the password guidelines (perceived password effectiveness) and assessment about the 
difficulty of following the recommended password guidelines (perceived cost).  
Figure 3.1 presents the research model used in this study and the hypothesized 
relationships. The model shows the proposed relationships between Threat Perceptions 
and Efficacy Perceptions and the dependent variable, intentions to comply with 
password guidelines. The dependent variable, which is represented by the construct 
protection motivation  in PMT, is typically a measure of behavioral intentions (Floyd 
et al., 2000; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997) and in fact PMT asserts that protective 
behavior is most appropriately predicted by behavioral intentions  (Prentice-Dunn & 
Rogers, 1986; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997; Weinstein, 1993). However, a meta-
analysis (Floyd et al., 2000) conducted on PMT studies that have measured both 
intentions and actual behaviors, suggests that PMT can be effectively used to predict 
intentions and actual behavior. Accordingly, the research model used in this study also 
includes measures of actual behavior, described as actual password compliance. The 
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model used in this research is also extended to include exposure to hacking, which 
relates to prior exposure to a hacking incident (discussed further in Section 3.6).  
























































The PMT model is useful for explaining how threat and efficacy perceptions 
influences behavior and therefore suitable for this study. PMT has been successfully 
used to explain IS security behaviors in a growing number of IS security studies (e.g. 
Herath & Rao, 2009; Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Posey et al., 
2011; Siponen et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Workman et al., 
2008). In this study, the relationships implied in the PMT framework form the bases 
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for the research model. Further, this study examines the direct effects of the variables 
perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, perceived threats, perceived password 
effectiveness, password self-efficacy and perceived cost on intentions to comply with 
password guidelines. Table 3.1 shows the definitions of the constructs used in this 
study. 
Table 3.1: Constructs definitions 
Construct Definition 
Fear appeals 
Persuasive messages containing information that emphasizes the severity 
of password related threats such as hacking and the likelihood of being 
exposed to the threats 
Perceived severity 
The degree to which a user believes that the consequences of password 
related threats would be severe 
Perceived 
vulnerability 
The degree to which a user believes that they are likely to experience 
password related threats 
Perceived threat The degree to which a user is worried about password related threats 
Exposure to hacking 
Prior exposure to a hacking incident, experienced by either a user, or 
someone they know personally 
Perceived password 
effectiveness 
The degree to which a user believes that recommended password 
guidelines will prevent password related threats 
Password               
self-efficacy 
The degree to which a user is confident in their ability to create a strong 
password 
Perceived cost 
The degree to which a user believes that remembering passwords would be 
difficult if password guidelines were followed 
Intentions to 
comply 




The quality of passwords created and is represented as password strength 
Password 
memorability 
The degree to which a user can remember a password 
 
 
With the exception of Siponen et al. (2010) who operationalized perceived severity and 
perceived vulnerability as a single variable, recent IS security studies have examined 
the direct effects of the individual threat appraisal and efficacy appraisal variables on 
IS security practice; for example: perceived vulnerability and perceived severity (Lee 
& Larsen, 2009; Posey et al., 2011; Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & 
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McDowell, 2009), response efficacy and self-efficacy (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; 
Lee & Larsen, 2009; Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 
2009), and response cost (Lee & Larsen, 2009; Siponen et al., 2010; Vance et al., 
2012; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009). This practice is also followed in 
this study. 
In this study, intentions to comply relates to an individual’s willingness to choose a 
password that follows all the guidelines recommended by the system. These might 
include: a combination of numbers, letters, and symbols; a password that is different 
from previously used passwords; or a password that is different from other online 
passwords. In this study, PMT is used as a basis for explaining intention and behavior 
in relation to password threats and also to explain the effects of fear appeals on 
password related behaviors. The following sections describe the fear appeals and 
variables examined in this study and the hypotheses formulated for this study (see 
Table 3.2).   
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Table 3.2: Summary of hypotheses 
Hypothesis Description of hypothesis 
H.1 Fear appeals will increase user compliance with password guidelines. 
H.2  Perceived severity of password related threats is positively related to intentions to comply with password guidelines. 
H.3 Perceived vulnerability to password related threats will not have a direct effect on intentions to comply with password guidelines. 
H.4 Perceived vulnerability is positively related to perceived threat. 
H.5 Perceived severity is positively related to perceived threat. 
H.6 Perceived threat is positively related to intentions to comply with password guidelines. 
H.7 Exposure to hacking is positively related to perceived vulnerability 
H.8 Perceived password effectiveness is positively related to intentions to comply with password guidelines 
H.9 Password self-efficacy is positively related to intentions to comply with password guidelines 
H.10 Perceived cost is negatively related to intentions to comply with password guidelines 
H.11 Intentions to comply is positively related to actual password compliance. 
H.12  Users who receive fear appeals will have higher intentions to comply over time than those who do not 
H.13  Users who receive fear appeals with a mnemonic training emphasis will have higher password memorability over time than those who do not 
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3.4 Fear appeals 
Fear appeals are persuasive messages aimed at motivating individuals to engage in a 
recommended behavior (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975, 1983). Fear appeals 
can have a significant impact on behavioral intentions, by altering individuals’ 
perceptions of threats and influencing the way they perceive recommended 
precautions. Fear appeals can also be used to motivate people to believe that they 
possess the capabilities to successfully execute the recommended precautions 
(Bandura, 1982). Fear appeal messages have been used in health-related studies to 
improve adoption of health preventative measures (e.g., Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987), 
and also in IS security studies to improve adoption of computer security preventative 
measures (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a).  
In a health-related study, Rippetoe and Rogers (1987) examined the effectiveness of 
fear appeals in promoting breast cancer examination by using persuasive messages to 
influence self-efficacy, response efficacy and threat perceptions. Their study found that 
those who received written statements and graphic information about the severity of 
breast cancer were more likely to go through with a breast cancer examination than 
those who received non-threatening messages. In an IS security study, Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010a) used fear appeal messages to influence perceptions about threats 
posed by computer spyware and perceptions about the effectiveness of anti-spyware 
software and Jenkins et al. (2013) successfully used fear appeals to deter users from 
reusing password on an online website. Consistent with Rippetoe and Rogers (1987) 
these IS security studies show that fear appeals can be effectively used to improve 
users’ intentions to perform recommended IS security measures.  
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This study defines fear appeals as persuasive messages containing information that 
emphasizes the severity of password related threats such as hacking and the likelihood 
of being exposed to the threats. In this study, fear appeals also include statements 
emphasizing the effectiveness of recommended password guidelines in preventing 
password related threats and training on how to create strong passwords that are also 
easy to remember. The fear appeals also incorporate the use of a mnemonic strategy 
for creating passwords where a password is created from the first letter of a sentence or 
a familiar phrase. Studies (e.g., Helkala & Svendsen, 2012; Vu et al., 2007; Yan et al., 
2004) show that this mnemonic training improves ability to remember passwords. 
Using fear appeals as a method of persuading individuals to follow recommendations, 
the PMT model is aimed at explaining change in threat and efficacy perceptions, and 
also predicting behavioral change (Rogers, 1975, 1983).  
A key focus of this study is behavioral change, or improving compliance with 
password guidelines using fear appeals and the hypotheses in this study are formulated 
on the basis that behavioral change is mediated via increased intention to comply with 
password security recommendations. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H.1 Fear appeals will increase user compliance with password guidelines. 
3.5 Effects of threat perceptions on intentions 
According to PMT, an individual’s assessment of threats, that is, beliefs about the 
likelihood of exposure to a threat, described as perceived vulnerability, and assessment 
of how severe the threat is likely to be, described as perceived severity, have a direct 
impact on behavioral intentions. Perceived vulnerability and perceived severity are 
also said to trigger an emotional feeling towards threat, also referred to as fear (Liang 
& Xue, 2010; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975, 1983; Witte, 1992), which is 
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described in this study as perceived threat. Thus in this study perceived threat is 
synonymous with fear as described in PMT. 
In this study, the Threat Perception component of the proposed model includes the 
variables: perceived severity, perceived vulnerability and perceived threat which are 
described in the following sections.  
 Effects of perceived severity on intentions 3.5.1
In this study, perceived severity relates to the degree to which a user believes that the 
consequences of password related threats would be severe. PMT suggests that higher 
perceptions of the severity of threats increase the likelihood that an individual will 
comply with recommended precautions (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975, 
1983). In IS security research perceived severity has been shown to contribute to 
compliance with IS security measures. For example, Woon et al. (2005) found that 
users are more likely to enable wireless security measures if they believe that a breach 
on their home wireless network would be detrimental. 
Several health-related PMT studies (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Milne & Milne, 2000; 
Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987), have found a significant direct effect of perceived severity 
on likelihood of undertaking recommended behavior. Perceived severity has been 
found to have a direct effect on users’ decisions to implement wireless security on their 
home computers (Woon et al., 2005) and a direct impact on business executives’ 
intentions to install anti-malware software within an organization (Lee & Larsen, 
2009). Thus, it seems likely that if users believe the consequences of being hacked into 
would be detrimental, they are more likely to comply with password security 
recommendations. This suggests that elevating users’ perception of the severity of 
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password related threats will increase their motivation to comply with recommended 
password guidelines. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H.2  Perceived severity of password related threats is positively related to intentions 
to comply with password guidelines. 
 Effects of perceived vulnerability on intentions 3.5.2
In this study, perceived vulnerability relates to the degree to which a user believes that 
they are likely to experience password related threats. PMT proposes a direct link 
between perceived vulnerability and behavioral intentions towards recommended 
precautions. This suggests that if users believe that their password is likely to be 
hacked they are more likely to comply with recommended password guidelines. The 
association between perceived vulnerability and intentions to perform recommended 
measures may not be direct. Some studies in the health-related domain and especially 
those in the IS security domain (Crossler et al., 2014; Skogan & Maxfield, 1981; 
Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009) have failed to 
confirm the impact of perceived vulnerability on motivation to perform preventative 
measures. Further, as meta-analysis (Milne & Milne, 2000) of PMT studies shows, 
although some studies find a significant relationship between perceived vulnerability 
and intentions, the strength of the association is typically small.  
Weinstein (1984) suggests that people usually have an unrealistically low perception 
about the likelihood of a threat occurring, and that this intrinsically reduced perceived 
vulnerability may have a negative effect on preventative behaviors. In fact, Sasse et al. 
(2001), who examined the link between user behavior and security failures, found that 
users generally believe that their information is worthless and not important enough to 
be targeted. It is thus not surprising that support for the link between perceived 
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vulnerability and compliance intentions has been weak. Further, Liang and Xue (2010) 
suggest that perceived severity and perceived vulnerability also have an indirect effect 
on behavioral intentions through perceived threat and that the relationship is mediated 
by perceived threat. This may further explain the mixed findings in studies that only 
examined direct effects of perceived vulnerability on behavioral intentions. Thus, it 
seems likely that perceived vulnerability will have no direct effect on a user’s intention 
to comply with password security guidelines.  
It should be noted that the null hypothesis is consistent with the fact that an 
overwhelming majority of published IS security research in the context of personal IS 
security has failed to establish perceived vulnerability as a predictor of intentions to 
comply. This also draws attention to the extent to which PMT is applicable in the IS 
security domain. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H.3 Perceived vulnerability to password related threats will not have a direct effect 
on intentions to comply with password guidelines. 
 Effects of perceived severity and perceived 3.5.3
vulnerability on perceived threat 
Perceived threat is a function of perceived severity and perceived vulnerability (Herath 
& Rao, 2009; Liang & Xue, 2010; Plotnikoff & Higginbotham, 2002; Rogers, 1983; 
Weinstein, 2000; Witte, 1994) and a better predictor of behavioral intentions than 
perceived severity or perceived vulnerability (Liang & Xue, 2010). Herath and Rao 
(2009) examined the relationship between the three threat perception variables, and 
found that perceived severity increases concern for security breaches. Although their 
study found insignificant correlation between perceived vulnerability and level of 
concern for security, a study by Liang and Xue (2010) found that both perceived 
severity and perceived vulnerability affects users’ level of concern. Their study found 
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that perceived severity and vulnerability have an indirect effect on intentions to use 
anti-spyware software and that the relationship is mediated by perceived threat.   
This suggests that threat perception increases if users believe that their online account 
is likely to be hacked and if they believe that hacking can lead to serious 
consequences. Thus, it seems likely that elevating a user’s perceived vulnerability and 
perceived severity would increase perceived threat.  It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H.4 Perceived vulnerability is positively related to perceived threat. 
H.5 Perceived severity is positively related to perceived threat. 
 Effects of perceived threat on intentions 3.5.4
In the model proposed in this thesis perceived severity and perceived vulnerability are 
proposed to trigger an emotional feeling towards threat, which is described as 
perceived threat. Perceived threat relates to the degree to which a user is worried 
about password related threats and reflects the emotional aspect of Threat Perceptions 
or concern for threats that result from fear of threats, while perceived severity and 
perceived vulnerability represent beliefs about the likelihood of being exposed to threat 
or the severity of threats (LaTour & Rotfeld, 1997; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; 
Plotnikoff & Higginbotham, 2002; Rogers, 1975).  
Perceived threat is said to increase the likelihood of behavioral intentions to comply 
with recommended precautions (LaTour & Rotfeld, 1997; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; 
Rogers, 1983; Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). The role of fear on behavioral intentions has 
received some support in several studies. While some (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; 
Rogers, 1983; Witte, 1994) suggest that fear has an indirect impact on intentions, via 
perceived severity and perceived vulnerability, studies such as that of Zhang and 
McDowell (2009) and Liang and Xue (2010) have found that fear (represented as 
 
79 
     
perceived threat) has a direct and positive impact on users’ intentions to protect their 
personal information. Therefore, fear, represented as perceived threat, is included in 
this study. 
Zhang and McDowell (2009) found that users who are nervous about password 
hacking are significantly more likely to implement password protection measures. 
Their study supports a direct effect of perceived threat on intentions to comply with 
recommended precautionary measures. Findings from a study by Liang and Xue 
(2010) investigating users’ decisions to protect their personal computers, also found 
that fear, represented in their study as perceived threat, had a direct influence on users’ 
intentions to protect their computer. This suggests that, the more worried users are 
about password related threats, the more likely they are to comply with password 
security guidelines. Therefore, it seems likely that, elevating a user’s perceived threat 
of password related threats would increase motivation to comply with recommended 
password guidelines. It is therefore hypothesized that:  
H.6 Perceived threat is positively related to intentions to comply with password 
guidelines.  
3.6 Effects of exposure to hacking on perceived 
vulnerability 
Exposure to hacking is defined as prior exposure to a hacking incident, experienced by 
either a user or someone they know personally. The PMT model does not explicitly 
include threat experience as a direct predictor of Threat Perceptions. However, PMT 
related studies, including health and IS security related studies, have reported mixed 
findings and failed to consistently confirm the significance of the construct perceived 
vulnerability in predicting behavioral intentions (Herath & Rao, 2009; Lee & Larsen, 
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2009; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & 
McDowell, 2009). These mixed findings warrant a consideration of the role of threat 
experience on vulnerability perceptions. Therefore, the relationship between password 
hacking experience and users’ perceived vulnerability to password related threats will 
also be examined.  
When a person or someone they know personally is exposed to threats, this experience 
is viewed as a form of acquired knowledge that could affect an individual’s perceived 
vulnerability (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981; Weinstein, 1989). In an IS related security 
study by Boss (2007), found that perceived vulnerability is developed through both 
personal experience and knowledge about others’ exposure to cyber security threats. 
This suggests that if a user or someone they know personally has had their online 
account hacked into, perceived vulnerability should increase. Therefore, it seems likely 
that exposure to hacking will be positively related to perceived vulnerability. It is 
therefore hypothesized that: 
H.7 Exposure to hacking is positively related to perceived vulnerability. 
3.7 Effects of efficacy perceptions on intentions 
PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975, 1983) suggests that intentions to adopt 
recommended preventative measure are maximized if the recommended measure is 
believed to be an effective means of preventing threats; this is referred to as response 
efficacy. Further, PMT suggests that behavioral intentions are elevated if an individual 
is confident in successfully executing the recommended measure; this is referred to as 
self-efficacy (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1983). PMT also suggests that 
behavioral intentions can be negatively impacted if the costs associated with 
performing the recommended measures are high and this is referred to as response 
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cost. In PMT, these factors are collectively referred to as coping appraisal. In this 
study, coping appraisal is represented as Efficacy Perceptions, and includes the 
variables: perceived password effectiveness, password self-efficacy and perceived cost, 
which are synonymous with PMT’s response efficacy, self-efficacy and response cost 
respectively. The Efficacy Perceptions variables investigated in this study are 
described in the following sections. 
 Effects of perceived password effectiveness on 3.7.1
intentions 
Perceived password effectiveness relates to the degree to which a user believes that 
recommended password guidelines will prevent password related threats. As suggested 
in PMT  (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975, 1983) and supported in studies 
based on PMT (e.g., Ifinedo, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Posey et al., 2011; Rippetoe 
& Rogers, 1987; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009), the higher the level of 
perceived effectiveness the higher the probability of compliance with recommended 
precautions.  
Studies that have examined factors associated with health-related preventative 
behaviors (e.g., Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987) as well as those 
that have examined IS security related preventative behaviors using the PMT model 
(e.g., Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & 
McDowell, 2009), have found evidence to support a positive association between 
perceived effectiveness and motivation to adopt preventative measures. In the health 
domain, importance of beliefs about the effectiveness of preventative measures was 
supported in an experiment by Maddux and Rogers (1983) which found that those who 
believed that quitting cigarette smoking would effectively eliminate the risks of heart 
and lung disease were more likely to follow through with the preventative measures. 
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Further, in a study by Rippetoe and Rogers (1987), perceived effectiveness, described 
in their study as response efficacy towards breast cancer detection, was found to be the 
strongest predictor of behavioral intentions.   
Studies such as those by Woon et al. (2005), Lee and Larsen (2009), and Zhang and 
McDowell (2009) suggest that users’ decision to adopt IS security measures is 
determined by whether they perceive the security measures as an effective means of 
preventing security threats. For example, Woon et al. (2005), who investigated factors 
associated with adoption of wireless security by home computer users, found perceived 
effectiveness to play a significant role in users’ decisions to implement wireless 
security. In a study by Lee and Larsen (2009), the perception that installing anti-
malware software would prevent malware threat, was also found to have a significant 
positive impact of business executives’ decisions to implement anti-malware measures 
within their small-to-medium (SME) sized organizations.  
Consistent with Rippetoe and Rogers (1987), Zhang and McDowell (2009), who used 
the PMT model to examine factors affecting password protection, found perceived 
effectiveness to be the strongest predictor of behavioral intentions among university 
college students. They found that those who believed that implementing password 
security measures would effectively safeguard their online accounts were more likely 
to implement password protection. This suggests that if users believe that the 
recommended password guidelines are an effective means of preventing password 
related threats such as hacking, they are more likely to comply with the guidelines. 
Therefore, it seems likely that elevating a user’s perceived password effectiveness 




     
H.8 Perceived password effectiveness is positively related to intentions to comply 
with password guidelines. 
 
 Effects of password self-efficacy on intentions 3.7.2
Password self-efficacy relates to the degree to which a user is confident in their ability 
to create a strong password. The revised version of the PMT model (Maddux & 
Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1983), which was revised to incorporate the variable self-
efficacy, suggests that in addition to beliefs about the effectiveness of recommended 
preventative measures, an individual’s beliefs about the ability to perform the 
recommended measures also have a significant impact on behavioral intentions 
(Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987). Following their experimental 
validation of the role of self-efficacy in protective behavior, Maddux and Rogers 
(1983) found self-efficacy to be a significant and key component of the PMT model. 
Furthermore, findings from several studies including meta analytic analyses of PMT 
studies  (e.g., Floyd et al., 2000; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Milne & Milne, 2000; 
Woon et al., 2005) suggest that self-efficacy may possibly be the strongest predictor of 
behavioral intentions to adopt preventative measures. 
In IS security related research, self-efficacy has been shown to play a significant role 
in determining a user’s intentions to use spyware software (Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010a) and also in motivating SME business executives to install anti-malware 
software (Lee & Larsen, 2009). Woon et al. (2005) also found that users who are 
confident that they can use wireless security measures are more likely to implement 
recommended wireless security measures and Siponen et al. (2014) also found that 
self-efficacy plays a significant role in motivating employees to comply with 
organizational IS security policies. This suggests that if users are confident about their 
 
84 
     
ability to create a strong password they are more likely to comply with password 
security recommendations. Therefore, it seems likely that elevating password self-
efficacy would increase the likelihood of compliance with recommended password 
guidelines. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H.9 Password self-efficacy is positively related to intentions to comply with 
password guidelines. 
 
 Effects of perceived cost on intentions 3.7.3
Perceived cost relates to the degree to which a user believes that remembering 
passwords would be difficult if password guidelines were followed. PMT suggests that 
response cost, referred in this study as perceived cost decreases the likelihood that an 
individual will comply with recommended measures (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; 
Rogers, 1983) and that the motivation process is stronger when perceived costs are low 
(Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986).  In accordance with PMT, if an individual believes 
that carrying out recommended measures would be difficult, complex, costly, 
unpleasant or require too much effort, they are less likely to undertake the 
recommended measures (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986). Difficulty in remembering 
passwords has been identified as a challenge to users and a significant barrier to safe 
password practices (Gaw & Felten, 2006; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; Ur et al., 2012; 
Yan et al., 2004; Zviran & Haga, 1999).  
Several key characteristics define a strong password; however these characteristics 
also make them difficult to remember (Yan et al., 2004). These include the number of 
characters, the uniqueness of characters, inclusion of special characters, and exclusion 
of familiar words such as dictionary words. They should also be changed frequently 
and be different from those used for other web accounts. These characteristics are a 
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standard requirement of most password guidelines. The problem is, the human memory 
is designed to remember short series of items that are familiar or memorable to the 
individual (Miller, 1956), and as studies have shown, this requirement has 
inadvertently let to inability to remember strong passwords (Yan et al., 2004; Zviran & 
Haga, 1999). This inability to remember strong passwords decreases the likelihood of 
compliance with password requirements (Yan et al., 2004). Further, the number of 
passwords users are required to memorize makes it even more difficult for them 
(Zhang, Luo, et al., 2009) and including special characters and numbers makes 
passwords less meaningful (Warkentin et al., 2004).  In this study, perceived cost 
represents an individual’s belief that remembering strong passwords would be difficult. 
Perceived cost has been found to have a negative effect on behavioral intentions in a 
variety of IS security domains. For example, perceived cost was found to have a 
negative impact on: intentions to adopt anti-malware software by SME business 
executives (Lee & Larsen, 2009); intentions to comply with security policies relating 
to encrypting portable media, locking employee computers or sharing passwords 
(Vance et al., 2012);  intentions to update and create strong unique passwords (Zhang 
& McDowell, 2009), and also influences actual implementation of wireless security 
measures by home computer users (Woon et al., 2005). This suggests that if users 
believe that a password that is created according to suggested password guidelines 
would be difficult to remember, they are less likely to comply with password security 
measures. It seems likely that decreasing a user’s perceived cost of conforming to 
password guidelines will increase likelihood to comply with the password guidelines. 
It is therefore hypothesized that: 




     
3.8 Compliance with password guidelines  
PMT is a behavioral intentions model that explains how sources of information about 
threats can affect an individual’s intentions to perform preventative measures (Maddux 
& Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975, 1983). In its original form, the PMT model does not 
explicitly predict actual behavior, but rather assumes that protective behavior is most 
appropriately predicted by behavioral intentions (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986; 
Weinstein, 1993). However, several studies have provided evidence to support 
incorporating actual behavior in the PMT model (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne & Milne, 
2000). The model described in this study (see Figure 3.1) explicitly includes both 
intentions and actual behavior. The following sections describe the dependent variables 
intentions to comply with password guidelines and actual password compliance.    
Based on the PMT construct protection motivation (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 
1975, 1983), intentions to comply refers to the degree to which a user intends to follow 
a set of recommended password guidelines. PMT assumes that behavioral intentions 
adequately predict behavior and therefore the dependent variable is usually 
operationalized as a measure of intentions (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986). As such, 
in this research, the dependent variable intentions to comply captures the degree to 
which an individual is willing or planning to follow a set of recommended password 
guidelines.  
Many studies have used PMT in its original form, where behavioral intentions is 
assumed to sufficiently represent actual behavior and thus no measure of actual 
behavior is included. For example, measures of intentions have been used in the 
health-related domain to examine intentions to undertake breast cancer self-
examination (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987) and to quit smoking (Maddux & Rogers, 
1983). PMT based IS security studies, have also used measures of intentions such as 
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intentions to use anti-spyware programs (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a), intentions to 
use anti-malware software (Lee & Larsen, 2009), intentions to comply with security 
policies relating to implementing encryption on portable media, locking computers and 
sharing passwords within an organization (Vance et al., 2012), and intentions to create 
strong unique passwords for online accounts (Zhang & McDowell, 2009). 
Although the literature suggests that an individual’s intentions to perform a particular 
task influences actual behaviors in many domains, there has been little research with 
respect to passwords examining the link between intentions and actual compliance. 
Therefore, the relationship between intentions to comply and actual password 
compliance, operationalized as password strength is explored in this study. Thus, this 
study investigates if behavioral change in users’ intentions to comply with a set of 
recommended password guidelines leads them to actually create stronger passwords.  
Studies (e.g., LaRose et al., 2008; Liang & Xue, 2010; Plotnikoff & Higginbotham, 
2002) that have incorporated actual behavior in a model based on PMT, have provided 
evidence to support an extension of the PMT to include a link between intentions and 
actual behavior. Using the PMT, Plotnikoff and Higginbotham (2002) examined 
factors that motivate individuals to exercise. Their study found a strong significant 
relationship between intentions to get adequate exercise and actual exercise behavior. 
In the IS security domain, Liang and Xue (2010) also found a significant positive 
relationship between users’ intentions to avoid the dangers of spyware and actually 
installing anti-spyware software. However, their model explained a larger variance in 
user intentions than actual behavior.  
It is assumed that measures of intentions can predict behavior to some extent (Ajzen, 
1991; Rogers, 1975, 1983). However, some studies suggest that the effects of 
manipulating the PMT variables are generally stronger on behavioral intentions than 
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on actual behavior (Floyd et al., 2000; Webb, 2006); for example, a medium sized 
change in behavioral intentions may not lead to a medium sized change in actual 
behavior, but rather a medium to small association (Webb, 2006). Further, findings 
from meta-analytical studies by Floyd et al. (2000) and Milne and Milne (2000) show 
that while the effect sizes for intentions tend to be large, the effect sizes for actual 
behaviors are typically smaller. As such, it is important to also examine the extent to 
which intentions to comply in this study can predict actual password compliance. 
It is assumed that users’ intentions to comply with password guidelines can predict 
users’ actual password compliance or password strength, but the variance explained in 
actual password compliance could be low. However, it seems plausible that elevating 
a user’s intentions to comply with password guidelines will increase likelihood of 
actually creating strong passwords. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H.11  Intentions to comply is positively related to actual password compliance. 
3.9 Effects of fear appeals over time 
Applications of persuasive communication, as described in the PMT framework, have 
typically considered the immediate effectiveness of fear appeals on motivating 
individuals to follow recommendations (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne & Milne, 2000). 
Similarly, applications of PMT defined fear appeals in IS security research have 
primarily examined the immediate effects of fear appeals on intentions (e.g., Johnston 
& Warkentin, 2010a) or actual behavior (Jenkins et al., 2013; Vance et al., 2013).  
Longitudinal studies that have examined the long-term effectiveness of fear appeals 
provide evidence to suggest that the effects of fear appeal messages can be maintained 
over time (Floyd et al., 2000). However, there has been little research with respect to 
the long-term effects of fear appeals on compliance with password policies. Therefore 
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this study investigates if change in an individual’s intentions to comply with a set of 
recommended password guidelines can be maintained over time. This study also 
explores if the ability to remember passwords, referred to as password memorability in 
this study, can be sustained over time following fear appeal communication. The 
following subsections describe the two dependent variables, intentions to comply and 
password memorability, examined for long-term effects. 
 Effects of fear appeals on intentions to comply 3.9.1
over time 
This study explores whether fear appeals will affect intentions to comply over time, 
following the fear appeals intervention. As the fear appeals used in this study are a 
form of security information and training intended to change behavioral intentions, this 
study aims to investigate if individuals are still motivated to comply with password 
guidelines once time has elapsed after the training. The information and training (fear 
appeal) used in this study corresponds with the four stimulus variables, magnitude of 
noxiousness, probability of threat occurrence and efficacy of available recommended 
response and self-efficacy, as described in PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983). A key strength 
of the PMT is that it is a model for establishing experimental interventions (fear 
appeals) aimed at changing behavior, yet only few studies have explored the long-term 
effectiveness of fear appeals on behavioral change. 
One such study is that of Wurtele and Maddux (1987), who examined the immediate 
and long-term effects of fear appeals on intentions to engage in regular exercise. To 
examine the long-term effects of the fear appeals, they conducted a follow-up study to 
determine if the change in behavioral intentions led to behavioral change two weeks 
following the intervention. The follow-up study examined behavioral change using 
measures of self-reported behavior by asking whether the participants’ level of 
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exercise was the same, decreased or increased two weeks later. A study by Hodgkins 
and Orbell (1998) also suggests that changed behavioral intentions can also be 
maintained over an extended period of time. In their follow-up study, the participants 
were asked if they had intended to perform breast cancer examination in the past 
month. Although their study did not use fear appeals communication to manipulate the 
PMT variable, their findings suggest that intentions can be sustained over time. 
However, thus far no published IS security behavioral studies appear to have 
conducted a follow-up study to determine if fear appeals have a long term effect on 
compliance intentions. 
Based on these findings, it is suggested that for users who receive fear appeals, 
changes in intentions to comply should be maintained over time. It is therefore 
hypothesized that: 
H.12  Users who receive fear appeals will have higher intentions to comply over time 
than those who do not. 
 Effects of fear appeals on password 3.9.2
memorability over time 
Password memorability relates to the degree to which a user can remember a 
password. This study also explores whether fear appeal communication will have a 
long-term effect on password memorability. Password memorability is a key barrier to 
secure password practices (Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; Ur et al., 2012; Yan et al., 2004).  
Users have difficulty remembering lengthy random characters (Yan et al., 2004; Zviran 
& Haga, 1993), in combination with the need to remember multiple unique passwords 
(Florêncio & Herley, 2007; Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011; Helkala & Svendsen, 
2012), they inevitably choose weak passwords. Training users how to create strong 
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passwords using a mnemonic technique where a password is created using the first 
letter of a sentence or phrase, improves password memorability (Helkala & Svendsen, 
2012; Yan et al., 2004), Further, the use of a mnemonic technique has been shown to 
be an effective way of improving memory, both short-term and long-term (Hampstead 
et al., 2012).  
Evidence suggest that mnemonic training can improve password recall (e.g., Vu et al., 
2007; Yan et al., 2004). Further, although Yan et al. (2004) did not explicitly examine 
the long-term effects of the mnemonic technique, their results suggest that the 
mnemonic strategies may have had a long term effect password recall. In their study, 
the group that created mnemonic based passwords reported them to be significantly 
easier to remember, and of the three experimental groups, this group kept written 
copies of their passwords for the least amount of time. This suggests that the 
mnemonic technique improved ability to remember passwords long after the 
mnemonic passwords were created.  
It therefore seems likely that users who receive fear appeal communications with a 
mnemonic training emphasis will have a more sustained ability to remember 
passwords over time. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H.13  Users who receive fear appeals with a mnemonic training emphasis will have 
higher password memorability over time than those who do not.  
3.10 Chapter Overview 
This chapter presented the research questions and hypotheses formulated for this study. 
With emphasis on the role of security perceptions and password efficacy perceptions, 
the objective the study described in this thesis is to provide insights into what 
motivates users to comply with password guidelines. The question of whether these 
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perceptions can be altered to improve compliance with password guidelines is also 
addressed in this study. A key component of this study is the use of fear appeals in 
eliciting change in IS password security behavior. This study seeks to investigate 
whether the effects of fear appeals can be sustained over time through a longitudinal 
study, which thus far has been overlooked in fear appeals based IS security research. 
The theoretical framework proposed in this chapter is based on PMT (Rogers, 1975, 
1983). PMT has received some support in IS security research (e.g. Herath & Rao, 
2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Workman 
et al., 2008) although studies (e.g., Crossler, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010; Milne et al., 
2009; Posey et al., 2011; Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 
2009) have failed to consistently confirm the role of perceived vulnerability in 
explaining IS security behaviors. Therefore, the research model proposed in this study 
was a modified version of the PMT framework proposing a null relationship between 
perceived vulnerability and IS security behavior. The proposed model was extended to 
explore the role of prior exposure to hacking incident and the possibility of providing 




     
4 Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the methodology, participants and the procedure for data 
collection used in this study. This Chapter also presents the study materials used in this 
study including those used for a follow-up. Lastly, this chapter describes SEM, the 
primary data analysis techniques applied in this study, which includes a description of 
procedure for assessing the measurement and structural model. 
4.2 Research design 
This study takes a quantitative and experimental design approach. This study uses a 
between-group experimental design to examine the impact of fear appeals on 
compliance with password security guidelines. As suggested by Leventhal (1970) a 
design where one group is exposed to fear appeals and another is not was chosen for 
this study. Thus, the study was designed so that a treatment group was exposed to fear 
appeal messages about the prevalence and potential consequences of password related 
threats, the effectiveness password guidelines, a password training session, and a 
questionnaire used to assess the influence of the fear appeals upon threat and efficacy 
perceptions, and compliance with password guidelines. The control group was 
unexposed to the fear appeal messages. 
This study used two kinds of study materials: i) password security information and 
training materials, representing fear appeals, and (ii) a survey instrument measuring the 
participants’ background information and the variables related to the research model 
described in this thesis. The control group completed the survey only; while the 
treatment group was exposed to the password security information and training 
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material and completed the survey. To assess the impact of fear appeals on actual 
compliance (password strength), passwords were collected from both study groups. 
Data was collected in two phases. Phase I is where the participants’ background 
information and initial levels of study variables were measured and also when the 
treatment group undertook the password security information and training session. 
Phase II was a post-training follow-up session undertaken to determine whether the 
effects of fear appeals are maintained over time. The second phase was conducted six 
weeks after completion of phase I. 
4.3 Participants 
As the target population for this study was Internet users who hold at least one online 
email account, data collected through an online questionnaire was not only appropriate 
but also ensured that the respondents held an online email account. Only participants 
who were 18 years of age or over were recruited, making the background variable age 
the only exclusion criteria for this study. Participants were sought from a wide 
spectrum of backgrounds including gender, level of education, computer skills and 
computer security knowledge. Having a group of participants from a wide range of 
backgrounds is of importance to the generalizability of the research findings.  
A sample size of ≥ 200 per study group was sought for this study. Details of how the 
sample size was estimated are described in Section 4.8.1.1. To ensure that the 
participants met the required sample size of ≥ 200, and fit the target population for this 
study, a third party recruiting company located in the United Stated (Authentic-
Response, 2012), was used. Using the recruiting company ensured that the participants 
were recruited from a wide cross-section of Internet users and that the required sample 
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size was achieved. A similar recruitment method was used by Bulgurcu et al. (2010) in 
their study investigating employee IS security compliance. 
4.4 Phase I data collection procedure 
This section describes the procedure for Phase I data collection. Figure 4.1 is an 
overview of the timeline of the recruitment and data collection process and shows an 
overview of Phase II.  























     
Prior to data collection ethics approval was sought from the Murdoch University 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) under Permit No. 2010/218 (see 
Appendix A, for a copy of the HREC approval). Authentic Response Inc. was 
contacted to prepare a project agreement, after which the email invitation was 
prepared. The participants were then contacted directly and invited by Authentic 
Response Inc. to participate in this study through an online survey. Using census 
balanced random sampling, a form of stratified random sampling, 3830 email 
invitations were distributed to the panel members who were randomly allocated to 
either the control or treatment group. The email invitations (see Appendix B) contained 
information on reimbursement for participating and a direct link to the version of the 
online survey the potential participant was to use. The reimbursement was points-
equivalent to approximately $1.50 - $2.00 US dollars each, where the points could be 
used to claim a reward.  
Figure 4.2 shows an overview of the order in which data was collected for the control 
and treatment group respectively, for Phase I of the study. On the first page of the 
survey, labeled "Participant Information", potential participants were presented with 
background information about the study and the expected duration of the study. The 
participants were also informed of their right to privacy and provided with the 
opportunity to consent to participate by clicking on a check box. Here they were also 




     



























As depicted in Figure 4.2 two separate survey instruments were prepared for the two 
study groups, and administered online using SurveyGizmo version 3.1 (2012). As, one 
of the objectives of this research was to determine if the password security information 
and training session completed by the treatment group would improve compliance with 
password security guidelines as well as improve password strength, two sets of 
passwords were collected.  
To obtain passwords the participants were required to create a password at the start of 
the survey, right after the Participant Information page, and also at the end they were 
asked to change their passwords. To collect the first set of passwords, participants were 
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instructed to create passwords that they would use to return to the survey hosting 
website to complete the follow-up study (Phase II) and to view the preliminary results 
from Phase I. This was done to ensure that the passwords created were realistic and 
representative of actual passwords used on the Internet.  
After creating the first password, the control group completed two sections containing 
56 items; these included background information (including self-reported knowledge 
of computer security) and measures of the constructs in the proposed research model: 
exposure to hacking; perceived severity; perceived vulnerability; perceived threat; 
perceived password effectiveness; perceived cost, password self-efficacy; intentions to 
comply with password guidelines; and actual password compliance. This was 
completed in approximately 15 minutes.  
The treatment group first completed the background information section, followed by 
the password security information and training session. The treatment group then 
completed the section to measure the model constructs. As the intention was to 
influence participants’ perceptions, the password security information and training 
session was completed after the collection of background information, but prior to 
collection of data relating to the model. To ensure that the treatment group paid 
attention to the password security information, they also completed an interactive 
question and answer session.  
See Figure 4.3 for a sample of the interactive questions and answers used in this study. 
The questions were directly related to the password security information presented. A 
similar approach was used by Maddux and Rogers (1983) to ensure that respondents 
paid close attention to the treatment materials used in their study, and to maximize the 
effects of the intervention material. After the password security information session, 
the treatment group completed the second section which consisted of the measures of 
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the variables in the proposed model. Their session took approximately 25 minutes in 
total.  
Figure 4.3: A sample interactive questions and answer 
 
Prior to completing the survey session, on the second to last page of the survey, the 
second set of passwords was collected. As mentioned earlier, the two sets of passwords 
were collected to examine if password strength was improved. To examine if there 
were any group differences in password strength, a second password was collected 
from the control group as well. The participants were asked to change their previously 
selected password and to ensure that their new password was strong but easy to 
remember. This was to ensure that both groups were given equal opportunity to create 
passwords that they perceived as strong and easy to remember.  
On the final page of the survey, labeled “Thank You”, the participants were informed 
that after completing the study, they would automatically be re-directed back to the 
Authentic Response Inc. website to receive reimbursement. The Thank You page also 
reminded the participants to keep their passwords safe as they would need them to 




     
4.5 Password security information and training 
materials  
The password security information and training materials represented the four 
components of fear appeals discussed in Section 3.4. The materials consisted of four 
information segments: i) vulnerability information; (ii) severity information; (iii) 
password effectiveness information; and (iv) a password training exercise. To ensure 
that the amount of information in each segment was balanced, each segment contained 
roughly the same word count, ranging from 327 to 375.  A similar approach was used 
by Maddux and Rogers (1983) and also Rippetoe and Rogers (1987) to administer the 
fear appeal messages in their study. Copies of the password security information and 
training materials discussed below are located in Appendix C.  
 Vulnerability information 4.5.1
The first segment of the password security information contained statements that 
emphasized the likelihood of being exposed to password related threats, and 
information about existing password threats and countermeasures. The information 
was based on the NIST Guide to Enterprise Password Management (Scarfone & 
Souppaya, 2009), the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team’s (US-
CERT) guidelines on choosing and protecting passwords (McDowell et al., 2009) and 
the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) (Stewart et al., 2008).   
 Severity information 4.5.2
The second segment of the password security information contained statements that 
emphasized the consequences and severity of password related threats. The 
information was also based on the NIST (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2009) password 
guidelines, US-CERT (McDowell et al., 2009) and CISSP (Stewart et al., 2008). This 
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segment was a follow on from the vulnerability information segment and described 
possible consequences of password related threats such as hacking.  
 Password effectiveness information 4.5.3
The password effectiveness segment of the password security information material 
focused on countermeasures described in the NIST (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2009) 
password guidelines and US-CERT (McDowell et al., 2009), with emphasis on their 
effectiveness. This segment consisted of a list of six preventative measures such as 
avoiding dictionary words or using a combination of upper and lowercase letters, 
numbers and special characters and described how these measures can make passwords 
difficult to crack.   
 Password technique information 4.5.4
Lastly, participants were presented with training on how to create strong memorable 
passwords using the mnemonic password selection technique. A mnemonic password 
selection technique is a method of creating passwords using letters from a sentence or 
a familiar phrase. The information presented in this study was based on a password 
instructional sheet used in an experimental password study by Yan et al. (2004).  
In addition to being presented with several examples of how to apply the technique, 
participants were also given an opportunity to practice creating passwords using the 
mnemonic technique via interactive exercises included as part of the training segment, 
as shown in Figure 4.4.  
The interactive exercises involved creating mnemonic passwords using two different 
English phrases; “An Eye for an Eye a Tooth for a Tooth” and “Different Passwords 
for Different Login Accounts”. Vance et al. (2013) found that adding interactivity in 
password training improves the efficacy of the training (Vance et al., 2013). 
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Furthermore, while static fear appeals have been shown to elicit changes in 
perceptions, perceived self-efficacy alone is no substitute for a lack of ability 
(Bandura, 1977, 1982), thus as a reinforcement, the interactive practice session was 
proposed.  
Figure 4.4: Interactive exercises 
 
4.6 Phase I survey instrument 
As mentioned in Section 4.4, the survey instrument used in Phase I was split into two 
major sections. The first section contained items to measure background and 
demographic variables. The second section consisted of items measuring the constructs 
in the research model as follows: exposure to hacking, perceived severity, perceived 
vulnerability, perceived threat, perceived password effectiveness, perceived cost, 
password self-efficacy, intentions to comply with password guidelines, and actual 
password compliance. The development of the instrument involved a review of many 
existing survey instruments. To ensure validity and reliability of the measures used, 
previously validated items were adopted where possible. See Appendix D for the 
complete survey instrument. 
 
103 
     
 Exposure to hacking  4.6.1
The construct exposure to hacking relates to whether a user or someone they know 
personally has ever had their online account hacked into and the degree to which the 
experience affected them. Two items, shown in Table 4.1 were used to measure the 
construct. The items relate to negative impact experienced personally and through 
others who have been impacted by hacking. The items used to measure this construct 
were adapted from the items used in a study by Boss (2007), to measure how 
participants have been impacted by computer security threats such as virus infection. 
In his study, Boss reported a Cronbach alpha of 0.80.   
Only some participants or people they know personally are likely to have fallen victim 
to hacking. Therefore, the items used in this study were measured on a score of zero 
(0) if participants answered ‘no’ to being hacked or a 7-point scale indicating the 
degree of impact with a score of (1) for ‘low impact’ and (7) for ‘high impact’.  
Table 4.1: Items used to measure the construct exposure to hacking 
Many web users have email accounts set up for receiving important information such as email 
messages from friends and family members, online banking notifications and online shopping 
confirmation.  
For the purpose of this study, we classify such email accounts as 'important' email accounts. 
HACKED01 
Have you ever had your important email account, online shopping account or online 
banking account hacked into? If yes, please indicate the degree to which that 
experience affected you (in terms of lost data, lost time, monetary losses, identity 
theft etc.) If no, please select 'no'. 
HACKED02 
Has someone you know personally ever had their important email account, online 
shopping account or online banking account hacked into? If yes, please indicate the 
degree to which that experience affected them (in terms of lost data, lost time, 
monetary losses, identity theft etc.) If no, please select 'no'. 
 
 Perceived vulnerability 4.6.2
The construct perceived vulnerability refers to the degree to which a user believes that 
they are likely to experience password related threats. The items developed for this 
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study were adapted from those used by Zhang and McDowell (2009). Their study used 
three items to measure users’ perceived vulnerability to password guessing and password 
cracking. Their items were used as a starting point in developing the items for this study. 
The four items shown in  Table 4.2  were used in this study and measure perceived 
vulnerability on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) labeled ‘strongly disagree’ and (7) 
labeled ‘strongly agree’.  
Table 4.2: Items used to measure perceived vulnerability 
Consider the passwords you use to log into your important email accounts and where you keep 
the password, for example on a piece of paper or saved on your computer etc.  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
PVUL01 There is a chance that someone could successfully guess at least one of my passwords 
PVUL02 
There is a chance that someone could successfully crack at least one of my passwords 
using password cracking software 
PVUL03 
There is a chance that someone could hack into at least one of my important email 
accounts 
PVUL04 
If someone hacked into my important email account, there is a chance that they could 
guess my other important passwords 
 
 Perceived severity 4.6.3
The construct perceived severity relates to the degree to which a user believes that if 
they were exposed to password related threats the impact would be detrimental. The 
items  used by Zhang and McDowell (2009) to measure users’ perceived severity of 
password threats and were used as a starting point in developing the items for this study. 
In this study, the six items shown on Table 4.3 were used to measure perceived 
severity. They were measured on a 7-point scale where (1) indicated ‘not at all severe’ 
and (7) indicated ‘very severe’.  
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Table 4.3: Items used to measure perceived severity 
Consider the type of information you have saved in your important email accounts and the type 
of passwords you use for logging into your important email accounts. 
How severe do you think the consequences would be if: 
PSEV01 Someone successfully guessed any of your important email passwords 
PSEV02 Someone hacked into any of your important email accounts 
PSEV03 
Someone used any of your important email accounts to send messages to your 
contact list without your knowledge 
PSEV04 Someone obtained your personal information from your important email accounts 
PSEV05 
Someone changed the password to your important email accounts without your 
knowledge 
PSEV06 Someone stole the password to one of your important email accounts 
 
 Perceived threat 4.6.4
The construct perceived threat relates to the degree to which users are worried about 
password related threats. In PMT literature, this is referred to as fear arousal and 
described using mood adjectives such as frightened, anxious, nervous or worried. The 
items developed for this study were adapted from those developed by Milne et al. 
(2002) to investigate the degree to which respondents felt frightened, scared or 
worried. The items (see Table 4.4) were modified to reflect concern for password 
related threats. 
Table 4.4: Items used to measure perceived threat 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
PTHR01 
The thought of someone guessing the password to any of my important email 
accounts makes me worried 
PTHR02 
The thought of someone hacking into any of my important email accounts makes me 
worried 
PTHR03 
The thought of someone using any of my important email accounts without my 
knowledge makes me worried 
PTHR04 
The thought of someone using my personal information from any of my important 
email accounts makes me worried 
PTHR05 
The thought of someone changing or deleting information obtained from any of my 
important email accounts makes me worried 
PTHR06 
The thought of someone using password monitoring software to record my important 




     
The six items shown in Table 4.4 were used to measure the construct perceived threat on 
a 7-point Likert scale where (1) indicated ‘strongly disagree’ and (7) indicated 
‘strongly agree’. 
 Perceived password effectiveness 4.6.5
The construct perceived password effectiveness refers to the degree to which a user 
believes the recommended password guidelines will prevent password related threats. 
The items developed for this study are adapted from those used by Zhang and 
McDowell (2009).   
Based on the PMT construct response efficacy (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rippetoe & 
Rogers, 1987), the items developed in the study by Zhang and McDowell measure the 
degree to which participants believe that password rules such as using strong 
passwords would protect their online accounts. Their items had a Cronbach alpha of 
0.96. In this study, the items were also based on the recommended password guidelines 
described in the NIST (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2009) password guidelines and US-
CERT (McDowell et al., 2009). The degree to which a user believes that these 
guidelines are effective was assessed. 
The construct perceived password effectiveness was measured using the six items 
shown in Table 4.5 and is measured on a 7-point scale where (1) is labeled ‘strongly 
disagree’ and (7) is labeled ‘strongly agree’.  
 
107 
     
Table 4.5: Items used to measure perceived password effectiveness 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
PEFF01 
Making sure that my passwords contain a combination of numbers, letters and 
symbols will prevent my passwords from being guessed 
PEFF02 
Making sure that my passwords do not contain any dictionary words will make them 
more difficult to guess 
PEFF03 
Making sure that my passwords do not contain personal information such as my date 
of birth will make them more difficult to guess 
PEFF04 
I can protect my online accounts better if I use a different password for each of my 
online accounts 
PEFF05 I can protect my online accounts better if I change my passwords regularly 
PEFF06 I can protect my online accounts better if I use a long complex password 
 
 Password self-efficacy 4.6.6
The construct password self-efficacy refers to the degree to which a user believes they 
are capable of creating strong passwords. The items used in this study were adapted 
from the computer self-efficacy items developed by Compeau and Higgins (1995) to 
measure respondents’ confidence in their software skills. Their measure of computer 
self-efficacy relates to a user’s confidence in performing unfamiliar computing tasks 
given a range of circumstances. For example, participants in their study indicated 
whether they were confident in using unfamiliar computer software if they had step-
by-step instructions or written manuals.  Their instrument consisted of 10 items 
measured on a 10-point scale from (1) ‘not at all confident’ to (10) ‘totally confident’ 
with a reported Cronbach alpha of 0.95. 
In this study, the four items shown in Table 4.6 were developed to measure password 
self-efficacy. The items are similar to those used by Compeau and Higgins (1995) with 
slight modifications aimed to reflect a typical password login environment. The four 
items used in this study also relate to a range of circumstances that users face when 
creating passwords such as availability of time or instructions. Such circumstances are 
said to have a significant effect on an individual’s confidence in performing unfamiliar 
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tasks (Bandura, 1991; Compeau & Higgins, 1995). The construct password self-
efficacy was measured using a 7-point scale where (1) indicated ‘not at all confident’ 
and (7) indicated ‘totally confident’.  
Table 4.6: Items used to measure password self-efficacy 
Consider the following scenario. Due to an increase in password hacking incidents, the password 
requirements for your email account have been changed. You have been asked to change your 
password immediately and to make sure that your new password follows strict password 
guidelines provided by the system. 
Please indicate how confident you are that you would be able to create a password that is strong 
enough to protect your email account from being hacked into. 
I would be able to create a strong password that is difficult to hack... 
PSEF01 If I had instructions on how to create a strong password 
PSEF02 If I had step-by-step instructions on how to memorize a strong password 
PSEF03 If I had a lot of time to create a strong password 
PSEF04 If I had used strong passwords before 
 
 Perceived cost 4.6.7
The construct perceived cost relates to the degree to which a user believes that 
remembering passwords would be difficult if password guidelines were followed. 
Perceived cost corresponds to the response cost construct described in PMT (Rippetoe 
& Rogers, 1987). The items in this study were adapted from the measurement 
instrument used by Milne et al. (2002) to operationalize the PMT construct, response 
cost. Milne et al. (2002) used a 4-item scale to measure participants’ beliefs about the 
cost of exercising at three different times yielding an average Cronbach alpha of 0.75.  
In this study, the objective was to create items that measure beliefs about difficulty in 
remembering passwords when specific guidelines are followed. The items used by Milne 
et al. (2002) were adjusted to match the password guidelines recommended by the US-
CERT (McDowell et al., 2009). The six items shown in Table 4.7 were developed for 
this study and measured using a 7-point scale where (1) was labeled ‘strongly disagree’ 
and (7) was labeled ‘strongly agree’. 
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Table 4.7: Items used to measure perceived cost 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
COST01 
Remembering a password that contains a combination of numbers, letters and 
symbols would be difficult 
COST 02 Remembering a password that is long and complex would be difficult 
COST 03 
Remembering a password that does not contain any dictionary words would be 
difficult 
COST 04 
Remembering a password that does not contain personal information such as date 
of birth would be difficult 
COST05 
If I use different passwords for each of my web accounts, it would be difficult for me 
to remember them all 
COST06 If I change my passwords regularly, it would be difficult for me to remember them 
 
 Intentions to comply 4.6.8
Based on the PMT construct protection motivation (Maddux & Rogers, 1983), in this 
study intentions to comply represents the degree to which a user intends to follow a set 
of recommended password guidelines. This study investigates users’ willingness or 
intentions to comply with a set of password guidelines on their important online email 
accounts. This study described an important email account as an email account set up 
for receiving important information such as email messages from friends and family 
members, online banking notifications and online shopping confirmations. The items 
used to measure intentions to comply were adapted from items developed by Bulgurcu 
et al. (2010)  based on Ajzen’s TPB (Ajzen, 1991). Bulgurcu et al. (2010) reported a 
Cronbach alpha of 0.977.  
Table 4.8  shows the six items used to measure the construct intentions to comply with 
password guidelines. The items measure participants’ intentions to comply with 
password guidelines as described in the NIST (Scarfone & Souppaya, 2009) password 
guidelines and the US-CERT’s recommendations for choosing and protecting 
passwords (McDowell et al., 2009). The items were measured on a 7-point scale where 
(1) was labeled ‘not at all likely’ and (7) was labeled ‘very likely’. 
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Table 4.8: Items used to measure intentions to comply with password guidelines 
If you were required to change the password for one of your important email accounts, to what 
extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
INTC01 
I would choose a password that follows the password length requirement suggested by 
the system 
INTC02 
I would choose a password with a combination of numbers, letters, and symbols as 
suggested by the system 
INTC03 I would choose a password that is difficult to guess 
INTC04 I would choose a password that follows all the guidelines provided by the system 
INTC05 I would choose a password that is different from my old password 
INTC06 I would choose a password that is different from my other online passwords 
 
 Actual password compliance 4.6.9
In this study, the construct actual password compliance represents password strength. 
Password strength was calculated for the two passwords collected using the survey 
instrument for Phase I. Different studies have measured password strength in a variety 
of ways. For example, studies have used password cracking tools to estimate how long 
it would take to crack a password (Cazier & Medlin, 2006; Mazurek et al., 2013; Vu et 
al., 2007; Weber et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2010). However, this method of measuring 
password strength has some limitations. First, numerous password cracking tools exist 
today, most of which use different cracking algorithms making some more efficient 
than others (Cazier & Medlin, 2006). In addition, the amount of time it takes to crack a 
password using cracking software can vary depending on a computer’s processor 
speed. Should a password cracking tool be used, the processor speed should at least be 
reported as did Zhang et al. (2010) whose study also used the password cracking 
method. 
Another method of measuring password strength is to determine the degree of 
character variation in a given password, also known as entropy or unpredictability of a 
password (Shay et al., 2010).  Entropy is a “measure of uncertainty” (Shannon, 2001 p. 
21) and can be applied in different areas of communication (Burr et al., 2013; Burr et 
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al., 2006). In relation to passwords, entropy, generally measured in bits, is a measure 
of unpredictability of passwords, or how difficult a password is to guess (Burr et al., 
2013; Burr et al., 2006; Komanduri et al., 2011). This method has an advantage 
because it uses a mathematical formula to calculate password strength, and thus 
independent of a computer’s processor speed. Additionally, lack of character variation 
is a key problem with user created passwords (Burr et al., 2013; Burr et al., 2006; 
Jermyn, Mayer, Monrose, Reiter, & Rubin, 1999). Therefore measuring password 
strength using a measure of character variation (entropy) seemed appropriate for this 
study.  
In this study, password strength was measured using Shannon’s (2001) formula for 
calculating entropy (see Table 4.9). Password strength guidelines included in the 
password strength measurement are based on the NIST (Burr et al., 2013; Burr et al., 
2006; Scarfone & Souppaya, 2009) password guidelines.  






Entropy per character 
(bits) 
1 SC 32 5.000 
2 N 10 3.322 
3 SL 26 4.700 
4 CL 26 4.700 
5 SC, N 42 5.392 
6 SC, SL 58 5.858 
7 SC, CL 58 5.858 
8 N, SL 36 5.170 
9 N, CL 36 5.170 
10 SL, CL 52 5.700 
11 SC, N, SL 68 6.087 
12 SC, N, CL 68 6.087 
13 SC, SL, CL 84 6.392 
14 N, SL, CL 62 5.954 
15 SL, N, SL, CL 94 6.555 
SC = Special Character; N = Number; SL = Small Letter; CL = Capital Letter 
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To calculate password entropy using Shannon’s formula two key units of information 
must be determined from a given password. First, the number of possible characters 
based on the 94 printable standard keyboard character-set (labeled character width) is 
determined. Then the actual number of characters in a password is totaled. Using these 
two values, the number of attempts an attacker would need to try out all possible 
combinations in a password cracking attack can be calculated.  The resulting value is 
measured in bits; a high bit value indicates a strong password. 
The following two examples illustrate how password entropy was calculated in this 
study. The first example is a 9-digit pin code selected from a combination of any of the 
10 digits found on a standard keyboard. The character width or the number of possible 
characters is 10 as each digit has 10 possible choices. The pin code has an entropy of 
3.322 bits per character
1
 and a total entropy of (9*3.322) = 29.898 bits. In other words, 




The second example is of a 9 character password selected from a combination of any 
of the 94 printable standard keyboard characters. The password can have a 
combination of numbers, upper and lowercase letters, and symbols, giving it a 
character width of 94, an entropy of 6.555 bits per character
2
 and a total entropy of 
(9*6.555) = 58.995 bits. However, if any of the characters are repeated, the total 
entropy is reduced. For example, the total password entropy of the 9 digit pin 
“122455789” is reduced to (7*3.322) = 23.25 bits. The higher the password entropy (in 
                                                 
1
 Entropy per character for a PIN number with a width of 10 = Log2(W) =  Log2(10) = 3.322 
2
 Entropy per character for a password with a width of 94 = Log2(W) = Log2(94) = 6.555 
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bits) the greater the number of possible values (2
bits
) which would take an attacker a 
longer time to guess (Burr et al., 2006).  
To automate the process of calculating password strength, a password analysis tool 
was developed and coded in Visual Basic. Figure 4.5 shows how the password strength 
of the 9 digit pin “122455789” was calculated using the password strength analysis 
tool.  
Figure 4.5: Password strength analysis tool used in this study 
 
 
Once the password strength was calculated a repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to determine if there was a significant increase in password strength after 
the training. To examine if there was an improvement in password strength, password 
strength was also examined within each group comparing the passwords created at the 
beginning of the study (time 1) and the passwords created at the conclusion of the 
study (time 2). Then a within-group ANOVA was conducted to determine if the 
improvement was a result of the training. 
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4.7 Phase II data collection  
This section describes the data collection procedure and survey instruments used in the 
follow-up session designed to address the research question of whether the effects of 
fear appeals can be maintained over time. Data was collected from the participants 
who completed Phase I and who were invited back to complete Phase II. However, as 
the participants were to remain anonymous there were no unique values attached to the 
participants to identify them across the two phases. 
One survey instrument was prepared. The survey instrument was organized into three 
sections: i) a login section where participants entered the password created in Phase I, 
ii) items measuring password memorability, and (iii) a final section measuring 
intentions to comply at follow-up. Both groups completed the same survey 
questionnaire.  However, data was collected from the control and treatment groups 
separately. Therefore, two separate online surveys were used for the follow-up data 
collection and administered using SurveyGizmo version 3.1 (2012). 
 Phase II data collection procedure 4.7.1
Data collection for Phase II followed six weeks later from Phase I, and was conducted 
(see Figure 4.1). Both control and treatment group participants were invited back via 
an email from Authentic Response Inc. to complete a follow-up questionnaire and to 
view the preliminary results from Phase I. A copy of the email invitation is located in 
Appendix E. Access to the follow-up questionnaire required the participants to enter 
the passwords created at the end of Phase I. In anticipation that some participants 
would forget their passwords, a generic password, as shown in Figure 4.6, was created 
and issued to those who forgot their passwords at the login screen. The generic 
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password was also used during analysis to determine the proportion of the participants 
who forgot their previously created passwords. 
Figure 4.6: Phase II login screen 
 
On the first page of Phase II survey, the returning respondents were presented with 
information about this Phase of the data collection and the approximate duration of the 
study (see Figure 4.7 for an overview of the survey instrument).  




Intentions to comply 
Download Phase I findings
‘Thank You’ page
Reimbursement




     
The participants were also informed of their right to privacy and provided with the 
opportunity to consent to participate by clicking on a check box. Here they were also 
informed that they will be reimbursement. Lastly, to assess if there were any changes 
to compliance intentions, the participants completed the same items described in 
Section 4.6.8, measuring the construct intentions to comply. For both groups, Phase II 
survey was completed in approximately 5 minutes. 
 Phase II survey instrument 4.7.2
The survey instrument was used to collect three types of information (see Appendix F 
for the complete follow-up survey instrument). It was first used to collect actual 
passwords created in Phase I. Password information was collected at the login section 
where participants entered their previously created password or generic password.  The 
next two sections of the follow-up survey consisted of items to measure password 
memorability and intentions to comply respectively. The items used to measure 
intentions to comply are identical to the ones used in Phase I (see Section 4.6.8).  
The construct password memorability relates to the degree to which a user can 
remember a password. The construct password memorability is operationalized using 
two constructs: actual password memorability, which refers to whether they can 
actually remember their password, and perceived password memorability, which refers 
to whether they perceive their password as easy to remember. The measure of actual 
password memorability was to gauge whether the participants used the generic 
password or the original password.  
The measure of perceived password memorability consisted of one item, “It was easy 
for me to remember the password I created for this study”. The item was based on a 
measure of perceived ease of use in a study of usability of passphrases by Keith et al. 
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(2007). In this study, the item was modified to measure perceived ease of password 
recall using a 7-point scale where (1) indicated ‘strongly disagree’ and (7) indicated 
‘strongly’. 
4.8 Data analysis techniques 
Data management was performed using SPSS version 19. However, the primary data 
analysis methods elected for this study was Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) using 
AMOS version 19 (Arbuckle, 2010a), while multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used to examine group 
differences. 
A one-way MANOVA was conducted to examine the overall effect of the fear appeals 
(the password security information and training) on the participants’ password threat 
perceptions and efficacy perceptions. One-way ANOVA was also conducted on 
individual variables to test the hypothesis that the participants who were presented 
with the training materials will have a higher perceived severity, perceived 
vulnerability, perceived threat, perceived password effectiveness, password self-
efficacy, perceived cost and intentions to comply with password guidelines than those 
who were not. A composite score was computed for each latent variable using 
regression imputation in AMOS version 19. A split-plot ANOVA with repeated 
measures and a between group analysis was conducted to examine if the participants 
who were presented with the training materials will have a higher password strength. 
The computed composite score is based on the factors scores of the measurement 
items. 
SEM is one of many multivariate analysis techniques available today. Other examples 
of multivariate analysis techniques include multiple regression, factor analysis and 
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MANOVA (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2010). What separates SEM 
from other multivariate analysis techniques is SEM’s ability to combine different 
aspects of multivariate analysis techniques (factor analysis and multiple regression) 
and simultaneously estimate relationships between numerous latent variables while 
examining relationships among observed variables.  
In addition to performing simultaneous parameter estimation, the SEM method 
separates estimation of errors associated with the measurement model to account for 
any unexplained phenomenon. Ultimately the measurement models and structural 
models are examined, and in the process errors associated with each measurement item 
are accounted for as well. SEM allows for simultaneous examination of multiple 
observed variables and their latent constructs and relationships amongst the latent 
constructs. This also means that multiple relationships can be explored at the same 
time.  
In SEM, the concept of latent construct or latent variable is used to describe a variable 
that cannot be measured directly (Byrne, 2010). Because a latent construct represents a 
phenomenon that is not directly quantifiable, an indirect measure of the latent construct 
is used to operationalize the latent variable. For example, in this study the latent 
construct perceived vulnerability cannot be measured directly. Therefore, a set of 
measurement items, also known as observed variables, were used to measure the latent 
construct perceived vulnerability. The terms latent construct, unobserved variable or 
latent variable are synonymous. 
SEM has two distinct types of model, structural model and measurement model, which 
relate to the multiple regression analysis and factors analysis upon which SEM is 
based. The structural model comprises a set of dependent relationships between latent 
variables. A single-headed arrow is typically used to represent the relationships. The 
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measurement model is a set of observed variables and their underlying latent 
constructs. The measurement component, models relationships of the measurement 
items to the underlying latent variable and enable the ability to assess the underlying 
construct. 
Although SEM allows for a one-step approach to testing models, that is, a 
simultaneous estimation of relationships amongst multiple observed variables and their 
underlying latent variables combined with path analysis, a two-step approach is 
recommended instead (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Hair et al., 2010). A two-step 
approach involves assessing the measurement model first then testing the structural 
model for relationships. The first step is the assessment of the measurement model, 
which involves establishing model fit and validity of the observed and latent variables 
before testing the structural model. Whereas the second step is when the path model is 
tested and significance of hypothesized relationships amongst the latent variables is 
assessed. The two-step approach to SEM ensures that any issues with the measurement 
model are dealt with and eliminated where necessary before proceeding with path 
analysis. As such, a two-step approach was used in this study to first identify and 
assess the measurement model before testing the structural model. The following 
sections describe the two-step SEM process undertaken in this study. 
 Measurement Model 4.8.1
The goal of measurement model assessment is to firstly find measurement items that 
best represent the underlying latent construct, then to assess the items for validity and 
finally to evaluate how well the observed data fit the hypothesized model (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988; Hair et al., 2010). As it is rare to find one measurement item that 
perfectly measures a latent construct, multiple observed variables are used.  Observed 
variables are a major part of the data collection process. For example, observed 
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variables in this study are the responses collected from the online questionnaire 
described in Section 4.6. A set of these responses (observed data) represent an 
underlying construct, the latent variable.  As it is expected that the observed items do 
not entirely measure the latent constructs, the measurement model must also account 
for this expected inaccuracy. This measurement inaccuracy is known as measurement 
error in SEM. Therefore, during the first step of the two-step SEM process, observed 
variables and their associated errors are specified.  
Once data is collected the observed variables must be assessed for construct validity.  
Construct validity estimates how well the observed variables measure the latent 
construct they are designed to represent (Hair et al., 2010). Since structural model 
analysis involves examining relationships between latent constructs, construct validity 
was assessed prior to analysis of the structural model. Although, the measurement 
items used in this study are from previously validated items, evidence of construct 
validity is of importance and was sought for this study. Construct validity is implies 
that the hypothesized latent constructs are distinct from each other, represented as 
discriminant validity, and that the observed variables have high factor loadings on the 
construct they represent, represented as convergent validity. The indicators of 
discriminant validity and convergent validity are described next.  
Discriminant validity is a measure used to demonstrate that latent constructs are truly 
different from each other. Each set of observed variables is unidimensional and 
represent only one underlying latent construct. To show that a set of items are 
unidimensional and that the latent constructs are distinct, there should be no cross 
loadings between latent constructs and no cross loadings between correlated error 
terms (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Hair et al., 2010). This means that a set of latent 
constructs that cross load is indicative of discriminant validity problems. This can be 
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determined by examining the Modification Indices (M.I.) in AMOS where large values 
between items indicate cross loadings.   
In addition to assessing the uniqueness of each latent construct, in this study a more 
rigorous measure of discriminant validity based on Average Extracted Variance (AVE) 
values (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Hair et al., 2010) was also used. AVE is the average 
percentage of variance explained by the observed variables for a latent construct or the 
amount of variance observed variables have in common (Hair et al., 2010), as shown in 
the formula below. The AVE values of two latent constructs should be greater than the 
square of the correlation between them as a larger AVE value indicates that a construct 
has more variance in common with its own measurement items (Hair et al., 2010).    
 
Average Extracted Variance (AVE) =     ∑𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠2 
                                                                                 n 
 
To examine convergent validity two measures, Construct Reliability (CR) and AVE, 
are looked at. CR is only one of several measures of reliability. CR is used in SEM 
while another measure of reliability, Cronbach’s Alpha, is commonly used in 
traditional statistical analysis techniques. CR is derived from summation of squared 
factor loadings, which is the loading of the items on the latent variables (Hair et al., 
2010), as shown in the formula below. To demonstrate convergent validity, CR should 
be greater 0.7 and also greater than AVE, and AVE should be larger than 0.5 (Hair et 
al., 2010).  
 
Construct Reliability (CR) =                     (∑𝑆𝑡𝑑. 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠)2 




     
The weight of the factor loading is an important aspect of convergent validity because 
in SEM models both CR and AVE are calculated using standardized factor loading 
estimates. As a rule of thumb, factor loadings greater than 0.5 are considered 
acceptable and 0.7 are recommended (Hair et al., 2010) and reflect that a set of 
observed variables that do not correlate well with each other is indicative of 
convergent validity issues.   
4.8.1.1 Sample size consideration 
When using SEM careful consideration of the sample size is required because SEM 
applications use parameter estimation algorithms that produce unreliable results when 
small sample sizes are used (Hair et al., 2010). Guidelines about sample size cutoff 
values vary in the SEM literature, with recommended values ranging from 50 to 500 
depending on the SEM estimation technique applied (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996; 
Hair et al., 2010). The sample size required is also dependent on the following: the 
number of measurement items per latent variable and data characteristics such as 
multivariate non-normality and missing data  (Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001; Curran et 
al., 1996; Hair et al., 2010; Marsh & Hau, 1999).  
An estimation technique is a mathematical calculation of estimates of the parameters 
identified in a given model. A Monte Carlo simulation study conducted by Curran et 
al. (1996) showed that when using the asymptotically distribution free (ADF) 
estimation technique, a sample size of less than 500 yields unreliable results. The study 
further showed that the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation technique yields stable 
results even at a sample size of 200.  
This study follows two strategies for determining appropriate sample size. Regarding 
the link between sample size and estimation techniques, one strategy was to take into 
consideration the SEM software used in this study and the estimation techniques 
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provided by the software.  In this study AMOS version 19 (Arbuckle, 2010a) was used. 
The AMOS software provides ADF and ML among other estimation methods 
(Arbuckle, 2010b). ML produces more accurate parameter estimates under 
multivariate-normality conditions and is therefore the most frequently used estimation 
technique in SEM (Hair et al., 2010). While the ADF technique requires a large sample 
size, typically greater than 500 (Boomsma, 2000), ML can produce reliable results 
even with a sample size of 200. Therefore, a minimum sample size of 200 per unit of 
analysis was deemed appropriate and sought for this study.  
Another strategy was to ensure that there were enough measurement items per latent 
variable.  When a model has a small number of items per latent variable, a large 
sample size is needed for any SEM estimation method to yield reliable results 
(Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001; Marsh & Hau, 1999). Likewise, increasing the number 
of items per latent variable can make up for a small sample size. In their simulation 
study, Marsh and Hau (1999) showed that when only two items per latent variable 
were measured a sample size greater than 400 was needed. Their results also indicated 
that a smaller sample size of 200 can yield reliable results when three to four 
measurement items per latent variable are used. Further, in an extreme case of six to 
twelve items per latent variable a sample size as small as 50 is sufficient (Boomsma & 
Hoogland, 2001). Given the high number of items per latent variable in this study, a 
sample size of at least 200 per study group was deemed appropriate for this study. 
Therefore, a sample size of ≥ 200 per study group was sought. 
4.8.1.2 Data screening process 
The observed data was screened for missing values, univariate normality, specifically 
skewness and kurtosis, and multivariate outliers. Performing tests for normality is 
essential and should be conducted before using any multivariate analysis methods such 
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as SEM (Arbuckle, 2010b; Byrne, 2010). Screening for missing values, outliers, 
skewness and kurtosis was conducted using SPSS version 19 (SPSS, 2010) and 
screening for multivariate outliers was conducted in AMOS. 
The test for missing values was conducted using Little's Missing Completely at 
Random (MCAR) test which is used to examine if any existing missing values follow a 
specific pattern or if the values are missing completely at random (Hair et al., 2010). In 
this study the MCAR test was conducted to firstly examine if the participants had left 
any survey questions unanswered and if so, what proportion of the questions were 
unanswered. Secondly, the MCAR test’s p-value was examined to determine if the 
unanswered questions were completely random. If less than 10% of the values are 
missing and the MCAR test yields a non-significant p-value then any method of data 
imputation can be applied to remedy any potential missing data issues (Hair et al., 
2010; Schafer & Graham, 2002). In this study, data imputation was conducted using 
Expectation Maximization (EM) in SPSS version 19 prior to conducting SEM analysis. 
In this study, a test for univariate normality was conducted to investigate whether the 
data distributions for individual (univariate) variables are weighted heavily towards the 
left or right (skewness) or if the distribution is excessively flat or peaked (kurtosis). It 
is important to test for skewness and kurtosis for several reasons: skewness will affect 
mean estimates while kurtosis will impact variances and covariance tests (DeCarlo, 
1997). As analysis of covariance is the basis for SEM as used in this study, severely 
kurtotic data would be of concern to the study. Likewise, as mean differences between 
control and treatment groups are also a focus of the study, severely skewed data would 
be problematic. With univariate skewness and kurtosis the impact decreases as sample 
size approaches 200 (Hair et al., 2010). Given that the sample size for both the control 
group and the treatment group was greater than 200, attention was paid only to extreme 
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cases of univariate skewness and kurtosis. Univariate kurtosis greater than  ± 7 and 
skewness greater than  ± 3 are considered problematic (Curran et al., 1996) and 
therefore of concern to this study.  
As SEM is a form of multivariate data analysis the multivariate outlier test conducted 
in this study aimed to examine if there were participants who had extreme values on 
multiple variables. Mahalanobis d-squared values (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 2010; 
Kline, 2011) provided in AMOS (Arbuckle, 2010a) were used to identify potential 
multivariate outliers. As suggested by Hair et al. (2010) and Kline (2011) a 
conservative p-value (p<0.001) was used to identify possible influential outliers. This 
prevents discarding cases that are representative of the population, a mistake that could 
limit the ability to generalize the study results. 
4.8.1.3 Goodness-of-fit Indices and thresholds for this study 
The fundamental goal of the measurement model assessment is to establish validity 
and reliability of the observed items and the underlying constructs they represent. How 
well the observed data fit the hypothesized model, referred to model fit, is then 
assessed. A measurement model is of good fit if the difference between the observed 
data and the hypothesized model is small (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 2010; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). To evaluate model fit several fit statistics are used, and over the years, 
different cut-off values have been suggested. With no consensus on the exact cut-off 
values, the SEM literature recommends reporting more than one fit statistic.  
Many of the fit indices are sensitive to factors such as sample size, number of observed 
variables or sample distribution such as skewness or kurtosis (Hair et al., 2010; 
Sharma, Mukherjee, Kumar, & Dillon, 2005). For example, chi-square (
2
) can 
fluctuate when sample sizes exceeds 200, and while a non-significant 
2
 is sought, 
when a large sample size is used a significant 
2 p-value is expected (Byrne, 2010; 
 
126 
     
Hair et al., 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Historically, the 
2
 statistic was the primary 
measure of model fit in SEM, however due to its volatility, indices that are less 
sensitive to sample size, have been developed as alternates (Hair et al., 2010). These 
alternates are however sensitive to a variety of other factors. For example, while 
Goodness-of-fit Index (GFI) was developed to minimize the effects of sample size, it is 
sensitive to sample distribution (Bollen, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1998). Further, the 
formula for estimating Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) includes 
2
 
therefore, sample size indirectly affects SRMR (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004; Tanaka, 
1993). 
Cutoff values for the fit indices must also be determined. As with fit indices, setting 
cutoff values is also a vexing challenge. For example, when an absolute cutoff value is 
used, models with numerous observed variables would likely be rejected than models 
with few observed variables (Sharma et al., 2005). As such, the SEM literature 
recommends multiple fit indices and provides various guidelines for cutoff values. 
Table 4.10 summarizes the goodness-of-fit indices and cutoff values used in this study. 
Table 4.10: Goodness-of-fit indices and cutoff values used in this study 
 
Goodness-of-Fit Indices Cutoff Values or Rules 
Chi-square
2
)  The smaller the value the better 
Chi-square significance (
2
 p-value) >.05 or <.05 if sample size is ≥ 200 
Normed Chi-square (
2
/df )  Between 1 and 2 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) >.95 (Hair et al., 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999) 
Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) 
< .50 or < .08 if CFI is > .95 (Hair et al., 2010; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999; Sharma et al., 2005)  
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) >.95 (Hair et al., 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999) 
Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) 
Minimum <.06, < .80 – 0.9 if CFI is > .92 (Hair et al., 
2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999),  
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) 








     
The numerous fit indices developed to date can be distinguished by their functions and 
categorized as either absolute, incremental or parsimony fit indices (Hair et al., 2010; 
Hu & Bentler, 1998).  Given their different functions and sensitivity to such factors as 
sample size, reporting at least one fit index from each category is recommended (Hair 
et al., 2010). 
Absolute indices directly measure how well the observed data fit the hypothesized 
model. Chi-square (
2
), Normed Chi-square (
2
 / df or 
2
: df), Standardized Root Mean 
Residual (SRMR) and Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) are used 
in this study. Given its volatility, the 
2 
statistic is reported in conjunction with 
Normed Chi-square. Normed Chi-square is the degrees of freedom (df) associated with 
the 
2 
and is calculated as a ratio of 
2
: df. As discussed earlier, a non-significant 
2
 
can be expected with sample sizes larger than 200 (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 2010; Hu 
& Bentler, 1999). As a sample size of greater than 200 was used for each group in this 
study, a significant 
2
 can be expected. Therefore, normed chi-square is reported as a 
supplement to 
2
. While a ratio (normed chi-square) between 2 and 5 is acceptable, a 
ratio of between 1 and 2 is indicative of a good fitting model (Hair et al., 2010). 
As mentioned earlier, with large samples models tend to be rejected due to a 
significant 
2 p-value. RMSEA was developed to remedy this problem, and as shown 
in a Monte Carlo study by Sharma et al. (2005), RMSEA is not affected by sample size 
larger than 200. As an absolute fit index, RMSEA assesses how well the observed data 
fits the hypothesized model. As an added benefit, RMSEA also measures how well the 
hypothesized model fits the population (Hair et al., 2010). Another absolute index used 
in this study is the SRMR, which assesses the discrepancy between observed data and 
hypothesized model. SRMR is sensitive to misspecified latent variable covariances 
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(Hu & Bentler, 1998) and is therefore a good method of identifying misspecified 
models.  
Coincidentally, both SRMR and RMSEA are measures of badness-of-fit in that larger 
values indicate bad fit. Including both SRMR and RMSEA we satisfy the guideline 
that at least one badness-of-fit index be evaluated. The cutoff values used in this study 
for these indices are < .50 as recommended for RMSEA and < 0.60 for SRMR the 
cutoff values is < .60 (Hair, et al., 2010; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Sharma, et al., 2005) 
Incremental indices, sometimes called comparative indices compare 
2
 for a baseline 
model with 
2
 for the posited model. A baseline model, also referred to as a null or 
independence model, is a model that assumes that the observed variables are 
uncorrelated. As such, a baseline model will yield large 
2
 values and thus be of poor 
fit. Hence an incremental index compares the hypothesized model with a model of 
poor fit. Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) are the 
incremental indices used in this study. TLI is used to compare the normed chi-square 
of a hypothesized model with that of the baseline model and is favored as it is 
generally not affected by sample size (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Before CFI was 
developed, Normed Fit Index (NFI) was one of the primary incremental indices used. 
However, complex models with many parameters inflate the NFI values. In contrast, 
CFI accounts for model complexity and for that reason is preferred to NFI (Hair et al., 
2010). While CFI compares the 
2
 of the hypothesized model and the baseline model, 
TLI compares the normed chi-square values of the two models. Therefore, this study 
reports both the CFI and TLI values. A cutoff value of >.95 (Hair, et al., 2010; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999) for both CFI and TLI is used in this study. 
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When evaluating the 
2
, generally a small value indicates good fit. A problem is that 
2
 
can be manipulated by adding parameters to the model which in turn deflates the 
2
 
value (Mulaik et al., 1989). Manipulating the 
2
 fit index in this manner can result in 
meaningless parameters that are only specific to the sample data and therefore 
ungeneralizable. When generalizing the results the model should ideally be 
parsimonious, with fewer parameters. Parsimony fit indices are adjustments of 
absolute and incremental indices that favor models with more parameters. Parsimony 
fit indices such as Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI)  are intended to ensure that 
model complexity (number of estimated parameters) is accounted for and models with 
more parameters are penalized. The advantage of PNFI is that it combines elements of 
parsimony and elements of goodness-of-fit together (Mulaik et al., 1989), and being 
the most commonly used parsimony index (Hair et al., 2010), PNFI was applied in this 
study. Although values approaching one and zero indicate parsimony and lack of 
parsimony respectively,  PNFI has no absolute cutoff point (Hair et al., 2010; Hooper, 
Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). 
PNFI is generally used to compare models where a model with a higher value is more 
parsimonious and is therefore preferred (Hair et al., 2010). Also to compare models, 
chi-square difference (
2
) between two models can be calculated. The 
2
 is also 
regarded as a goodness-of-fit index and is used to compare multi group models such as 
the ones used in this study. A significant 
2
 p-value (<.05) indicates that the multi 
group models are significantly different. Analysis of the multi group measurement 
model is discussed in the following section. 
4.8.1.4 Baseline model specification and re-specification 
Once goodness-of-fit and validity of the measurement model is assessed, the structural 
model can then be tested. However, in the case of a multi group study such as this 
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study, it is important to first assess whether the measurement model operates the same 
way across groups. When comparing data across more than one group, it is the 
assumption that the observed variables measure the same underlying latent construct 
and that they behave the same way across groups. This assumption is statistically 
tested using SEM analysis tools at the measurement model stage (Byrne, 2008).  
As this study includes a multi-group analysis, before performing a test of the structural 
model the goal was to test whether the measurement model behaves the same way 
across the two groups. Testing for multi-group equivalence on a measurement model, 
as described by Byrne (2008), involves determining a good-fitting baseline model also 
known as a configural model. The model is established separately for each group. This 
is the proposed measurement model and is tested separately for each group.  
In practice, it may be difficult to find a fully identical measurement model across 
groups. In such situations one group may have error covariance specified on a set of 
observed variables, while other groups may have none or they may have error 
covariance specified on different observed variables (Arbuckle, 2010b; Byrne, 2008; 
Hair et al., 2010). This was the case in findings presented by Byrne et al. (1989). If a 
fully equivalent measurement model cannot be achieved, structural analysis can still 
proceed if certain conditions are met. In addition to a priori theoretical knowledge of 
existing group differences (Byrne, 1989, 2008), partial equivalence is acceptable if at 
least two observed variables per latent variable are equal (Hair et al., 2010).  
During the process of determining a good fitting baseline model, goodness-of-fit 
statistics were used to establish model fit. Covariance M.I. which are calculated for all 
unspecified parameters, were used to identify misspecified parameters. Although an 
M.I. value greater than 4.0 suggests some degree of misspecification they should only 
be used as a guide to identifying potential problematic items (Hair et al., 2010). Only 
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excessively high M.I. values were used to identify problematic measurement items and 
allow error terms to covary.  
Finally, this study used standardized residuals estimates to examine the degree of 
discrepancy (residuals) between the hypothesized measurement model and the 
observed sample data. Smaller residuals indicate better fit (Hair et al., 2010). 
Standardized residuals between 2.5 and 4 are large but not necessarily a problem. 
However, they should be examined for other problems associated with specific items 
(Hair et al., 2010).  
A baseline model is final when all items have been examined for reliability issues. 
Following the measurement model analysis, factor loadings for each latent variable 
were examined for item reliability for each item. This is different from Convergent 
Validity as described in Section 4.8.1, which determines reliability of the latent 
variable. In this study, factor loadings greater than 0.7 (Hair et al., 2010), with Critical 
Ratio greater than ±1.96 indicating that the factor loading is significantly different 
from zero when p<0.05, were considered acceptable. Also, provided in AMOS, the 
Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) estimates were used to examine individual item 
reliability. In this study a SMC value greater than 0.5, which suggests that at least 50% 
of the variance in an item is accounted for by a latent variable (Hair et al., 2010), is 
considered acceptable while item reliability (SMC) between 0.3 and 0.5 are considered 
weak but adequate (Hair et al., 2010). 
In summary, to determine a good fitting baseline model for each group, the proposed 
model was examined for model fit (baseline model) and the baseline model was re-
specified as needed and tested for discriminant and convergent validity issues. Each 
latent variable was then tested for item reliability issues and finally a test for model 
equivalence (described in Section 4.8.1.5) was conducted on the baseline model to 
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ensure that the model operates the same way across the two groups. The analysis was 
conducted separately for the two study groups and items dropped accordingly. This 
process was conducted separately for the Threat Perceptions model, described in 
Section 3.5, and the Efficacy Perceptions model described in Section 3.7, while the 
latent variable intentions to comply described in Section 3.8 was analyzed as a 
congeneric model. A final analysis was conducted on the full measurement model and 
goodness-of-fit statistics and reliability measures examined. This was to rule out any 
possible multicollinearity issues (high correlation between two or more latent 
variables) or cross loadings (high correlation between measurement items and 
unrelated latent variables). 
4.8.1.5 Test for multi-group measurement model equivalence 
Once a good-fitting baseline model is established for both groups individually, the data 
files are combined in order to test for multi-group model equivalence. This process 
tests whether the two baseline models are equivalent. The two baseline measurement 
models, which may have covariances specified on different items, are run 
simultaneously and with no equality constraints. If the goodness-of-fit statistics for the 
baseline model are reasonable, then testing for measurement model equivalence can be 
initiated. 
When testing for measurement model equivalence, factor loadings for the first group 
are estimated then equal constraints are imposed on the second group. As it is possible 
to have error covariance specified on one set of observed variables for one group, 
while another group may have none or they may have error covariance specified on a 
different set of observed variables (Arbuckle, 2010b; Byrne, 2008; Hair et al., 2010), 
in this study error covariances were only constrained equal if they were specified on 
both group models. This is because imposing equality constraints on error variances is 
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not a common practice and may be considered overly rigid (Byrne, 2010). If error 
covariances are specified on both models, equal constraints must be imposed on the 
error covariances.  
To test for equivalence AMOS calculates the difference between the baseline model 
and the constraint model. If the chi-square-square difference (
2
) is significant, then 
the two models are not equivalent. To claim model equality, a non-significant 
2
 is 
desired. A test for multi-group equivalence was performed separately for each latent 
variable and for each group. To determine if the measurements are equal across groups 
a non-significant p-value is sought (Byrne, 2010; Hair et al., 2010).  
 Structural model 4.8.2
The second step in the two-step approach is the evaluation of the structural model. This 
process involves structural model specification and assessment of structural model 
validity. Model specification involves assessing model fit as a nested model by 
combining the control and treatment group models and calculating goodness-of-fit. 
M.I. and standardized residuals are also examined to identify significant discrepancies 
(residuals) between the hypothesized structural model and the observed sample data.  
Similar to assessment of the measurement model, Chi-square (
2
) is also used to assess 
structural model fit. However the 
2
 of the structural model must not be lower than that 
of the measurement model because the structural model must include the same 
relationships between latent constructs as specified in the measurement model (Hair et 
al., 2010). To assess structural model fit, the same seven goodness-of-fit indices used 





 /df), SRMR, RMSEA, CFI and TLI and PNFI. Table 4.10 summarizes 
describes the above goodness-of-fit indices and their cutoff values.  
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Following the specification of the structural model, validity of the structural model was 
examined. For each group model, validity of the structural model, including the 
direction of the relationships path significance and size of the path estimates. In 
addition, the extent to which the structural model explains the variance in the latent 
dependent variable was examined. Similar to the assessment of measurement model 
validity, explained variance was used to determine the validity of the structural model. 
This approach is analogous to the use of R
2
 applied in multiple regression analysis. In 
AMOS this is reported as SMC associated with dependent latent variables which 
measures the percentage of variance explained. Finally, analysis of the research 
hypotheses was conducted. 
 Summary statistical analysis techniques 4.8.3
Table 4.11 summarizes the hypotheses and the statistical analysis techniques used to 
test the hypotheses. 
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Table 4.11: Summary statistical analysis techniques 
Overview of  constructs hypothesis and statistical analysis 
Hypothesis Statistical analysis 







tool to measure pre 
and post password 
strength 
Repeated measures 
ANOVA with Split 
Plot to determine if 
password strength 
was improved 




was due to fear 
appeals 
H2  Perceived severity of password related threats is positively related to 
intentions to comply with password guidelines. 
SEM 
H 3 Perceived vulnerability to password related threats will not have a direct 
effect on intentions to comply with password guidelines. 
SEM 
H 4 Perceived threat is positively related to intentions to comply with password 
guidelines. 
SEM 
H 5 Perceived vulnerability is positively related to perceived threat. SEM 
H 6 Perceived severity is positively related to perceived threat. SEM 
H 7 Exposure to hacking is positively related to perceived vulnerability SEM 
H 8 Perceived password effectiveness is positively related to intentions to 
comply with password guidelines 
SEM 
H 9 Password self-efficacy is positively related to intentions to comply with 
password guidelines 
SEM 
H 10 Perceived cost is negatively related to intentions to comply with password 
guidelines 
SEM 
H 11 Intentions to comply is positively related to actual password 
compliance. 
SEM 
H 12 Users who receive fear appeals will have higher intentions to comply over 
time than those who do not 
One-way between-
group ANOVA 
H 13  Users who receive fear appeals with a mnemonic training emphasis will 





     
4.9 Phase II data analysis techniques 
The data collected in Phase II is aimed to determine if the fear appeals used in this 
study had a long-term effect on password memorability and intentions to comply with 
password guidelines.  
To determine the long-term effects of the fear appeals on the participants’ ability to 
remember passwords, a generic password supplied during login was used during 
analysis to determine the proportion of the participants who forgot the passwords they 
created in Phase I. A 
2
 test of independence was conducted to examine if there were 
group differences. Further, a one-way between-group ANOVA was performed to 
determine in fear appeals had a long-term effect on the participants’ perceived 
password memorability. Finally, a one-way between-group ANOVA was performed to 
examine if the fear appeals had a long-term effect on intentions to comply. 
4.10 Chapter overview  
This chapter described the research design and analysis techniques used in Phase I and 
Phase II of this study. The study was a between-group experimental design where one 
group completed a password information and training, and another was not.  The 
training included information about the pervasiveness and consequences of password 
related threats, the effectiveness password guidelines and a password training session. 
The participants were Internet users who held at least one online email account. 
Through a third party recruiting company the participants were from a wide spectrum 




     
This chapter provided a detailed description of the primary data analysis technique 
used in this study, SEM and the two-step approach to SEM used in this study. Chapter 






     
5 Data Analysis and Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the findings from the analysis of the data collected to test the 
research hypotheses. The chapter is divided into four major sections. The first section 
reports the demographic and computer background data about the participants. This 
study uses a two-step SEM approach where analysis of the measurement model and the 
structural model was conducted separately. Thus, the results of the measurement model 
assessment and validation method, and the results of the structural model testing are 
presented in two separate sections. The final section presents the results of each 
hypothesis.  
5.2 Participants’ demographic characteristics 
This section presents the background information about the participants. This section 
also reports the number of online email accounts, password management practices, 
level of education and self-reported computer and computer security knowledge.  
 Phase I participants 5.2.1
In total, 459 surveys were completed in Phase I. Of these 209 were participants in the 
control group and 210 in the treatment group. The total number of valid completions 
was 419, a valid response rate of 10.9% as 3830 email invitations were distributed. 
Generally, web based surveys have lower response rates, with an average of 34% and 
as low as 7% (Shih & Fan, 2008). Considering the data in Phase I of this study was 
collected over three days, the valid response rate for this study is acceptable. The 
results in this section are based on the 419 valid survey responses. For each 
background variable, a follow-up chi-squared (
2
) test of independence was conducted 
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to examine if there were any group differences. As can be seen in Table 5.1, for both 
study groups, the majority of participants were female, 56.8% and 58.9% for the 
control and treatment groups respectively. In total, there were 42.1% males and 57.9% 
females. A 
2
 test of independence showed no significant difference in gender (
2 
(1) = 
0.194, p=0.659) between the two groups.  
Table 5.1: Gender of the participants in control and treatment groups 
 Male Frequency Female Frequency Male % Female % 
Control Group 89 117 43.2 56.8 
Treatment Group 85 122 41.1 58.9 
Combined Total 174 239 42.1 57.9 
 
As shown in Table 5.2, the participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 84 for the control 
group and 18 to 85 for the treatment group. The average ages were 43.78 and 43.61 for 
the control and the treatment group respectively, with a combined average age of 
43.70. There was no significant difference in age (
2 
(62) = 57.36, p=0.643) between 
the two groups. 
Table 5.2: Age of the participants in control and treatment groups 
  Average Median Minimum Maximum SD 
Control Group  43.8 44 18 84 15.3 
Treatment Group 43.6 44 18 85 15.3 
Combined 43.7 44 18 85 15.3 
 
 Number of online email accounts 5.2.2
Figure 5.1 shows the two groups share a similar pattern of distribution about the 
number of email accounts they hold. Most participants, 81.4% of the control group and 
86% of the treatment group, indicated that they have three or less online email 
addresses. A 
2
 test comparing the two groups showed no significant difference in the 
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number of email accounts (
2 
(15) = 18.79, p=0.223) held by participants in the control 
and treatment groups.  
Figure 5.1: Participants' number of online email accounts 
 
 Password management practices 5.2.3
Data on participants’ password management practices, including password length, 
changing passwords and password sharing were also collected. As shown in Figure 
5.2, most participants indicated that the longest password they had voluntarily created 
was between 7 and 10 characters long. The data shows a noticeably different pattern of 
distribution between the two groups, with 58.4% of the control group and a much 
higher proportion (67.1%) of the treatment group indicating that they had used a 
password of 7 to 10 characters long without being prompted. A 
2
 test comparing the 
two groups on password length showed that there was a significant difference in the 
self-reported password length (
2 
(6) = 13.98, p=0.030), thus indicating that the 
reported maximum password length was different between the two groups.  
The maximum password length reported by the participants in this study is consistent 







3 or less email accounts 4 to 6 7 or more email accounts
Number of email accounts 
Control group Treatment group
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leaked Hotmail passwords and found that most (69%) of the passwords were between 
6 to 9 characters long. Also, Cazier & Medlin’s (2006) empirical investigation of an e-
commerce website with no password restrictions observed that the average password 
length was 7 to 8 characters. This phenomenon is supported by Miller’s (1956) claim 
that the human brain can only memorize between 5 to 9 non-arbitrary objects. 
Interestingly, this result reveals a very different trend compared with that shown in 
Zviran and Haga (1999) approximately 15 years back. In their study, a majority 
(71.9%) of participants indicated that their password was six or less characters long. 
The current trend toward password length appears to have increased.  
Figure 5.2: Participants' longest password ever voluntarily used 
 
Further, as shown in Table 5.3, when asked if they had ever changed their passwords 
voluntarily, a majority of participants in each group indicated that they had changed 
passwords even when password change was not enforced: 68.4% and 71.2% for the 
control and treatment group respectively. There was also no significant group 
difference in password management practices related to changing passwords 
voluntarily (
2 







6 characters or less 7 to 10 11 characters or more
Longest password ever voluntarily used 
Control group Treatment group
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Table 5.3: Proportion of participants who have changed passwords voluntarily 
  Yes (n) No (n) Yes (%) No (%) 
Control Group  141 65 68.4 31.6 
Treatment Group 146 59 71.2 28.8 
 
As shown in Table 5.4, only 15.7% and 20.1% of the control and treatment group 
respectively indicated that they had shared passwords before and there was no 
significant difference between the two groups (
2 
(1) = 1.37, p=0.243). 
Table 5.4: Proportion of participants who have shared passwords 
  Yes (n) No (n) Yes (%) No (%) 
Control Group  32 172 15.7 84.3 
Treatment Group 42 167 20.1 79.9 
  
With regards password management practices, both groups appear to have no 
difficultly creating long passwords, as indicated by the results in Figure 5.2, or 
changing passwords voluntarily, and a large proportion of the participants do not share 
passwords. 
 Education and ICT background 5.2.4
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the participants’ levels of education. Only a small 
proportion of the control group (1.9%) indicated that they had less than a high school 
diploma, while 20.8% had a high school diploma or equivalent, 35.7% had some 
college but with no degree, 29.5% held a bachelor’s degree and 12.1% held a post-
graduate degree. With a similar distribution, a small proportion of the treatment group 
(1%) had less than a high school diploma, 20.7% had a high school diploma or 
equivalent, 32.7% had some college but with no degree, 31.2% held a bachelor’s 
degree and 14.4% held a post-graduate degree. No significant differences were found 
in level of education (
2 
(4) = 1.499, p=0.827) across the two study groups. 
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Figure 5.3: Participants' level of education 
 
Both groups had a similar pattern of distribution in their reported computer skills and 
computer security knowledge. Both groups perceived themselves as having mostly 
average or above average computer skills and knowledge of computer security. Only 
8.6% of the control group rated their computer skills as below average and a low 6.2% 
of the treatment group rated their computer skills as below average. Slightly more 
participants from both groups indicated that they had a below average knowledge of 
computer security compared to computer skills. Still, a low 15.3% of the control group 
rated themselves as below average and a low 12.4% of the treatment group rated their 
computer security knowledge as below average. No significant group differences were 
found in self-reported computer skills (
2 
(6) = 3.941, p=0.685) or computer security 
knowledge (
2 
(6) = 2.890, p=0.822). The complete demographic computer and 
computer security background of respondents can be located in Appendix G. 
5.3 Analysis of measurement model  
This section reports the results of the measurement model analysis. First, the results for 
the data cleaning process are presented. This section also reports the results of the 

















Level of Education 
Control group Treatment group
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Perceptions and Efficacy Perceptions models. The latent variable intentions to comply 
with password guidelines, was analyzed as a congeneric model. With the exception of 
exposure to hacking and actual password compliance, tests for multi-group model 
equivalence were carried out and the results are presented separately for the Threat 
Perceptions and Efficacy Perceptions models and the intentions to comply congeneric 
model. This section also presents the results of final full measurement model analysis. 
 Data cleaning results 5.3.1
Prior to the measurement model analysis using SEM, the data was examined for 
missing values, potential outliers and tested for normality, with emphasis on skewness 
and kurtosis issues. The following sub-sections present the outcomes of the data 
screening process. 
5.3.1.1 Missing data analysis 
The MCAR test, described in Section 4.8.1.2, was conducted separately for the 
observed data for the Threat Perceptions model, the Efficacy Perceptions model, 
perceived cost and intentions to comply. Exposure to hacking and actual password 
compliance were required fields therefore there were no missing values. Observed data 
for perceived cost was examined separately as it is the only construct hypothesized to 
have a negative impact on intentions to comply with password guidelines. Table 5.5 
and Table 5.6 summarize the results obtained from the MCAR tests. As can be seen 
from the MCAR statistics in Table 5.5, the test produced non-significant p-values (p = 
>0.5) across all variables for the control group suggesting that the values were missing 
completely at random. Given that the highest proportion of missing values on any 
given set of variables was 2.9%, data imputation was conducted using EM in SPSS 
version 19 (SPSS, 2010).  
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Table 5.5: Control group MCAR test statistics 
Variable Set 
Max. % of missing 
values 
Max. no. of 
missing values 
Little's MCAR test Sig. 
Threat Perceptions 2.9% 6 p = .931 
Efficacy Perceptions 1.9% 4 p = .967 
Perceived Cost 1.4% 3 p = .928 
Intentions to Comply 2.9% 6 p = .808 
 
In Table 5.6 is a summary of the results of the MCAR test carried out on the treatment 
group dataset. The results were non-significant across all variables indicating that the 
missing data pattern occurred completely at random. Therefore, imputation of the 
missing values was also conducted using the EM method prior to SEM analysis. 
Table 5.6: Treatment group MCAR test statistics 
Variable Set 
Max. % of missing 
values 
Max. no. of 
missing values 
Little's MCAR test Sig. 
Threat Perceptions 2.4% 5 p = .987 
Efficacy Perceptions 2.4% 5 p = .968 
Perceived Cost 1.4% 3 p = .128 
Intentions to Comply 2.4% 5 p = .969 
 
5.3.1.2 Test for univariate normality assumption 
The data in Table 5.7 show the extent to which the distribution for each observed 
variable deviates from normality. A normal distribution would have a kurtosis and 
skewness of zero, while kurtosis and skewness greater than  ± 1.96 is generally 
considered non-normal (Cramer & Howitt, 2004) and values up to ± 7 and ± 3 
respectively would be considered extreme (Curran et al., 1996). Therefore, in this 
study values up to ± 7 and ± 3 were considered problematic. As can be seen in Table 
5.7, the kurtosis and skewness values are below the cutoff values and meet the 
univariate non-normality assumption for this study. 
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Table 5.7: Parameters of Univariate Skewness and Kurtosis 
Variables Min. Skewness Max. Skewness Min. Kurtosis Max. Kurtosis 
Control group 
Exposure to Hacking 0.844 1.373 -0.839 0.392 
Perceived Vulnerability -0.546 0.084 -0.998 -0.175 
Perceived Severity -0.807 0.005 -1.118 -0.566 
Perceived Threat -1.207 -0.637 -0.251 0.728 
Perceived Effectiveness -1.171 -0.366 -0.482 1.488 
Perceived Cost -0.832 0.105 -1.054 -0.005 
Perceived Self-efficacy -0.923 -0.517 0.481 -0.457 
Intentions to Comply -1.032 -0.725 -0.177 0.816 
Treatment group 
Exposure to hacking 0.551 0.962 -1.221 -0.647 
Perceived Vulnerability -0.472 -0.211 -0.772 -0.304 
Perceived Severity -1.144 -0.415 -0.569 0.953 
Perceived Threat -1.000 -0.542 -0.181 0.421 
Perceived Effectiveness -1.283 -0.941 0.347 1.769 
Perceived Cost -0.969 -0.088 -1.011 0.274 
Perceived Self-efficacy -0.945 -0.593 -0.333 0.825 
Intentions to Comply -1.068 -0.801 -0.032 0.917 




5.3.1.3 Test for multivariate Outliers 
To test for multivariate outliers a conservative Mahalanobis d-squared p-value of 
<0.001 (Hair et al., 2010) was used as a cutoff value. Additionally, following a closer 
examination of the actual data, seven control group cases and six treatment group cases 
were identified as extreme or potential influential multivariate outliers. The 
Mahalanobis d-squared p-value suggests that the correlations between variables for 13 
participants were significantly different from the rest of the respondents. Including 
these cases would potentially distort the multivariate SEM analysis results (Hair et al., 
2010; Kline, 2011), therefore the cases were deleted.  
A total of 202 control and 204 treatment group cases were used in the subsequent 
analysis of the measurement model and the structural model analysis. 
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 Exposure to hacking measurement 5.3.2
The exploratory variable exposure to hacking was measured using two measurement 
items where the participants indicated whether they or someone they know personally 
had ever been a victim of hacking. A single composite score was computed using 
regression imputation in AMOS version 19 (Arbuckle, 2010a), and construct reliability 
examined. 
The Cronbach’s Alpha value for the treatment group was acceptable with a construct 
reliability value of 0.738, while the control group value (0.633) was slightly lower than 
the recommended construct reliability value of > 0.7. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the construct exposure to hacking is not part of the PMT (Maddux & 
Rogers, 1983), and therefore considered exploratory for this study. Construct reliability 
of 0.633 is acceptable as it is greater than > 0.5, the minimum recommended threshold 
for exploratory factors. Therefore, the construct reliability for exposure to hacking was 
considered satisfactory. 
 Threat perceptions measurement model 5.3.3
The Threat Perceptions, Efficacy Perceptions and the intentions to comply congeneric 
models were analyzed and the results are reported separately in Sections 5.3.3 - 5.3.5. 
Each section reports the model specification, including the goodness-of-fit statistics for 
the initial model described in Chapter 3, construct validity (discriminant and 
convergent validity), individual latent variables, individual item reliability, and finally 
a multi-group model equivalence test. The outcome of each section is a good fitting 
measurement model that operates the same way across the two groups. Section 5.3.7 




     
This section presents the results of analysis of the Threat Perceptions measurement 
model. The model includes the latent constructs, perceived vulnerability, perceived 
severity and perceived threat. The analysis was conducted for the control and treatment 
group separately. 
5.3.3.1 Baseline model specification and re-specification 
The initial analysis of the hypothesized model yielded goodness-of-fit statistics higher 
than the recommended cutoff values proposed for this study (see Table 4.10), thus 
indicating poor fit. As discussed in Section 4.8.1.4, only items with relatively high M.I. 
values were allowed to covary, and only items with high correlations, standardized 
residual values, and low reliability (SMC) values were examined to determine if they 
should be excluded from the measurement model. Appendix H, Section H.1 presents 
the complete M.I. values, standardized residuals and SMC values associated with the 
Threat Perceptions model. 
The correlation between PSEV01 and PSEV02 (0.66) and PTHR01 and PTHR02 
(0.60) for the control group was particularly high, suggesting that each set of items had 
a high level of shared variance or that the items were possibly measuring the same 
thing. The correlation between PSEV01 and PSEV02 was also excessively high for the 
treatment group at 0.72. The standardized residuals for the treatment group were 
greater than 2.0 between PVUL04 and items PSEV01, PSEV0 2 and PSEV03. Further, 
for both groups, PVUL04 had the lowest item reliability (SMC) values. Therefore, 
with the high M.I. and standardized residuals values, and a high correlation between 
PSEV01- PSEV02 and PTHR01 - PTHR02, PSEV01 and PTHR01 were dropped due 
to lower than recommended item reliability. PVUL04 was also dropped due to high 
standardized residuals and low item reliability. 
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5.3.3.2 Assessment of construct validity 
After determining a good-fitting baseline Threat Perceptions model, four perceived 
severity items were retained, three items were retained for perceived vulnerability and 
five measurement items were retained for perceived threat. Discriminant and 
convergent validity and construct reliability for the three latent variables were then 
examined.  
Table 5.8 summarizes the goodness-of-fit statistics and reliability measures for the 
control group. With the exception of the 
2
 p-value (significant at p= 0.007) which is 
expected when the sample size is greater than 200 (Hair et al., 2010), all goodness-of-
fit statistics were acceptable indicating that the control group sample data represents 
the proposed baseline model well. Reliability measures were also acceptable with 
composite reliability ranging from .884 to a high reliability value of .976 while 
Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .879 to .976. AVE values were also acceptable 
indicating no discriminant or convergent validity issues.  
Table 5.8: Reliability and goodness-of-fit statistics, Threat Perceptions model 
Chi-square (X
2
)  Control  Treatment 
Chi-square (
2
)  78.2    89.1   
Degrees of freedom (df)  50    49   
Normed chi-square (
2
/df)  1.56    1.82   
Chi-square (
2
) p-value  0.007    0.000   
Goodness-of-fit indices             
Comparative fit index (CFI)  0.989    0.983   
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)  0.985    0.977   
Standardized root mean residual (SRMR)  0.028    0.045   




   
0.063 
  
Construct reliability measures CA CR AVE CA CR AVE 
Perceived severity  0.920 0.922 0.746 0.897 0.887 0.667 
Perceived vulnerability  0.879 0.882 0.714 0.920 0.922 0.797 
Perceived threat  0.976 0.976 0.889 0.961 0.960 0.827 




     
The goodness-of-fit statistics for the treatment group also suggested the observed data 
fits the treatment group Threat Perceptions measurement model well. Reliability 
measures were also adequate with CR values ranging from .887 to .960 and acceptable 
Cronbach’s alpha values ranging from .897 to .961. The AVE values suggested no 
discriminant or convergent validity issues. 
The following subsections describe the parameter estimates for each latent variable in 
the Threat Perceptions model including item reliability measures for each retained 
item. Factor loadings are provided as both unstandardized estimates as shown in the 
Estimates column, and standardized estimates, in the Standardized Estimates column, 
in Table 5.9. In AMOS (Arbuckle, 2010a), path coefficients and factor loadings are 
labeled as regression weights. In this study, path coefficients represent structural path 
correlations and factor loadings refer to correlations between measurement items and 
their underlying factors.  
5.3.3.3 Perceived severity 
As shown in Table 5.9 all factor loadings and CR values are acceptable. Item 
reliability values, represented as SMC, are also acceptable with the exception of the 
SMC value of 0.425 for the item PSEV03 (treatment group) which is slightly low but 
considered adequate. Therefore, all retained measurement items were considered a 
good measure of perceived severity.  
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Table 5.9: Parameter estimates for perceived severity 







PSEV01 <--- PERCEIVED_SEVERITY 1       0.665 0.816 
PSEV03 <--- PERCEIVED_SEVERITY 1.040 0.072 14.530 *** 0.739 0.860 
PSEV04 <--- PERCEIVED_SEVERITY 1.136 0.071 16.070 *** 0.854 0.924 
PSEV05 <--- PERCEIVED_SEVERITY 1.089 0.076 14.332 *** 0.725 0.852 
Treatment group 
PSEV01 <--- PERCEIVED_SEVERITY 1       0.552 0.743 
PSEV03 <--- PERCEIVED_SEVERITY 0.911 0.069 13.127 *** 0.425 0.652 
PSEV04 <--- PERCEIVED_SEVERITY 1.226 0.090 13.616 *** 0.908 0.953 
PSEV05 <--- PERCEIVED_SEVERITY 1.126 0.086 13.074 *** 0.783 0.885 
Std. Estimate=factor loadings; *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001 
 
5.3.3.4 Perceived threat 
As can be seen from the parameter estimates in Table 5.10, all factor loadings for 
perceived threat are significant and acceptable. In addition, item reliability measures 
(SMC) for all five measurement items are acceptable suggesting that all measurement 
items are a good measure of perceived threat. 
Table 5.10: Parameter estimates for perceived threat 







PTHR02 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 1       0.866 0.931 
PTHR03 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 1.044 0.036 23.364 *** 0.935 0.967 
PTHR04 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 1.029 0.037 28.175 *** 0.918 0.958 
PTHR05 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 1.003 0.040 25.104 *** 0.867 0.931 
PTHR06 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 0.979 0.040 24.708 *** 0.859 0.927 
Treatment group 
PTHR02 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 1       0.832 0.912 
PTHR03 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 1.041 0.043 24.182 *** 0.893 0.945 
PTHR04 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 0.965 0.042 22.944 *** 0.863 0.929 
PTHR05 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 0.955 0.048 20.010 *** 0.784 0.886 
PTHR06 <--- PERCEIVED_THREAT 0.944 0.049 19.354 *** 0.764 0.874 






     
5.3.3.5 Perceived vulnerability 
Table 5.11 summarizes factor loadings and reliability measures for the items 
measuring perceived vulnerability. As suggested by the Critical Ratio values, all factor 
loadings are acceptable and the three measurement items significantly correlate to the 
underlying latent variable. In addition, the SMC for all measurement items are greater 
than 0.5, signifying acceptable item reliability and that the items are a good measure of 
perceived vulnerability.  
Table 5.11: Parameter estimates for perceived vulnerability 







PVUL01 <--- PERCEIVED_VULNERABILITY 1       0.611 0.781 
PVUL02 <--- PERCEIVED_VULNERABILITY 1.008 0.079 12.696 *** 0.732 0.856 
PVUL03 <--- PERCEIVED_VULNERABILITY 1.098 0.085 12.964 *** 0.800 0.894 
Treatment group 
PVUL01 <--- PERCEIVED_VULNERABILITY 1       0.747 0.864 
PVUL02 <--- PERCEIVED_VULNERABILITY 0.907 0.056 16.259 *** 0.734 0.857 
PVUL03 <--- PERCEIVED_VULNERABILITY 1.509 0.057 18.706 *** 0.911 0.954 
Std. Estimate=factor loadings; *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001 
 
5.3.3.6 Multi-group analysis of model equivalence  
Once the baseline model was determined for both groups a multi-group analysis was 
conducted to investigate if the measurement models were equivalent across the two 
groups. Multi-group analysis accounts for both groups therefore one set of goodness-
of-fit statistics was computed and is presented in this section.  
The two baseline models were first analyzed with no equality constraints imposed. 
Equality constraints were sequentially added to the factor loadings (Model A), error 
covariances (Model B) and factor covariances (Model C). To examine if the two 
baseline models were equivalent, the two models were analyzed simultaneously and 
goodness-of-fit statistics for the three models (A, B and C) were compared as shown in 
Table 5.12.  
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Table 5.12: Threat Perceptions model equivalence test results 
Model  Chi-square Baseline Model A Model B Model C 
Chi-square
2
 167.30 174.78 174.81 179.93 
Degrees of freedom (df) 99 108 109 112 
Normed chi-square
2
/df 1.69 1.62 1.60 1.61 

2 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Goodness-of-fit indices 
CFI 0.986 0.986 0.987 0.986 
TLI 0.981 0.983 0.984 0.984 
SRMR 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.490 
RMSEA 0.041 0.039 0.490 0.390 
Test of model equivalence 

2
 - 7.67 7.99 13.34 
df - 9 10 13 

2 
p-value - 0.568 0.629 0.422 
Baseline model=no constraints 
A=Factor Loadings constrained equal 
B=Factor Loadings + Error Covariance constrained equal 
C=Factor Loadings + Error Covariance + Factor Covariance constrained equal 

2
 , df, 
2
 p-value compared with Baseline model with no equal constraints 
 
Analysis of the unconstrained baseline model yielded a 
2
 value of 167.30 with 99 
degrees of freedom. All the goodness-of-fit statistics were acceptable, confirming that 
the constrained model fits the sample data as well as the unconstrained model. As can 
be seen from the 
2
 p-values in Table 5.12, the results of the multi-group analysis 
reveal that when all factor loadings, error covariances and factor covariances are 
constrained equal, the 
2
 between the constrained models and the baseline model are 
not statistically different. This indicates that the Threat Perceptions measurement 
model is a good fitting model and operates the same across both control and treatment 
groups, suggesting that the two measurement models are equivalent. 
 Efficacy perceptions measurement model 5.3.4
This section reports the results of analysis of the Efficacy Perceptions measurement 
model. The latent variables included in this model are perceived password 
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effectiveness, password self-efficacy and perceived cost. The analysis was conducted 
for the control and treatment group separately. 
5.3.4.1 Baseline model specification and re-specification 
The goodness-of-fit statistics for the two initial group models suggested poor fit. Items 
with relatively high M.I. values were allowed to covary, while items with high 
correlations, high standardized residuals values and low item reliability (SMC) values 
were dropped. Appendix H, Section H.2 shows the complete M.I. values, standardized 
residuals and SMC values associated with the Efficacy Perceptions model.  
The correlation between the error terms associated with COST05 and COST06 for the 
control group was particularly high at 0.71 suggesting that the two items are possibly 
measuring the same thing. Also for the control group, the M.I. and standardized 
residuals associated with COST05 and COST06 were high, thus the two items were 
allowed to covary. This resulted in a relatively low item reliability for PEFF01 (0.37) 
and COST04 (0.31) suggesting that these items are problematic and may be candidates 
for deletion. Similarly, the treatment group model yielded high standardized residuals 
and M.I. values for COST05 and COST06, and PEFF01 and COST04 also had low 
item reliability compared to the rest of the items. As the correlation between COST05 
and COST06 was high for both groups suggesting that the two items are measuring the 
same thing, only COST05 was deleted. Therefore, items PEFF01, COST04 and 
COST05 were excluded from the model.  
5.3.4.2 Assessment of construct validity 
After a good-fitting baseline model was determined, five perceived password 
effectiveness measurement items were retained, all four password self-efficacy items 
were retained and four perceived cost items were retained. Discriminant and 
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convergent validity and construct reliability for the three latent variables were then 
examined.  
As shown in Table 5.13, the goodness-of-fit statistics were all acceptable, suggesting 
that the observed data fits the control group baseline model well. Reliability measures 
were also acceptable with CR ranging from .846 to .883 and Cronbach’s Alpha ranging 
from .846 to .893. The AVE values were also acceptable indicating that the model has 
no discriminant or convergent validity issues.  
Table 5.13: Reliability and goodness-of-fit statistics, Efficacy Perceptions model 
Chi-square (2)  Control Treatment 
Chi-square (
2
) 100.4 106.7 
Degrees of freedom (df) 59 60 
Normed chi-square (
2
/df) 1.70 1.78 
Chi-square (
2
) p-value 0.001 0.000 
Goodness-of-fit indices             
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.971 0.976 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0.962 0.968 
Standardized root mean residual (SRMR) 0.048 0.041 
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 0.059 0.062 
Construct reliability measures CA CR AVE CA CR AVE 
Perceived password effectiveness 0.846 0.846 0.526 0.921 0.918 0.691 
Password self-efficacy 0.893 0.883 0.656 0.909 0.910 0.717 
Perceived cost 0.876 0.879 0.649 0.886 0.898 0.690 
CA=Cronbach’s alpha; CR=composite reliability; AVE=average extracted variance 
 
The goodness-of-fit statistics and reliability measures for the treatment group baseline 
model were also all acceptable suggesting that the observed data fits the model well. 
The three latent variables had no reliability issues as indicated by the CR values that 
range from .898 to .918 and the Cronbach’s Alpha values which range from .886 to 
.921. No discriminant or convergent validity issues were observed as suggested by the 
AVE values. 
The following subsections summarizes the parameter estimates for each latent variable 
in the Efficacy Perceptions measurement model, including item reliability measures for 
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each retained item. Table 5.14 to Table 5.16 show the item reliability measures for the 
individual items, as suggested by the SMC values and factors loadings (Standardized 
Estimates) for the 3 latent variables.  
5.3.4.3 Perceived password effectiveness  
All factor loadings for perceived password effectiveness are within the acceptable 
range as shown in Table 5.14 and the SMC values are adequate for this study. The 
goodness-of-fit statistics and construct validity measures suggest that all items are a 
good measure of perceived password effectiveness.  
Table 5.14: Parameter estimates for perceived password effectiveness 







PEFF02 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 0.859 0.103 8.311 *** 0.433 0.658 
PEFF03 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 0.820 0.094 8.726 *** 0.396 0.629 
PEFF04 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 1       0.672 0.820 
PEFF05 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 0.890 0.083 10.738 *** 0.572 0.757 
PEFF06 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 0.836 0.079 10.574 *** 0.555 0.745 
Treatment group 
PEFF02 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 0.962 0.066 14.51 *** 0.635 0.797 
PEFF03 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 1       0.802 0.896 
PEFF04 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 0.906 0.059 15.397 *** 0.683 0.827 
PEFF05 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 0.876 0.061 14.413 *** 0.636 0.798 
PEFF06 <--- PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS 0.903 0.057 15.741 *** 0.696 0.834 
Std. Estimate=factor loadings; PERCEIVED_EFFECTIVENESS=perceived password effectiveness 
*=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001 
 
5.3.4.4 Password self-efficacy 
Table 5.15 shows the factors loadings and reliability measures for the four items 
measuring password self-efficacy. All factor loadings are significant (Critical Ratios 
>1.96, p<0.001) and acceptable. The SMC values are acceptable suggesting that the 
four items are an adequate measure of password self-efficacy. 
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Table 5.15: Parameter estimates for password self-efficacy 







PSEF01 <-- PASSWORD_SELF-EFFICACY 1       0.738 0.859 
PSEF02 <-- PASSWORD_SELF-EFFICACY 1.085 0.067 16.162 *** 0.880 0.938 
PSEF03 <-- PASSWORD_SELF-EFFICACY 0.882 0.072 12.255 *** 0.545 0.739 
PSEF04 <-- PASSWORD_SELF-EFFICACY 0.716 0.066 10.847 *** 0.461 0.679 
Treatment group 
PSEF01 <-- PASSWORD_SELF-EFFICACY 1       0.715 0.845 
PSEF02 <-- PASSWORD_SELF-EFFICACY 1.058 0.071 14.888 *** 0.724 0.851 
PSEF03 <-- PASSWORD_SELF-EFFICACY 1.078 0.069 15.613 *** 0.772 0.879 
PSEF04 <-- PASSWORD_SELF-EFFICACY 0.901 0.065 13.809 *** 0.656 0.810 
Std. Estimate=factor loadings 
*=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001 
 
 
5.3.4.5 Perceived cost 
Table 5.16 summarizes the factors loadings and reliability measures for the four items 
measuring perceived cost. As shown in the table, all Critical Ratios are greater than 
1.96, indicating that all factor loadings are significant. Although COST06 (control 
group) has the lowest factor loading (0.6550 and a low item reliability of 0.429, all 
estimates are within acceptable range. All four items are therefore adequate measures 
of perceived cost.   
Table 5.16: Parameter estimates for perceived cost 







COST01 <-- PERCEIVED_COST 1       0.750 0.866 
COST02 <-- PERCEIVED_COST 1.038 0.063 16.571 *** 0.863 0.929 
COST03 <-- PERCEIVED_COST 0.857 0.069 12.417 *** 0.551 0.743 
COST06 <-- PERCEIVED_COST 0.704 0.068 10.373 *** 0.429 0.655 
Treatment group 
COST01 <-- PERCEIVED_COST 1       0.757 0.870 
COST02 <-- PERCEIVED_COST 1.078 0.066 16.364 *** 0.843 0.918 
COST03 <-- PERCEIVED_COST 0.997 0.078 12.786 *** 0.576 0.759 
COST06 <-- PERCEIVED_COST 0.938 0.084 11.112 *** 0.584 0.764 




     
5.3.4.6 Multi-group analysis of model equivalence 
Having determined a baseline model for both study groups, measurement model 
equivalence was examined for the Efficacy Perceptions measurement model. Table 
5.17 summarizes the goodness-of-fit statistics and the results for the chi-square 
difference (
2
) test.  
Table 5.17: Efficacy Perceptions model equivalence test results 
Model  Chi-square Baseline Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Ch-square
2
 207.02 226.53 226.99 224.40 222.02 
Degrees of freedom (df) 119 129 132 131 130 
Normed chi-square
2
/df 1.74 1.76 1.72 1.71 1.71 

2 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Goodness-of-fit indices   
CFI 0.974 0.971 0.972 0.972 0.972 
TLI 0.965 0.965 0.966 0.967 0.967 
SRMR 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.049 0.049 
RMSEA 0.043 0.043 0.042 0.420 0.042 
Test of model equivalence   

2
 - 19.51 19.97 17.38 14.998 
df - 10 13 12 11 

2 
p-value - 0.034 0.096 0.136 0.183 
Baseline model=no constraints 
A=Factor Loadings constrained equal 
B=Factor Loadings + Factor Covariance constrained equal 
C=Factor Loadings + Error Covariance constrained equal + no constrain on PEFF03 
D=Factor Loadings + Error Covariance constrained equal + no constrain on PEFF03 and PSEF03 

2
df p-value compared with Baseline model with no equal constraints 
  
The goodness-of-fit statistics for the multi-group baseline model are acceptable, as 
shown in Table 5.17, with a 
2
 of 207.02 with 119 degrees of freedom suggesting that 
the proposed baseline model is a good fitting model across both groups. The 
2
 
between the baseline model and the fully constrained Model A was significant (
2
 p 
= 0.034). This means that the two models are significantly different and that one or 
more factor loadings are not equivalent across the two groups.  
As the treatment group had relatively higher factor loadings on items PEFF03 and 
PSEF03, the two items were unconstrained in Model C and D respectively both 
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yielding a non-significant 
2
, Model C (
2
 p = 0.136) and D (
2
 p = 0.183). This 
suggests that when the two items are unconstrained the model fit was not significantly 
different from the baseline model.  
Although a fully equivalent measurement model was not achieved, structural analysis 
was conducted since the results show that at least two of the observed variables are 
equal (Hair et al., 2010). The Efficacy Perceptions measurement model was therefore 
considered a good fitting model and, though only partially equivalent, the model is 
considered to be sufficiently equal across the two study groups. 
 Intentions to comply congeneric model 5.3.5
This section presents the results for the analysis of the intentions to comply congeneric 
model. The analysis was conducted for the control and treatment group separately.  
5.3.5.1 Baseline model specification and re-specification 
The goodness-of-fit statistics for the initial model suggest that the sample data did not 
fit the proposed model well. As discussed in Section 4.8.1.4, only items with high M.I. 
values were allowed to covary, and items with high correlations, high standardized 
residuals and low item reliability (SMC) values were dropped. Appendix H, Section 
H.3 presents the complete M.I. values, standardized residuals and SMC values 
associated with the intentions to comply congeneric model. 
The M.I. values and standardized residuals associated with INT05 and INT06 were 
high, particularly for the control group model. When the items were allowed to covary 
the correlation between the error terms associated with the two items (0.66) was 
approaching the extreme threshold of 0.7. This suggested that the two items have a 
high shared variance and that one of the items may be a candidate for deletion. Of the 
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two items, INT06 had lower item reliability and was therefore excluded from the 
model. 
Reliability issues was also observed on one other item, INT03, which had considerably 
low item reliability (0.387) compared to the remaining five items and was therefore 
dropped. Ultimately, four measurement items were retained.  
5.3.5.2 Assessment of construct validity 
Table 5.18 summarizes the goodness-of-fit statistics for the four-item intentions to 
comply congeneric model. Although the normed chi-square (
2
/df), TLI and RMSEA 
(0.159) for both groups suggested poor fit, the CFI and SRMR indicated good fit. 
Construct reliability measures, CR and Cronbach’s Alpha, were also acceptable 
suggesting that the four items are an acceptable measure of intentions to comply latent 
variable.  
Table 5.18: Reliability and goodness-of-fit statistics, intentions to comply  
Chi-square (
2
) Control Treatment 
Chi-square (
2
) 12.15 8.25 
Degrees of freedom (df) 2 1 
Normed chi-square (
2
/df) 6.07 8.25 
Chi-square (
2
) p-value 0.002 0.004 
Goodness-of-fit indices         
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.979 0.984 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0.937 0.906 
Standardized root mean residual (SRMR) 0.029 0.018 
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 0.159 0.159 
Construct reliability measures CA CR CA CR 
Intentions to comply 0.876 0.89 0.881 0.872 
CA=Cronbach’s alpha; CR=composite reliability; Note, AVE is not available for congeneric 
models 
 
5.3.5.3 Intention to comply 
Table 5.19 summarizes the item reliability measures, shown as SMC, and factor 
loadings (Std. Estimates) for the four items measuring intentions to comply. All factor 
loadings were acceptable. However, SMC for INT05 for the control group (0.441) and 
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particularly treatment group (0.395) was low compared to the other measurement 
items. While item reliability between 0.3 and 0.5 is still considered adequate, item 
INT05 was a possible candidate for deletion. Section 5.3.7 below reports the results of 
the analysis of the full measurement model where the implications of deleting the item 
were assessed.   
Table 5.19: Parameter estimates for intentions to comply 







INT01 <-- INTENTIONS_TO_COMPLY 1       0.681 0.825 
INT02 <-- INTENTIONS_TO_COMPLY 1.040 0.072 14.51 *** 0.750 0.866 
INT04 <-- INTENTIONS_TO_COMPLY 1.077 0.071 15.16 *** 0.815 0.903 
INT05 <-- INTENTIONS_TO_COMPLY 0.796 0.079 10.14 *** 0.441 0.664 
Treatment group 
INT01 <-- INTENTIONS_TO_COMPLY 1       0.841 0.917 
INT02 <-- INTENTIONS_TO_COMPLY 0.749 0.061 12.32 *** 0.554 0.745 
INT04 <-- INTENTIONS_TO_COMPLY 0.857 0.059 14.57 *** 0.729 0.854 
INT05 <-- INTENTIONS_TO_COMPLY 0.581 0.060 9.697 *** 0.395 0.628 
Std. Estimate=factor loadings; *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001 
 
5.3.5.4 Multi-group analysis of model equivalence  
Multi-group analysis was conducted to test if the measurement items for the intentions 
to comply congeneric model operate equally for both groups. Table 5.20 summarizes 
the goodness-of-fit statistics and chi-square difference (
2
) test results.  
With the exception of the normed chi-square, TLI and RMSEA, all goodness-of-fit 
statistics were acceptable. The values of the normed chi-square (
2
/df = 6.8), TLI 
(0.926), and RMSEA (0.12) suggest that the baseline model is a poor representation of 
the sample data. Further, the 
2
 values in Table 5.20 show that the baseline 
congeneric model and the constrained Model A were significantly different (
2
 p = 
0.009) suggesting that one or more items were not operating equally across the two 
groups. To find out which item was different across groups, each item was 
unconstrained separately. As can be seen from the 
2
 values, all three models, Model 
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B (
2
 p = 0.004), Model C (
2
 p = 0.009) and Model D (
2
 p = 0.025), were 
significantly different from the baseline model.  
Table 5.20: Intentions to comply congeneric model equivalence test results 













 20.40 31.91 31.64 31.91 27.76 51.23 
Degrees of freedom (df) 3 6 5 6 5 6 
Normed chi-square
2
/df 6.80 5.32 6.33 5.32 5.55 7.32 

2 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Goodness-of-fit indices    
CFI 0.982 0.973 0.972 0.973 0.976 0.953 
TLI 0.826 0.945 0.932 0.945 0.942 0.920 
SRMR 0.029 0.340 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033 
RMSEA 0.120 0.103 0.115 0.103 0.106 0.125 
Test of model equivalence     

2
 - 11.51 11.24 11.51 7.36 7.29 
df - 3 2 3 2 3 

2 
p-value - 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.025 0.063 
Baseline model=no constraints 
A=Factor Loadings constrained equal 
B=Factor Loadings constrained equal + no constrain on INT05 
C=Factor Loadings constrained equal + no constrain on INT04 
D=Factor Loadings constrained equal + no constrain on INT02 
E=Factor Loadings constrained equal + INT02 to 0 

2
df p-value compared with Baseline model with no equal constraints 
 
To further investigate model equality issues, item INT05, which as discussed in 
Section 5.3.5.3 was a candidate for deletion, had error covariance specified between 
INT02 and INT05 specified for the treatment group model. The error covariance 
associated with INT02 and INT05 was constrained to zero (see Model E in Table 5.20) 
and item INT02 was unconstrained given the relatively high chi-square difference p-
value as seen in Model D (
2
 p = 0.025). The results of the 
2
 test for the intention 
to comply congeneric model E (
2
 p = 0.063), suggest partial equivalence, which is 
adequate (Hair et al., 2010).  
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 Actual password compliance measurement 5.3.6
Actual password compliance was measured as a single item. It was obtained from the 
password strength of the passwords collected in Phase I of this study. Password 
strength was computed using the password analysis tool developed for this study  (see 
Section 4.6.9).  
 Analysis of the full measurement model 5.3.7
To rule out any possible multicollinearity issues or cross-loadings, the re-specified 
measurement models described in Sections 5.3.3 to 5.3.5 were combined, then 
analyzed as a full measurement model and goodness-of-fit statistics and reliability 
measures examined.  
Table 5.21 summarizes the goodness-of-fit statistics and reliability measures for the 
full control and treatment measurement models. The table shows the data with and 
without INT05. As shown, excluding INT05 resulted in a better fitting control group 




 = 59.517, df = 27, p<0.001). Excluding 





 = 55.693, df = 26, p<0.001). The AVE values indicate that the final control 
and treatment models had no discriminant or convergent validity issues while all 
construct reliability measures were also acceptable. There was also no indication of 
multicollinearity issues, or cross-loading issues for either model. Therefore, the 
proposed final measurement model is a good representation of the sample data in this 
study, thus suitable for SEM structural model analysis. 
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Table 5.21: Reliability and goodness-of-fit statistics, full measurement model 
Chi-square (
2
) without INT05  Control Treatment 
Chi-square (
2
) 516.24 531.67 
Degrees of freedom (df) 325 325 
Normed chi-square (
2
/df) 1.59 1.64 
Chi-square (
2
) p-value 0.000 0.000 
Goodness-of-fit indices     
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.959 0.958 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0.952 0.951 
Standardized root mean residual (SRMR) 0.051 0.044 
Root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) 
0.054 0.056 
Construct reliability measures CR AVE CR AVE 
PERCEIVED_SEVERITY 0.921 0.745 0.887 0.667 
PERCEIVED_THREAT 0.976 0.890 0.960 0.828 
PERCEIVED_VULNERABILITY 0.882 0.715 0.922 0.798 
PERCEIVED_SELF-EFFICACY 0.885 0.662 0.910 0.716 
PERCEIVED_COST 0.880 0.650 0.899 0.692 
PERCEIVED__PASSWORD_EFFECTIVENESS 0.846 0.526 0.918 0.691 
INTENTIONS_TO_COMPLY 0.900 0.751 0.879 0.709 
CR=composite reliability; AVE=average extracted variance 
 
5.4 Analysis of structural model validity 
This section presents the results of the structural model testing. The final structural 
model was first examined for specification issues by considering the goodness-of-fit 
statistics of the nested structural model. The validity of the structural model, including 
the direction of the relationships, path significance, size of the path estimates, and the 
SMC values which are comparable to the use of R
2 
in multiple regression were 
examined.  
 Structural model specification 5.4.1
This section presents the analysis of the validity of the structural model and the path 
coefficient results. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the nested model were acceptable. 
Model 
2
 was 1220.024 with 711 degrees of freedom resulting in an acceptable 
normed chi-square (
2
/df) of 1.716. The 
2
 p-value was significant (p = 0.000) which 
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was expected for a sample size greater than 200 (Hair et al., 2010). Although the 
SRMR was 0.094, suggesting poor fit, the CFI (0.947), TLI (0.940) and RMSEA 
(0.042) indicated good fit for a complex model with 29 observed variables (Hair et al., 
2010). Given a complex model like this one, the SRMR statistic of 0.094 is acceptable 
since the value is less than 0.1 indicating that it is not a bad fit, and the CFI is greater 
than 0.92 (Hair et al., 2010). Thus, the goodness-of-fit statistics for the nested 
structural model suggest that the control and treatment group baseline structural 
models fit the data well. 
Only a few residuals (particularly for the treatment group) were high, and the M.I. 
values were not high enough to warrant additional paths or suggest cross-loadings. As 
it is normal for two groups to behave differently (Byrne, 2008), and a non-normal 
distribution can be expected in a treatment group (Hair et al., 2010), the differences in 
residuals observed in this study are considered acceptable. As the fit of the structural 
model was good, no further modifications were made.  
 Structural model validity 5.4.2
To assess the validity of the structural model the correlations between latent variables, 
the path coefficients (path correlations), standard errors, and goodness-of-fit statistics 
were considered. Table 5.22 shows the goodness-of-fit statistics and path estimates for 
the control and treatment group structural models. 
The correlations between latent variables were all below the recommended 0.9 
threshold (Hair et al., 2010). Complete correlation matrices for the control and 
treatment group structural model can be located in Appendix I, Table I.11 and Table 
I.12. The goodness-of-fit statistics for both models were all acceptable except SRMR. 
However, for a complex model like the one tested in this study, SRMR of 0.092 
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(control and treatment, separately) is acceptable as the CFI for each study group was 
greater than 0.92 (Hair et al., 2010). Thus, the goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that 
even when tested separately the observed data fits the each group’s final structural 
model well.  
The final structural models consist of five exogenous variables, exposure to hacking, 
perceived severity, password self-efficacy, perceived password effectiveness and 
perceived cost, and four endogenous variables, perceived vulnerability, perceived 
threat, intentions to comply with password guidelines and actual password 
compliance. As shown in Table 5.22, seven hypothesized paths were significant while 
three were not.   
 












  Control Treatment 
Exposure to hacking  Perceived vulnerability 0.38 0.097 <0.001 0.30 0.053 <0.001 
Perceived severity  Perceived threat 0.51 0.065 <0.001 0.55 0.072 <0.001 
Perceived vulnerability  Perceived threat 0.23 0.071 <0.001 0.29 0.052 <0.001 
Perceived vulnerability  Intentions to comply 0.00 0.053 0.500 0.04 0.054 0.284 
Perceived threat  Intentions to comply 0.18 0.058 0.013 0.13 0.078 0.047 
Perceived severity  Intentions to comply 0.03 0.052 0.340 -0.05 0.077 0.267 
Password self-efficacy  Intentions to comply 0.47 0.065 <0.001 0.60 0.085 <0.001 
Perceived password effectiveness  Intentions to comply 0.19 0.095 0.015 0.18 0.094 0.016 
Perceived cost  Intentions to comply -0.01 0.046 0.421 -0.02 0.056 0.404 
Intentions to comply  Actual compliance 0.36 1.105 <0.001 0.15 1.016 0.024 
Goodness of fit statistics         
Chi-square (X2) 629.62        695.77     
Degrees of freedom (df) 383      383     
Normed chi-square (X2/df) 1.64     1.64     
Chi-square (X2) p-value 0.000     0.000     
Comparative fit index (CFI) 0.948     0.948     
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0.940     0.940     
Standardized root mean residual (SRMR) 0.092     0.092     
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 0.057     0.057     
Path coefficient are represented as Standardized Regression Weights in AMOS 
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Finally, as an additional goodness-of-fit measure, the SMC associated with the 
dependent variable, intentions to comply, was also considered. In SEM analysis, the 
SMC values associated with an endogenous variable represent the proportion of 
variance explained by the structural model. The SMC is thus analogous to R
2
 in a 
traditional regression analysis. The SMC values (control 0.43 and treatment 0.54) 
indicate that the control group model explained 43% of the variance in intention to 
comply and the treatment group model explained 54% of variance in intention to 
comply. Therefore, both models explained intention to comply moderately well. 
5.5 Analysis of the research hypotheses 
Figure 5.4 is a representation of the full control and treatment group structural model. 
The hypotheses that were supported in the control group model were also supported in 
the treatment group model. Similarly, the hypothesized relationships that were rejected 
in the control group model were also rejected in the treatment group model, thus 
suggesting that the models are equal across the two groups.  
The paths between the two Threat Perceptions factors, perceived severity and 
perceived vulnerability, and intentions to comply with password guidelines were not 
significant. Also not significant, was the path between perceived cost and intentions to 
comply with password guidelines. The strongest predictor of intentions to comply with 
password guidelines was password self-efficacy for the both the control group (path 
coefficient=0.47) and the treatment group (path coefficient=0.60). Whether the 
participants intended to comply with the password guidelines was largely based on 
their confidence in their ability to create strong passwords.  
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The path between perceived severity and perceived threat were significant, and the 
path between perceived vulnerability and perceived threat was also significant. This 
suggests that perceived threat is influenced by perceived severity and perceived 
vulnerability. While the path between perceived vulnerability and intentions to comply 
was not significant, nor the one between perceived severity and intentions to comply, 
the path between perceived threat and intentions to comply was significant. According 
to Baron and Kenny (1986) these results suggest that the effect of perceived 
vulnerability and perceived severity on intentions to comply with password guidelines 
may be mediated by perceived threat. An analysis of total effects was thus conducted 
to explore if there were any significant indirect effects, particularly for the Threat 
Perceptions component of the model. 
The standardized total effects summarized in Table 5.23 indicate that for both groups 
exposure to hacking had a significant indirect effect on perceived threat however the 
effect was weak at <0.2 (Hair et al., 2010). Exposure to hacking had no significant 
indirect impact on intentions to comply with password guidelines. The results also 
suggest that for the control group, perceived severity and perceived vulnerability had a 
significant indirect effect on intentions to comply with password guidelines through 
perceived threat. Also for the control group, the results indicate that perceived threat 
has a significant indirect effect on actual password compliance. The control group’s 
password self-efficacy also had a significant indirect effect on actual password 
compliance. 
The standardized total effects were however different for the treatment group. 
Perceived severity and perceived vulnerability did not have a significant indirect 
impact on intentions to comply with password guidelines and perceived threat had no 
significant indirect effect on the treatment group’s actual password compliance. 
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Therefore, the effects of perceived vulnerability and perceived severity on compliance 
intentions differ between the two groups. The effect of password self-efficacy on 
actual password compliance was also different between the two groups. Unlike the 
control group, the treatment group’s password self-efficacy also had no significant 




    
























Perceived vulnerability 0.375**               
Perceived threat 0.087** 0.514** 0.233**           
Intentions to comply 0.016 0.125* 0.042* 0.181* 0.186* 0.472** -0.013   
Actual password compliance 0.006 0.044 0.015 0.064* 0.066 0.168* -0.005 0.356** 
Treatment group 
Perceived vulnerability 0.299**               
Perceived threat 0.085** 0.546** 0.285**           
Intentions to comply 0.023 0.022 0.076 0.131* 0.179* 0.597** -0.015   
Actual password compliance 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.019 0.026 0.086 -0.002 0.144* 
Two-tailed significance at 95% Confidence Interval: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Table shows total effects (direct effect + indirect effect) of each latent variable listed across the top of the table as column headings and all the 
dependent variable listed as side row headings. 
Significant indirect effects are shown in bold text 
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The following sections are organized as follows. Sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.4 present the 
results of testing the hypothesized paths as depicted in Figure 5.4. Section 5.5.5 
presents the results relating to the effects of fear appeals on Threat Perceptions, 
Efficacy Perceptions, and compliance with password guidelines. Lastly, Section 5.5.6 
reports the results of the long-term effects of the fear appeals used in this study.  
 Exposure to hacking and perceived vulnerability 5.5.1
As hypothesized, exposure to hacking was shown to have a significant influence on 
perceived vulnerability for the control (path coefficient=0.38) and treatment group 
(path coefficient=0.30). This suggests that when individuals or people they know 
personally are exposed to a hacking incident, they are more inclined to feel vulnerable 
to password threats. Therefore, H7, exposure to hacking is positively related to 
perceived vulnerability was supported. 
 Threat perceptions and intentions to comply  5.5.2
Contrary to what was hypothesized, perceived severity had no association with 
intentions to comply for the control (path coefficient=0.03) and the treatment group 
(path coefficient=-0.05). This finding suggests that the degree to which a user believes 
that the consequences of password threat would be detrimental has no impact on 
intention to comply with recommended password guidelines. Therefore, H2, a user’s 
perceived severity of password related threats is positively related to intentions to 
comply with password guidelines, was not supported. 
As hypothesized, the results of this study also provide no evidence of an association 
between perceived vulnerability and intentions to comply with password guidelines. 
The paths associated with this relationship were not significant for both the control 
(path coefficient=0.00) and treatment group (path coefficient=0.04). This suggests that 
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the degree to which users believe they are likely to experience a password related 
threat does not influence their compliance intentions. This finding is consistent with 
numerous other PMT studies in the IS security domain, particularly those related to 
personal computer protection, which found no support for a direct relationship between 
threat vulnerability and intentions (e.g., Crossler, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010; Milne et 
al., 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Therefore, H3, perceived 
vulnerability to password related threats will not have a direct effect on intentions to 
comply with password guidelines, was supported. 
Although in this study perceived vulnerability had no impact on intentions to comply 
with password guidelines, the results show a significant relationship between perceived 
vulnerability and perceived threat for both the control (path coefficient=0.23) and the 
treatment group (path coefficient=0.29). This indicates that the degree to which users 
believe that they are likely to experience password related threats contributes to their 
emotional feeling of concern towards password related threats. Therefore, H4, a user’s 
perceived vulnerability is positively related to perceived threat, was supported. 
The results of this study suggest that perceived threat is also influenced by perceptions 
about the severity of password threats. The path between perceived severity and 
perceived threat was significant for both the control (path coefficient=0.51) and the 
treatment group (path coefficient=0.55). This suggests that users’ perceived severity 
significantly affects their level of concern for password related threats. Therefore, H5, 
a user’s perceived severity is positively related to perceived threat, was supported.  
Of the three Threat Perceptions latent variables, perceived threat was the only one 
shown to directly predict the participants’ compliance intentions. The path between 
perceived threat and intentions to comply with password guidelines was significant for 
both the control (path coefficient=0.18) and treatment group (path coefficient=0.13). 
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This suggests that when users worry about password threats, they are more likely to 
form intentions to comply with the recommended guidelines. Therefore, H6, a user’s 
perceived threat is positively related to intentions to comply with password 
guidelines, was supported. 
In summary, the results suggest that the Threat Perceptions component of the research 
model is a weak predictor of intentions to comply with password guidelines. This is, 
however, consistent with findings in the PMT literature (e.g., Aytes & Connolly, 2004; 
Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Milne & Milne, 2000). The results of this study thus suggest 
that the threat appraisal component of PMT has only a relatively small impact on IS 
security behaviors. 
 Efficacy perceptions and intentions to comply 5.5.3
The results of this study suggest that perceived password effectiveness affects 
compliance intentions. The path between perceived password effectiveness and 
intentions to comply with password recommendations was significant for the control 
(path coefficient=0.19) as well as for the treatment group (path coefficient=0.18). This 
suggests that users are more likely to intend to comply with password guidelines when 
they believe that doing so will protect their online account from being hacked. 
Therefore, H8, a user’s perceived password effectiveness is positively related to 
intentions to comply with password guidelines, was supported.  
As hypothesized, the results of this study show that self-efficacy perceptions play a 
significant role in promoting compliance intentions. The path between password self-
efficacy and intention to comply was significant for both the control (path 
coefficient=0.47) and the treatment group (path coefficient=0.60). This implies that the 
users confidence in their ability to create strong passwords that are also easy to 
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remember determines whether they intend to comply with recommended measures. 
Therefore, H9, a user’s password self-efficacy is positively related to intentions to 
comply with password guidelines, was supported.  
Contrary to what was hypothesized, the path between perceived cost and intentions to 
comply was not significant for either the control (path coefficient=-0.01) or the 
treatment group (path coefficient=-0.02). This indicates that the participants’ perceived 
difficulty in remembering strong passwords did not affect their intentions to follow the 
recommended password guidelines. Therefore, H10, a user’s perceived cost is 
negatively related to intentions to comply with password guidelines, was not 
supported.  
In summary, the Efficacy Perceptions component of the research model proposed in 
this study is a better predictor of intentions to comply than the Threat Perceptions 
component. Of the three Efficacy Perceptions factors, password self-efficacy and 
perceived password effectiveness have a significant influence on compliance 
intentions. This is consistent with findings from several PMT studies (e.g., Aytes & 
Connolly, 2004; Floyd et al., 2000; Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Milne & Milne, 2000) 
which suggest that coping appraisal may be a better predictor of preventative behavior 
than threat appraisal. Like these studies, the results of this study also suggest that self-
efficacy perceptions have a strong influence on compliance intentions.  
 Intentions to comply and actual password 5.5.4
compliance  
As hypothesized, intentions to comply with password guidelines predict actual 
password compliance. The paths between intentions to comply with password 
guidelines and actual password compliance were significant for both the control (path 
coefficient=0.36) and treatment group (path coefficient=0.15). This suggests that 
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whether a user intends to comply predicts actual compliance. However, the correlation 
between compliance intentions and actual password compliance was stronger for the 
control group. Overall, the results provide evidence of a significant link between 
intentions and actual behavior. Therefore, H11, intentions to comply is positively 
related to actual password compliance, was supported.  
 Effects of fear appeals on perceptions and 5.5.5
compliance 
This study proposes that providing fear appeals will increase user compliance with 
password guidelines. In this study, compliance with password guidelines is examined 
as compliance intentions and actual compliance. Thus, this section reports the results 
on whether the fear appeals (password security information and training) used in this 
study increased threat and efficacy perceptions, and whether the effects led to 
improved compliance intentions and password strength.  
This section first presents the results of the one-way MANOVA conducted to examine 
the overall effect of the password security information and training. This is followed 
by the results of the one-way ANOVA conducted on the variables from the model 
(perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, perceived threat, perceived password 
effectiveness, password self-efficacy, perceived cost and intentions to comply with 
password guidelines), to examine if the means were higher for participants who 
interacted with the training materials. As the variable actual password compliance was 
measured on a different scale from the other variables, the ANOVA was conducted 
separately and is discussed later in this section. 
The test of MANOVA effect was statistically significant with Pillai’s Trace value of 
0.345 (F (7, 398) = 29.99, p = 0.000), therefore the null hypothesis that the group 
means are equal across the tested variables could be rejected. This suggests that 
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Internet users’ password Threat Perceptions, Efficacy Perceptions and intentions to 
comply with password guidelines depend on whether they receive training or not. The 
estimated effect size represented by the Partial Eta Squared value (partial 
2
) was 
0.345 indicating that 34.5% of the variance in Threat Perceptions, Efficacy 
Perceptions and intentions to comply with password guidelines was accounted for by 
the fear appeals. 
Prior to examining the individual dependent variables using ANOVA, the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance was examined. Of the seven dependent variables, three 
(perceived threat p = 0.014; perceived severity, p = 0.000; and password self-efficacy, 
p=0.005) did not satisfy the homogeneity of variance assumption of equality of 
variance. However, none of the variances were greater than four times the size of the 
standard deviations (SD) and corresponding variances (see Table 5.24).  As such, 
given that the sample sizes of the two groups were virtually equal (n=202 and n=204), 
the ANOVA results would still be applicable (Howell, 2012).  
Table 5.24: Between group mean difference 
Dependent variable 
ANOVA Control group Treatment group 
F p-value  Mean SD Variance Mean SD Variance 
Perceived vulnerability 27.04 0.000 0.063 3.645 1.337 1.787 4.359 1.424 2.028 
Perceived threat 5.91 0.015 0.014 5.235 1.531 2.343 5.569 1.219 1.486 
Perceived severity 4.57 0.033 0.011 4.361 1.555 2.417 4.655 1.190 1.417 
Password self-efficacy 6.58 0.011 0.016 5.220 1.305 1.704 5.525 1.083 1.172 
Perceived password 
effectiveness 
112.05 0.000 0.271 4.736 0.915 0.838 5.750 1.012 1.024 
Perceived cost 1.19 0.275 0.003 4.746 1.497 2.240 4.897 1.296 1.680 
Intentions to comply 71.44 0.000 0.150 5.286 1.055 1.113 6.224 1.178 1.387 
Control n=202; Treatment n=204; 
2
 = partial eta squared (equivalent to R
2
) 
Mean scores based on a 7-point scale 
 
As indicated by the p-values in Table 5.24, all dependent variables except perceived 
cost were significantly different between the two groups. Thus, fear appeals appear to 
significantly raise the level of perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, perceived 
threat, perceived password effectiveness, password self-efficacy, and intentions to 
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comply with password guidelines. For both groups the average levels of perceived 
vulnerability and perceived severity were low compared to the rest. The participants’ 
vulnerability perceptions were however the lowest implying that on average users have 
a low perceived vulnerability to security threats. 
The magnitude of the ANOVA effect size (
2
) ranged from 0.011 to a high of 0.217 
for the six statistically significant dependent variables with perceived password 
effectiveness shown to be the most influenced by the fear appeals, with the highest 
variance explained (21.7%) by the fear appeals. The ANOVA effect results suggest 
that virtually no variance (0.003%) in perceived cost was explained by the fear 
appeals. Except for perceived cost, the password security information and training 
(fear appeals) therefore appear to alter perceptions and lead to higher intentions to 
comply with password guidelines as hypothesized.  
The rest of the section presents the results for the effects of the fear appeals on actual 
password compliance. First repeated measures ANOVA results are reported to 
determine if the password strength for the treatment group was significantly improved 
compared with the control group. Then a within-group ANOVA is reported to 
determine if the improvement is a result of the fear appeals.  
A repeated measures ANOVA was first conducted to determine if the post-test 
password strength (the passwords created at the conclusion of Phase I, Time 2) was 
significantly improved compared with the pre-test password strength (the passwords 
created at the beginning of Phase I, Time 1). At Time 2, both groups were instructed to 
create a password that is strong and easy to remember, while the treatment group was 
also exposed to fears appeals. As hypothesized, the treatment group had a larger 
improvement compared with the control group; however, the control group also had a 
significant increase in password strength. 
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 As the means and p-values in Table 5.25 show, there was a significant increase in 
password strength for both groups (p<0.001). The control group had a mean password 
strength of 28.405 bits at Time 1 and showed a significant (p<0.001) increase in 
password strength (mean = 37.896 bits) at Time 2. The treatment group had a mean 
password strength of 28.064 bits at Time 1 and a significant (p<0.001) increase in 
password strength at Time 2 (mean = 41.816 bits).  












Password strength at Time 1 (pre-test) 28.405 13.534 
9.491 1.106 p<0.001 
Password strength at Time 2 (post-test) 37.896 17.161 
Treatment Group 
Password strength at Time 1 (pre-test) 28.064 11.029 
13.752 1.149 p<0.001 
Password strength at Time 2 (post-test) 41.816 16.727 
Mean password strength=password entropy in bits 
 
Figure 5.5 provides a visual illustration of the mean pre-test and post-test password 
strength for each group. The lines for both groups suggest that the two groups had a 
substantial increase in password strength from Time 1 to Time 2. However, the 
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Figure 5.5: Profile plot showing the mean change in password strength between time 1 and time 2 
 
 
Given that both groups showed a significant increase in password strength, a between-
group ANOVA was performed to examine if the password security information and 
exercise session had an effect (interaction) on the password strength of the treatment 
group. The analysis incorporates both a repeated measure effect where password 
strengths before and after the exercise session are analyzed as well as a between 
groups effect. The analysis was a 2 x 2 ANOVA with two levels in a repeated measure 
(pre-test password strength and post-test password strength) and the between groups 
effects has two groups (control group and treatment group). The results of the within-
subjects effects suggest that the treatment group increased significantly more than the 
control group. The results also show that the group interaction was significant (F 
(1,404) = 7.136, p = 0.008), indicating that the treatment group increased significantly 
more than the control group. 
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To determine if the increase in password strength was a result of the fear appeals the 
results of a follow-up within-subject ANOVA (see Table 5.26 ) were examined. The 
partial eta squared (
2
) values indicate that compared with the control group, the 
treatment group had a higher variance explained by the fear appeals. The partial 
2
 
values suggest that for the control group, only 26.8% of the variance in password 
strength was accounted for by the time variable, yet for the treatment group 41.4% of 
the variance in password strength was predicted by the time variable. This suggests 
that the fear appeals presented to the treatment group led to significantly stronger 
password strength. 
Table 5.26: Within-subjects ANOVA 









Pre-post 1 9098.356 73.684 0.000 .268 
Pre-post(Error) 201 123.478       
Treatment Group 
Pre-post 1 19290.545 143.206 0.000 .414 
Pre-post(Error) 203 134.705       
 
In summary, the password security information and training appear to alter threat and 
efficacy perceptions and lead to significantly improved intentions to comply and 
improved password strength. Therefore, H1, fear appeals will increase user 
compliance with password guidelines, was supported. 
 Effects of fear appeals in the long-term 5.5.6
This section presents the results of the analysis of the data collected in Phase II, six 
weeks after Phase I. The data includes the passwords used to access the Phase II 
survey, and the variables related to perceived password memorability and intentions to 
comply with password guidelines. The data was examined to determine whether the 
effects of the fear appeals used this this study were maintained over time. 
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5.5.6.1 Phase II Participants 
A total of 256 follow-up surveys were completed with a total of 194 valid completions. 
Of these, 99 surveys were completed by participants in the control group and 95 by 
participants in treatment group. As email invitations were distributed to all the 419 
participants who completed Phase I, the valid response rate for the follow-up session 
was 46.3%. 
5.5.6.2 Intentions to comply, six weeks later 
Table 5.27 shows the descriptive statistics associated with intentions to comply across 
the two groups. The control group had a slightly lower mean level (M =5.33, SD=1.17) 
than the treatment group (M=5.42, SD=1.08). To test the hypothesis that password 
training had a long-term effect on intentions to comply, a one-way between-group 
ANOVA was performed. The assumption of homogeneity of variances was first tested 
and based on Levene’s F test, F(1,192) = 2.399, p = 0.123 this assumption was 
satisfied. 
Table 5.27: Intentions to comply six weeks later 
 n M SD Skew  Kurtosis  
Control Group 99 5.33 1.17 -.767 -.328 
Treatment Group 95 5.42 1.08 -1.284 -2.049 
 
The between-group ANOVA yielded a statistically non-significant effect F (1,192) = 
0.316, p = 0.574, =.002. Thus, the hypothesis that the means are different was not 
supported. This indicates that after six weeks, the two groups are equally likely to 
intend to comply with password guidelines. In comparison, immediately after taking 
the password security training (six weeks prior), the treatment group’s intentions to 
comply with password guidelines were significantly higher (M =6.22, SD=1.18) than 
those of the control group (M =5.28, SD=1.05). The treatment group was more likely 
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than the control group to intend to comply with password guidelines immediately after 
the training. However, six weeks later their intentions were virtually the same as those 
of the control group. Therefore, H12, users who receive fear appeals will have higher 
intentions to comply over time than those who do not, was not supported. 
5.5.6.3 Password memorability  
Table 5.28 shows the descriptive statistics associated with actual password 
memorability for the two study groups. Of the 99 returning participants in the control 
group, only 6.1% (n=6) remembered their previous passwords. While 11.6% of the 95 
returning participants in the treatment group remembered their passwords. Those who 
did not remember their password used a generic password to access the Phase II 
survey.  
Table 5.28: Actual password memorability six week later 
  
Forgot 
(used generic passwords) 
Remembered 
(used previous passwords) 
Control n=99 
n 93 6 
% 93.9 6.1 
Treatment n=95 
n 84 11 




 test of independence was conducted to examine if the proportion of 
those who remembered their passwords was significantly different between the two 
groups. The 
2
 test statistics suggests no significant difference in actual password 
memorability (
2 
(1) = 1.85, p=0.174) between the two groups. This indicates that the 
proportion of those who remembered their previous passwords did not vary 
significantly between the two groups. Although the proportion of those who 
remembered their passwords was relatively small for both groups, given that the 
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number of those in the treatment who remembered their passwords was nearly double, 
this should be explored further in future research. 
Table 5.29 shows the descriptive statistics associated with perceived password 
memorability across the two groups. The control group was associated with the 
smallest mean level of perceived password memorability (M=2.45, SD=1.83) while the 
treatment group had a higher mean score (M =2.81, SD=1.94). However, given that the 
scores were on a 7-point scale, both groups had a relatively low level of perceived 
password memorability. Both groups indicated that it was difficult to remember their 
password. To determine if the password training had an effect on perceived password 
memorability, a one-way between-group ANOVA was performed. The assumption of 
homogeneity of variances was first tested. From Levene’s F test, F(1,192) = .68, p = 
0.410, the assumption that the variances are equal across the two groups was satisfied. 
Table 5.29: Perceived password memorability six weeks later 
 n M SD Skew  Kurtosis  
Control Group 99 2.45 1.83 1.22 .539 
Treatment Group 95 2.81 1.94 .89 -.312 
 
The between-group ANOVA yielded a statistically non-significant effect F (1,192) = 
1.74, p = 0.189, with a squared eta (
2
) value of .009. Thus, the hypothesis that the 
means are different was rejected, indicating that the two groups showed the same level 
of perceived password memorability. Therefore, H13, users who receive fear appeals 
with a mnemonic training emphasis will have higher password memorability over time 
than those who do not, was not supported. 
  
 186   
       
5.6 Chapter overview 
This chapter reported the results of the data analysis and findings for the research 
hypotheses for Phase I and II. The results of the measurement model analysis suggest 
that the final measurement model was a good representation of the sample data in this 
study. The test of model equivalence also suggests that the measurement model was 
adequately equivalent across the two groups, and thus suitable for SEM structural 
model analysis. The structural model was also examined for specification and validity 
issues. The goodness-of-fit statistics for the nested structural model suggested that the 
control and treatment group structural models fit the sample data well, thus no 
modifications were made.  
The results of the path analysis show that of the three Threat Perceptions latent 
variables, perceived threat has a significant influence on compliance intentions. The 
Efficacy Perceptions component of the research model proposed in this study is a 
better predictor of intentions to comply than the Threat Perceptions component, with 
password self-efficacy and perceived password effectiveness shown to have a 
significant influence on compliance intentions. The fear appeals used in this study 
appear to significantly raise the level of threat and efficacy perceptions, which also 
lead to significantly improved  intentions to comply and password strength. The fear 
appeals were however shown to have no long-term effects on compliance intentions. 
The model explained 43% of the variance in intentions to comply for the control group 
and 54% of variance for the treatment group. Therefore, both models explained 
intention to comply moderately well. Of the ten structural paths tested using SEM, only 
three were non-significant. As the path between perceived vulnerability and intentions 
to comply with password guidelines was hypothesized to be non-significant, eight of 
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the hypothesized paths were supported by the data. The following chapter discusses in 
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6 Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results and explains the key findings of this study with 
reference to relevant research. The chapter first presents a discussion of the effects of 
the fear appeals used in this study on threat and efficacy perceptions and on 
compliance with password guidelines. This chapter then discusses the results of each 
hypothesis with explanation of the findings. The contribution of the research model is 
also discussed in this chapter. Finally, the chapter summarizes key findings and 
contribution of this research in answering the research questions raised in this study.   
6.2 Effects of password security information 
and training on perceptions and compliance 
The fear appeals used in this study, which were in the form of a password security 
information and training session, were used as a stimuli to alter threat perceptions and 
efficacy perceptions. This study reveals two key findings concerning the use of fear 
appeals in the IS security domain. 
First, the results suggest that providing password security information and training can 
alter threat and efficacy perceptions. The participants who received password security 
information and training had significantly higher mean levels of all threat and efficacy 
perceptions except perceived cost, demonstrating that fear appeals can elevate 
perceptions about threat and efficacy of password security recommendations. The 
higher threat and efficacy perceptions among the users who received the fear appeals 
suggest that fear appeals can be used to elevate user security perceptions and improve 
  
 189   
       
users’ confidence in the effectiveness of recommended security measures and their 
ability to comply with security guidelines. 
Contrary to expectations, the fear appeals, which included password training with a 
mnemonic technique for creating complex passwords, did not significantly decrease 
the levels of perceived cost. On average, both groups indicated that they slightly agree 
that remembering passwords would be difficult if they followed password guidelines. 
A potential reason why the two groups had the same average level of perceived cost is 
that most participants already used passwords with 7 or more characters. Further, as 
indicated by the background statistics described in Section 5.2.3, many of the 
participants in this study also changed their passwords voluntarily. This may be an 
indication that the scenarios used in the measurement items for perceived cost may 
have been trivial for this group of participants and therefore the training had no impact 
on their perceived cost.  
The second key finding related to fear appeals suggests that providing password 
security information could lead to improved compliance. In this study, compliance 
with password guidelines was examined as compliance intentions and actual 
compliance. The results of this study show that those with high threat perceptions and 
efficacy perceptions also had significantly higher motivation to comply with password 
guidelines. This implies that changing how users perceive security threats, their self-
efficacy and their confidence in the effectiveness of the security measures, causes 
significant changes in their compliance intentions. This finding is consistent with PMT 
(Rogers, 1975, 1983) which suggests that elevating threat and efficacy perceptions 
increases protection motivation. This finding is also consistent with Johnston and 
Warkentin’s (2010a) experimental study in the IS security domain, where improving 
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threat perceptions and efficacy perceptions was found to improve users intentions to 
apply anti-spyware safeguards.  
As described in Section 4.6.9, passwords were collected at the beginning of the study 
(time 1) and at the end of the study (time 2) to determine if there was a significant 
increase in password strength after the training. The results confirm that providing 
password security information could improve password strength. The fear appeals used 
in this study contributed to a significant increase in password strength for the treatment 
group after the training session. The group of participants who received password 
security information and training created significantly stronger passwords than those 
who did not. This is consistent with findings from other password related studies, 
which found that fear appeals (Vance et al., 2013) or provision of password security 
training (Charoen, Raman, & Olfman, 2008; Jenkins et al., 2012; McCrohan, Engel, & 
Harvey, 2010) can significantly improve password strength.  
It is of interest to note that the control group also created significantly stronger 
passwords after completing the survey. There are two possible reasons for this. First, 
just answering the survey questions may have sensitized the respondents’ awareness 
thus leading to stronger passwords. Secondly, both groups were instructed to create 
strong memorable passwords at this point. This instruction was to ensure that both 
groups had an equal opportunity to create passwords that they perceived as strong and 
easy to remember, thus emulating a typical password login environment. Both groups 
were therefore expected to have stronger passwords than they created initially when 
they were only asked to create a password with no additional instruction. However, the 
password security training led to a weak but significant increase in password strength 
for the treatment group.  
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Another interesting finding is that the participants who received the password security 
information highlighting the likelihood and consequences of password related threats 
the raised levels of perceived vulnerability and perceived severity did not lead to 
increased compliance intentions.  
A possible explanation for this finding is that the concept of fear appeals was 
originally applied to health-related risks such as to promote use of breast cancer 
preventative measures (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987). Thus, it is likely that the magnitude 
of the feeling of susceptibility and severity of an illness such as cancer may not be 
comparable to the feeling of susceptibility and severity of password related threats 
(Crossler et al., 2013). This rationale points to a possible limitation in this study and 
raises the question of whether a more severe message pertaining to vulnerability and 
severity of password threats would have resulted in higher perceptions of vulnerability 
and severity. Future research should be undertaken to compare the effectiveness of 
using different fear appeals messages such as low-threat and high-threat messages.  
6.3 Discussion of hypotheses 
This section discusses the results of the hypotheses testing relating to the research 
model proposed in this study. Table 6.1 summarizes the hypothesized relationships, 
indicating which were supported and which were not. Reasons for this are then 
explored. 
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Table 6.1: Summary of hypothesized relationships and effects of fear appeals 
Hypothesized relations [supported] 
Exposure to hacking   perceived vulnerability 
Perceived vulnerability  intentions to comply 
Perceived severity  perceived threat perceived vulnerability 
Perceived threat  intentions to comply 
Perceived password effectiveness  intentions 
Password self-efficacy  intentions to comply 
Intentions to comply  actual password compliance 
Fear appeals effects   compliance with password guidelines 
Hypothesized relations [not supported] 
Perceived severity  intentions to comply 
Perceived cost  intentions to comply 
Long-term effects of fear appeals  intentions to comply 
Long-term effects of fear appeals  password memorability 
 
 Exposure to hacking affects perceived 6.3.1
vulnerability 
Users have a tendency to underestimate their vulnerability to security threats (Sasse et 
al., 2001; Woon et al., 2005). It is therefore important to understand what it takes to 
make users believe they are vulnerable to IS security threats. The results of this study 
suggest that prior exposure to hacking contributes to users’ belief that they are 
vulnerable to security threats. When a user or someone they know personally has their 
online account hacked into they are more likely to feel at risk. This experience is a 
form of acquired information that shapes how people assess their vulnerability to 
threats (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981; Weinstein, 1984). By adding a path between 
exposure to hacking and perceived vulnerability this study provides some explanation 
how vulnerability perceptions are developed. A discussion of how perceived 
vulnerability is developed is important given the mixed findings on the role of 
perceived vulnerability in the IS security domain. 
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 Perceived vulnerability does not affect intentions 6.3.2
According to PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983), a person’s perceived vulnerability has a 
direct impact on their protection motivation. However, the results of this study show 
no direct association between perceived vulnerability and intentions to comply with 
password guidelines. Believing that their online email account was likely to be hacked 
did not motivate users to comply with password guidelines. This finding supports the 
hypothesis of this study that perceived vulnerability and intentions to comply with 
password guidelines are not significantly related. The results of this study also 
corroborate the findings of several other IS security studies (e.g. Lee & Larsen, 2009; 
Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009).  
A possible explanation why perceived vulnerability is not a significant predictor of 
compliance intentions in this study is that there might be differences in how users 
behave in their decision to protect their personal computer environment versus in an 
organizational setting. This study examined how perceived vulnerability relates to 
users’ intentions to comply with the recommended password guidelines on their 
personal online email accounts.   
Like this study, an overwhelming majority of the studies that have examined the 
relationship between perceived vulnerability and IS security behavioral intentions in 
the context of personal computer protection (i.e., Crossler, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010; 
Milne et al., 2009; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009), have found no 
evidence to support this association. On the contrary, the role of perceived 
vulnerability has received some support in organizational settings. For example, Lee 
and Larsen (2009) reported the significant impact perceived vulnerability has on 
executives’ adoption of anti-malware software for their organization. While other 
studies (e.g., Ifinedo, 2012; Workman et al., 2008) found that perceived vulnerability 
  
 194   
       
influences employees’ intentions to comply with security policies within an 
organizational setting.  
The view that users behave differently in different IS security context corroborates 
Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) proposition that, given different situations, different 
beliefs guide an individual’s intentions to carry out a specific behavior. A possible 
implication of this is that it potentially opens new research directions in the 
applications of PMT to IS security behaviors. For example, future research could be 
undertaken to compare user security behavior in personal and organizational settings.  
 Perceived severity does not affect intentions 6.3.3
It was hypothesized that users who view password related threats as a serious issue 
would be more willing to comply with password guidelines. The results of this study 
did not support this hypothesis. Whether or not the Internet users were aware of the 
potential consequences of a threat targeted at their online email account did not 
influence their compliance intentions. This is an interesting finding given that it 
contradicts numerous other studies in the IS security domain (e.g., Herath & Rao, 
2009; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Siponen et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; 
Workman et al., 2008) that have found perceived severity to play a significant role in 
motivating users to follow security recommendations.  
The fact that perceived severity and, as discussed above, perceived vulnerability had 
no significant influence on intentions to comply with password guidelines in this study 
might be indicative of the limitations of the threat appraisal component in explaining 
IS security behavior. The fact that perceived vulnerability and severity were weak 
predictors of compliance intentions is consistent with previous IS security studies (e.g., 
Aytes & Connolly, 2004; Crossler et al., 2014; Posey et al., 2011; Siponen et al., 2010; 
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Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Given that even the group of participants who received the 
fear appeals in this study also had relatively low vulnerability and severity perceptions, 
this study also raises the question of whether providing information about the 
likelihood and consequences of threats is enough to improve compliance with security 
recommendations. The results of this study on the relationship between perceived 
vulnerability and intentions, and perceived severity and intentions, also draw attention 
to the possibility that the underlying assumptions of PMT may not be applicable in the 
IS security domain.    
 Perceived severity and perceived vulnerability 6.3.4
affect perceived threat  
It was hypothesized that when users believe that their email account could be hacked 
into and that the consequences would be severe, they would be more inclined to worry 
about threats. Also referred to as fear arousal (LaTour & Rotfeld, 1997; Maddux & 
Rogers, 1983), perceived threat is an emotional response to threat where people feel 
threatened or worried. As hypothesized, perceived vulnerability and perceived severity 
had a significant influence on perceived threat. When users perceive their online email 
accounts as vulnerable to password threats, they develop an emotional feeling towards 
password related threats.  
Likewise, users are inclined to feel threatened when they are aware of the potential 
consequences of a breach on their email account. This is consistent with the results of 
Liang and Xue (2010) who found a significant relationship between threat perception 
and vulnerability and severity perceptions. Herath and Rao (2009) also found a 
significant relationship between employees’ level of concern about security breaches 
and their awareness of the consequences of a breach, however perceived vulnerability 
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did not influence their level of concern in that study. Their results also revealed that on 
average the participants had low perceived vulnerability. 
Interestingly, the results of this study revealed a stronger relationship between 
perceived severity and perceived threat, than between perceived vulnerability and 
perceived threat, for both groups. The results imply perceived severity is a better 
predictor of perceived threat than perceived vulnerability. Although Woon et al. 
(2005) suggested that communicating to users about severity of a security threat may 
be more effective than educating them about the probability of experiencing a 
computer attack, given that users generally have a low perceived vulnerability, perhaps 
more effort should be made to effectively communicate the prevalence of IS security 
threats. 
 Perceived threat affects intentions 6.3.5
As hypothesized, the results of this study show that perceived threat had a significant 
influence on compliance intentions. Users who express a high level of concern about 
IS security risks are more likely to adopt the necessary preventative measures. This 
finding supports the previous results of Zhang and McDowell (2009), who found a 
positive relationship between perceived threat (represented as fear in their study) and 
intentions to apply online password protection. Liang and Xue (2010) also found a 
significant association between threat perception and motivation to avoid security 
risks. Also consistent with this study is the fact that Zhang and McDowell (2009) 
found perceived threat to be a better predictor of behvaioral intentions than perceived 
vulnerability or perceived severity. This is an important finding because many previous 
applications of PMT to IS security behaviors have overlooked the role of fear.  
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Conversely, the results of this study contradict the PMT (Rogers, 1983) and other 
health-related literature (e.g., Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; 
Witte, 1994) which suggest that fear has an indirect relationship with behavioral 
intentions through perceived vulnerability and severity. An important implication of 
this finding is that it highlights the possibility that the role and influence of fear could 
be different in the IS security domain. Although few IS studies have tested the ability 
of fear to predict IS security behavioral intentions, the results of this study and that of 
Liang and Xue (2010) and Zhang and McDowell (2009) suggest that fear has a direct 
influence on IS related protective behavior. More research will however need to be 
undertaken before the role and influence of fear in the IS security domain can be 
clearly understood.    
Another important finding is that based on the results of this study, and that of Liang 
and Xue (2010) and Zhang and McDowell (2009), it appears that emotions play a 
significant role in motivating users to safeguard their personal information assets. 
Thus, users feel threatened when they think about the security threats to their personal 
information assets, which in turn motivates them to apply safeguards. However, in 
Posey et al. (2011), fear was shown to have no significant influence on employees’ 
intention to protect their organization’s information assets.  
In fact, the participants in their study had low levels of fear suggesting that employees 
do not feel threatened when they think about the security threats to their organization. 
Thus, as Posey et al. (2011) noted it appears that in the context of organizational 
protection emotions do not influence employees’ compliance considerations. The 
results in this study, and the results of Liang and Xue (2010) and Zhang and McDowell 
(2009), point to the possibility that there might be a difference between domains, 
though the evidence is limited.  
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 Perceived password effectiveness affects 6.3.6
intentions 
As hypothesized, the results of this study show a positive relationship between 
perceived password effectiveness and intentions to comply with password guidelines. 
Users intend to comply with password guidelines with greater consistency when they 
believe that password guidelines will protect their online account from being hacked. 
This is consistent with several IS security studies (e.g., Lee & Larsen, 2009; Woon et 
al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009) that found perceptions about effectiveness of 
password guidelines to play a significant role in users’ implementation of security 
measures.  
While it is important that users are aware of the available security mechanisms 
(Dhamija et al., 2006; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Woon et al., 2005), the results of this study 
show that their decision to apply security measures is dependent on whether they 
perceive them as effective. It is therefore important that users have confidence that the 
recommended security safeguards will effectively thwart security attacks. 
 Password self-efficacy affects intentions 6.3.7
As hypothesized, password self-efficacy had a significant influence on intentions to 
comply with password guidelines. This finding suggests that when users are confident 
in their ability to create and remember strong passwords they are more likely to 
comply with password guidelines. Self-efficacy has also been found to play a 
significant role in improving compliance with organizational IS security policies. For 
example, Vance et al. (2012) and Siponen et al. (2014) demonstrate the importance of 
strengthening users’ beliefs about their ability to apply recommended IS security 
measures within an organization. Also consistent with this study are findings from 
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other studies (e.g., Crossler, 2010; Woon et al., 2005) that self-efficacy beliefs have a 
significant effect on IS security behavior in the context of personal protection.  
 Perceived cost does not affect intentions 6.3.8
Surprisingly, the hypothesis that perceived cost would have a negative influence on 
intentions to comply with password guidelines was not supported. Perceived effort in 
remembering passwords when the recommended guidelines are followed does not 
appear to be a factor in users’ intentions to comply. This result differs from a previous 
password related study by Zhang and McDowell (2009), who found that perceived cost 
has a significant negative influence on users intentions to follow password guidelines. 
Several other studies have also found perceived cost to have a negative effect on 
motivation to apply security safeguards (e.g., Lee & Larsen, 2009; Vance et al., 2012). 
A possible factor that may have contributed to the non-significant finding is that the 
items used to measure perceived cost all focused on password recall issues. While the 
struggle to remember and maintain multiple strong password has been a longstanding 
issue (Bonneau, 2012; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; NCSA-McAfee, 2011; Yan et al., 
2004; Zviran & Haga, 1999), other password related cost factors have also been shown 
to contribute to poor password practices. For example, Tam et al. (2009) found that 
when users have a limited time to memorize their email passwords, they tend to create 
weak passwords. While Grawemeyer and Johnson (2011) found that usability issues 
such as mistype errors can have a negative impact on password quality. Thus, a 
consideration of other costs associated with password use such as time (e.g., Tam et 
al., 2009) and mistype issues (e.g., Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011) could provide better 
insights into the relationship. 
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 Compliance intentions leads to actual 6.3.9
compliance 
It was hypothesized that intentions to comply with password guidelines would predict 
actual password compliance. This hypothesis was supported. Users who have a strong 
motivation to comply with password guidelines are more likely to comply. This 
finding supports Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1980; 1975) proposition that behavior is 
determined by intentions. The results of this study are also consistent with Liang and 
Xue’s (2010) study in the IS security domain, where home computer users’ threat 
avoidance behavior was found to be determined by avoidance motivation.  
Although the hypothesis in this study was supported, the relationship between 
intentions and actual compliance, particularly for the treatment group, was not strong. 
This finding has important implications in the application of PMT in IS security 
research where measures of intentions have been used to predict a variety of security 
behaviors such as, adoption of specific anti-malware software (Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010a; Lee & Larsen, 2009), compliance with a range of security policies (Vance et 
al., 2012), and adoption of online passwords measures (Zhang & McDowell, 2009).  
While PMT assumes that behavior can be adequately predicted by behavioral 
intentions (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986; Weinstein, 1993), the results of this study 
indicate a gap between intentions and actual compliance. Thus it is important to 
determine how well intentions can predict IS security behavior and the possible factors 
that may contribute to a weak predictability of actual behavior. 
The weak relationship in this study may be attributable to the fact that the participants 
were asked to indicate their intentions to comply with password guidelines for “their 
important email account” (see Appendix D), but the actual passwords were for a 
different context, that is, survey passwords. The limitation in this is that when users 
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perceive their web account as unimportant, they are more likely to ignore safe 
password practices and use weak or recycled passwords (Adams et al., 1997; Taiabul 
Haque, Wright, & Scielzo, 2014; Zviran & Haga, 1999). It is therefore possible that the 
users perceived the survey account as unimportant which may have influence the 
quality of passwords (actual password compliance).   
 Fear appeals do not have a long-term effect on 6.3.10
compliance intentions and password 
memorability   
While some experimental evidence (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010a; Vance et al., 2013) supports the use of fear appeals within the IS security 
domain, the long term effects have been largely overlooked. As such, this study 
contributes to a growing body of fear appeals based IS security research, draws 
attention to the need of more longitudinal studies in this area. The fear appeals used in 
this study led to an immediate positive effect on compliance intentions and password 
strength. However, contrary to the hypothesis in this study, the fear appeals had no 
long-term effects on intentions to comply with password guidelines. This finding 
suggests that there may be a need for an ongoing IS security training to ensure that 
users continue to comply. 
Fear appeals also had no significant impact on password memorability over time. The 
lack of evidence of a long-term effect of the fear appeals used in this study may be 
attributable to the fact that the participants were not actually using the passwords for a 
period of six weeks. The less frequently a password is used, the more difficult it is to 
remember. While this study provides a point of reference on how difficult it is to 
memorize passwords, this was a critical limitation, as it does not model a typical 
operational setting.  
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However, as the proportion of those who remembered their passwords after six weeks 
without using it was nearly double for the group that received mnemonic password 
training , and the long-term impact of mnemonic training has been demonstrated in 
studies such as that of Hampstead et al. (2012), further research is warranted. Given 
that improving a user’s ability to memorize passwords promotes safe password 
practices, the findings in this study, though not conclusive, demonstrates how a key 
challenge associated with insecure password practices, can be improved and 
potentially be sustained over time. 
6.4 Support for the model proposed in this 
study 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the revised model based on the results. Overall, the proposed 
research model appears to explain the hypothesized relationships and compliance with 
password policies relatively well.  
The results of this study show that the observed data fit the proposed model well and a 
large proportion of the variance in intentions to comply for both the control and 
treatment groups. Given that the relationship between perceived vulnerability and 
intentions to comply with password guidelines was hypothesized as a non-significant 
relation, only two hypothesized relationships were not supported. This model therefore 
provides a substantial contribution to applications of PMT to IS security behaviors. 
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The results suggest that users who have had their online accounts breached are more 
inclined to feel vulnerable to password related threats, but their vulnerability 
perceptions have no direct impact on their compliance intentions. Likewise, awareness 
of the potential consequences of a breach has no direct influence on users’ motivation 
to comply with recommended password guidelines. Although awareness of the 
likelihood and consequences of a security breach have no direct impacts on 
compliance intentions, they play a significant role in increasing the level of concern for 
security threats. When users are concerned about security threats, they are more 
inclined to be motivated to follow the recommended measures. Internet users who 
recognize that compliance will protect their online account from being hacked are 
more motivated to comply. In particular, users’ confidence in their ability to create 
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strong passwords that they can easily recall has a strong influence on their compliance 
considerations.   
6.5 Research questions 
This section discusses the contribution of this study toward answering the research 
questions raised in this study. 
The first research question addressed in this study is: 
1. How do user perceptions about password threats and password efficacy affect 
compliance with password guidelines? 
The results of this study indicate that the threat perceptions have an impact on users’ 
password guidelines compliance intentions but these are not entirely as proposed. 
Perceived threat has a direct impact on compliance intentions, however this study 
shows that perceived severity and perceived vulnerability have no direct influence on 
intentions to comply with password guidelines. Interestingly, for those who did not 
receive the password security information and training compliance intentions appeared 
to be indirectly influenced by perceived vulnerability and perceived severity via 
perceived threat. The indirect impact was however weak. These findings highlight the 
complex nature of the relationship between threat perceptions and IS security 
behaviors, and raises the question of the potential difference between organizational 
and personal domains. 
The results suggest that efficacy perceptions, perceived password effectiveness and 
password self-efficacy have a direct influence on users’ intentions to comply with 
recommended password guidelines, while perceived cost has no effect on their 
compliance intentions. Efficacy perceptions appear to be better predictors of 
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compliance intentions than threat perceptions, and the relationships were consistent for 
those who received the training and those who did not.  
The second research question addressed in this study is: 
2. Can these perceptions be altered?  
With the exception of perceived cost, the results of this study indicate that fear appeals 
can effectively alter threat perceptions and efficacy perceptions. Overall, the results of 
this study provide evidence that threat and efficacy perceptions can be altered using 
fear appeals.  
As a follow-up to the previous question, this study also explored whether altering these 
perceptions can have a positive impact on intentions to comply with password 
guidelines and actual compliance: 
2a. If so, can altering these perceptions improve compliance with password 
security guidelines?  
The results showed that fear appeals significantly increase intentions to comply among 
those who were exposed to the fear appeals. Additionally, those exposed to fear 
appeals create significantly stronger passwords. Therefore, the results demonstrate that 
threat and efficacy perceptions can be altered using fear appeals and ultimately 
improve compliance.  
A second follow-up question explores whether any improved compliance with 
password guidelines is maintained over time: 
2b. Can the effects of altering these perceptions be maintained over time? 
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While the immediate effects of fear appeals were positive, the benefits of altering these 
perceptions on compliance intentions did not extend very long after the fear appeals 
intervention period. The results revealed no evidence of a long-term effect. The results 
show that immediately after providing the password security training, the treatment 
group’s intentions to comply with password guidelines was significantly higher than 
the control group. However, six weeks later their intentions were not significantly 
different to those of the control group. 
It is, however, of interest that nearly double the proportion of those who received 
training remembered their password over time, suggesting that password recall could 
potentially be maintained over time if training programs included password memory 
strategies. However, as password memorability was not significantly different between 
groups, further research, particularly longitudinal studies should be undertaken.  
6.6 Chapter overview 
This chapter discussed the results of this study and provided possible explanation for 
the key findings. This study provides insight into how compliance with password 
guidelines can be improved.  
This study demonstrates that fear appeals can elevate perceptions about password 
threats and about the efficacy of password security recommendations. More 
importantly, this study shows that elevating users’ threat perceptions and efficacy 
perceptions increases their compliance intentions and significantly improve password 
quality. Of the three threat perception factors examined in this study, only perceived 
threat was found to have a significant influence users motivation to comply. Another 
important finding is that that fear plays a significant role in motivating users to 
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safeguard their personal information assets therefore highlighting the importance of 
investigating the influence of fear in future IS security research. 
This study contributes to a growing body of fear appeals based research in the IS 
security domain. In particular, this appears to be the first reported study to examine the 
long-term effects of fear appeals on IS security behavior. While this study found no 
evidence of long-term effects on intentions to comply with password guidelines, it 
highlights the need for continuing IS security training to ensure that users continue to 
comply and more importantly, it draws attention to the importance of conducting 
longitudinal studies in this area. The following chapter discusses the implications of 
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7 Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the contribution of this study to research and practice. The 
chapter first discusses the key findings of this study and the future research directions 
associated with the findings. This chapter then discusses the practical contribution of 
this study. Finally, the key limitations of this study are noted. 
7.2 Summary of research contribution 
The study described in this thesis addresses three key research questions. The first 
relates to the impact of perceived password threats and password efficacy perceptions 
on compliance with password guidelines. While threat perceptions contribute to 
compliance with password guidelines, only perceived threat was found to have a direct 
impact on compliance intentions. The results about the role of efficacy perceptions 
suggest that perceived effectiveness of security measures and self-efficacy perceptions 
are better predictors of IS security compliance intentions than threat perceptions. This 
is an interesting finding. Unfortunately, as found in a study by Peters, Ruiter, and Kok 
(2014) on the effectiveness of fear appeals communication, fear appeals developers 
underestimate the importance of efficacy-inducing components. Further, perceived 
cost did not have an effect on compliance intentions. 
The second research question relates to whether fear appeals can alter threat and 
efficacy perceptions, and if in turn, this would improve compliance with password 
guidelines. The fear appeals used in this study significantly raised the levels of 
perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, perceived threat, perceived password 
effectiveness, and password self-efficacy; only perceived cost was not affected.  
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Furthermore, those who received the fear appeals were more motivated to comply and 
created stronger passwords. Thus this study shows that fear appeals can be used to alter 
users’ security perceptions and improve compliance with IS security policies. 
Finally, this research explores the extent to which the effects of fear appeals are 
maintained over time. Currently, little is known about the long-term effects of fear 
appeals on compliance with IS policies. While the fear appeals in this study had no 
long-term effects on users’ compliance intentions, this study makes a substantial 
contribution by highlighting the need for more longitudinal studies in the IS security 
domain. 
The research model proposed in this study included three key modifications to the 
PMT (Rogers, 1975, 1983), made to reflect previous research in the IS security 
domain. Firstly, this study hypothesized that the path between perceived vulnerability 
and intentions to comply with password guidelines would be a non-significant 
relationship. The results of this study support this hypothesis and open up opportunities 
for future research questions on the role perceived vulnerability plays IS security 
behavior.  
Secondly, the model incorporates the impact of prior exposure to a hacking incident 
(exposure to hacking) on perceived vulnerability. PMT related studies have reported 
mixed findings on the role of perceived vulnerability and its influence on IS behavioral 
intentions (Herath & Rao, 2009; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; 
Vance et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Exposure to 
hacking was originally added to the model to help provide a better understanding of 
the role of perceived vulnerability and how vulnerability perceptions are formed. 
Adding this path provided insights into how users develop vulnerability perceptions 
but provided no additional insight into the role vulnerability perceptions play in their 
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decisions to comply with security recommendations. Future research could explore 
other possible relationships between exposure to hacking, and threat perception and 
efficacy perception variables. 
Lastly, the research model in this study incorporated a path between intentions to 
comply with password guidelines and actual password compliance. Like several other 
studies (e.g., LaRose et al., 2008; Liang & Xue, 2010; Siponen et al., 2014), this study 
also provides evidence to support an extension of the PMT to include a link between 
intentions and actual behavior, which only few studies (see Table 2.1), particularly 
with respect to passwords, have explored. 
The research model explained the influences of password compliance relatively well, 
with eight of the ten hypothesized relationships supported. Further, the model 
explained 43% of the variance in intentions for the control group and 54% of variance 
for the group that received the fear appeals. Therefore, the model proposed in this 
research made a useful contribution to the existing literature. 
7.3 Implications for research 
This research has provided a better understanding of factors that affect compliance 
with password guidelines and the effects of fear appeals on IS security compliance. 
Based on the key findings in this study, a range of areas for future research are 
discussed in this section.  
Future research should further explore the role of fear in IS security behavior: 
Fear, represented in this study as perceived threat, was the only Threat Perceptions 
factor found to have a significant direct impact on password compliance intentions. 
This is an interesting finding given that the PMT framework (Rogers, 1983) assumes 
that fear has an influence on protective behavior but only through perceived severity 
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and perceived vulnerability. Further, this study found that perceived severity and 
perceived vulnerability have no direct impact on IS security behavior. This finding also 
contradicts PMT, and other health-related research (e.g., Maddux & Rogers, 1983; 
Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; Rogers, 1983; Witte, 1994) that suggests that severity 
perceptions and vulnerability perceptions have a direct influence on preventative 
behavior.  
The prevailing viewpoint in IS security research is that severity and vulnerability 
perceptions have a direct influence on IS protection motivation (e.g., Crossler, 2010; 
Crossler et al., 2014; Ifinedo, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Siponen et al., 2014; Vance 
et al., 2012; Woon et al., 2005; Workman et al., 2008), while the influence of fear has 
been largely overlooked. The results of this study and findings from studies such as 
that of Zhang and McDowell (2009) and Liang and Xue (2010), demonstrate that fear 
should be considered a key variable in future applications of PMT to IS security 
behaviors.  
Users may behave differently in different IS security contexts: The results of this 
study point to two potential differences in how users behave in different IS security 
contexts. First, the results open up some interesting questions about how fear 
influences behavioral intentions, given different IS security contexts. This study 
suggests that in their decision to comply with security recommendations, users respond 
emotionally when the security behavior relates to personal protection as opposed to in 
a work environment. The results of studies such as that of Zhang and McDowell 
(2009) and Liang and Xue (2010), also suggest that users respond positively to security 
recommendations if they feel threatened or nervous. In the study by Zhang and 
McDowell (2009) fear of password related threats was found to influence users’ 
intentions to implement online password protection. While Liang and Xue (2010) 
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found that users will avoid security threats when they feel personally threatened. A key 
similarity between these studies and the current study is that they all examined the role 
of fear in the context of personal computer protection.  
One other study that investigated the influence of fear on IS security behavioral 
intentions was that of Posey et al. (2011). Their study examined the role of fear in 
employees’ motivation to protect their organization’s information assets. Posey et al. 
(2011) found no significant relationship between fear and IS security behavior. They 
noted that fear may only be a predictor of intentions in the context of personal 
computer protection. Collectively, these findings suggest that in the context of personal 
protection, users respond emotionally to threat; this emotional feeling towards security 
threats influences their willingness to implement security measures. More research 
should however be undertaken to better understand the impact of fear in different IS 
security contexts.  
The second potential difference in users’ protection motivation behavior in different IS 
security contexts relates to how they assess their vulnerability to security threats. The 
results of this study show that, in the context of personal protection, the degree to 
which users believe they are likely to experience a password related threat does not 
influence their compliance intentions. Interestingly, studies in organizational settings 
(e.g., Ifinedo, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Siponen et al., 2014; Workman et al., 2008) 
have found evidence of a relationship between perceived vulnerability and intentions. 
While an overwhelming majority of studies in the context of personal protection (i.e., 
Crossler, 2010; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Liang & Xue, 2010; Milne et al., 2009; 
Woon et al., 2005; Zhang & McDowell, 2009), including this study, have found no 
such link. The findings in these studies corroborate the proposition that users generally 
perceive others as more vulnerable to threats (Sasse et al., 2001; Weinstein, 1984; 
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Woon et al., 2005). Thus, users’ tendencies to perceive others as more vulnerable than 
them could explain why, in a personal setting,  perceived vulnerability has no direct 
influence on compliance intentions as the results of this study show.  
The findings in this study open up a new set of interesting research questions and 
potential avenues for future research. Based on the results of this study two possible 
propositions could be made regarding the role of perceived vulnerabity and fear on IS 
security behavior. First, it is possible that in the context of personal protection, users 
are influenced by an emotional response to threat. Secondly, given that people appear 
to have an unrealistically low perception about their vulnerability to threats (Sasse et 
al., 2001; Weinstein, 1984; Woon et al., 2005), it is likely that in the context of 
personal protection users’ IS security behavior is not influenced by perceived 
vulnerability. Perceived vulnerability and perceived severity are considered a cognitive 
response to threat (LaTour & Rotfeld, 1997). Thus, users may respond cognitively in 
an organizational setting and emotionally in a personal setting. More research should 
be undertaken to explore if users behave differently, particularly in their threat 
appraisal process, given different IS security contexts. This would also provide more 
insight into why the threat appraisal component of PMT has received weak support in 
the IS security domain. 
While these findings suggest an interesting phenomenon, the possibility that the PMT 
model operates differently in different IS security contexts raises the question of 
whether PMT in its entirety is applicable in explaining IS security behaviors. Thus, 
future studies should investigate the applicability of PMT in different IS security 
domain.  
Thus far, research applying the PMT model in the IS security domain largely proposes  
perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, response efficacy, response cost and self-
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efficacy as a key determinant of security behavior. There is, however, no consensus on 
the exact relationship between these factors and behavioral intentions. The prevailing 
view is that threat appraisal and coping appraisal factors have an independent and 
direct impact on users’ IS security behavioral intentions. However, the interpretation of 
the PMT model, particularly on the structure of the threat appraisal component, varies 
greatly from study to study. This not only makes comparing results across studies 
challenging, but also, as the findings in this study show, the applicability of PMT in 
the IS domain is open to question and should be addressed in future studies. 
Future studies should consider longitudinal analysis of the effects of fear appeals 
to determine the long-term effects of fear appeals: The results of this study show 
that those provided with fear appeals are significantly more likely to comply with 
password guidelines, and create significantly stronger passwords immediately after 
experiencing the fear appeals. However, the fear appeals used in this study only had 
short-term effects. While the results of this aspect of the study are discouraging, they 
nevertheless suggest a need for future research.  
An interesting direction would be to examine whether individual differences play a 
role in the long-term effects of fear appeals. For example, Hu, West, Smarandescu, and 
Yaple (2014), found that individuals with low self-control have a tendency to ignore 
long-term security implications and therefore make risky decisions that are beneficial 
in the short-term.  Using electroencephalography (EEG) and event related potentials 
(ERPs), the findings in their study, which examined brain neural processes of high and 
low self-control subjects, suggest that the effectiveness of SETA (security education, 
training, and awareness) programs may depend on whether an employee has high or 
low-self-control. Neuro IS security examinations should therefore play a part in future 
IS security research.  
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Only a few published applications of the PMT model have examined the effectiveness 
of fear appeals in IS security research (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010a; Vance et al., 2013), and none thus far appear to have considered if 
the effects of fear appeals were maintained after the intervention. As the results of this 
study show, fear appeals do not always have a long-term effect on security behavior. 
This study highlights the importance of longitudinal studies; these should be conducted 
to examine if, and under what conditions, fear appeals can have longer-term effects on 
IS security behavior. 
No significant long-term effect of password training on participants’ ability to 
remember passwords was found. However, although the proportion of those who 
remembered their passwords after six weeks was not statistically different between the 
two groups, given that the number of those in the treatment who remembered their 
passwords was nearly double, future research should consider the long-term effects of 
different training strategies. 
7.4 Implications for practice 
This section discusses the practical implications of the findings from this study. This 
study demonstrates that providing guidance such as awareness training and the 
necessary skills to implement the recommended security measures can significantly 
improve security practices. While this study examines compliance with password 
guidelines on personal email accounts, risky security practices by employees, 
particularly on their personal online accounts can have serious implications for an 
organization (Ives et al., 2004; Jenkins et al., 2013; Winkler, 2009). Therefore, in 
addition to the implications for personal users, this study has implications for 
organizations as well as IS security training practitioners. 
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Personal online accounts such as social networking accounts are high on hackers’ 
target lists (Goncharov, 2012). This is because personal online accounts contain 
sensitive information, including financial and medical information (El Emam et al., 
2011; Florêncio & Herley, 2007). Yet, despite the widespread use of weak passwords 
on the Internet (Florêncio & Herley, 2010; Inglesant & Sasse, 2010; Lorenz et al., 
2013), only a small proportion of Internet users are concerned about someone hacking 
their non-financial or email accounts (NCSA-McAfee, 2011). While this study 
demonstrates that providing guidance and support to users is important, making such 
support accessible to users outside of an organizational setting can be a challenge. 
Vendors and websites typically rely on a set of password guidelines to ensure that the 
users maintain a certain level of password quality and security, however password 
guidelines alone have proved to have little impact (Florêncio & Herley, 2007; Vu et 
al., 2007; Yan et al., 2004). The findings in this study also have implications for 
vendors and websites that require users to use passwords to access their services. 
The importance of raising security awareness through training: Security 
awareness training has been proposed as an effective strategy for improving 
compliance with security policies. Training strategies can include communicating the 
reality of threats to information (Choi et al., 2008; Herath & Rao, 2009) and ensuring 
users are aware of the appropriate response mechanisms (Puhakainen & Siponen, 
2010). Persuasive communication which targets an individual’s beliefs in an attempt to 
persuade into taking preventative measures (Fishbein, 2008; Fishbein & Cappella, 
2006; Rogers, 1983) has also been shown to be a valuable means to encourage users to 
apply security safeguards (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010a; Vance et al., 2013).  
This study has shown that users with password security training have higher levels 
threat awareness, which also increases their overall level of concern for security threats 
  
 217   
       
and the likelihood of compliance with security policies. Organizations should aim to 
convince users that security attacks are prevalent and emphasize the magnitude of 
severity this sort of attack could have on their organization or on themselves. 
Concerning passwords, one of the challenges with the existing password guidelines is 
that they are ineffective in convincing users to comply with the recommended 
guidelines (Vu et al., 2007; Yan et al., 2004). Such websites should play a more active 
role by providing additional information about the likelihood of being hacked and the 
possible consequences if weak passwords are used.  
In addition, users are also more likely to comply if they are convinced that the 
recommended security mechanisms will prevent threats, and more importantly, if they 
believe they are able to implement the available security mechanisms. Organizations 
should also communicate to users what recommended responses are available to 
prevent a security breach. As this study shows, whether they adopt the recommended 
security response is dependent upon how effective they feel the recommended 
response would be in preventing attacks. Therefore, the information should also 
communicate to users how the recommended security response would prevent attacks. 
In addition, this study shows that to comply with password guidelines, users must 
believe that they are capable of creating strong, memorable passwords. As self-efficacy 
perceptions had the strongest impact on intentions to comply in this study, improving 
users’ self-efficacy should be a training priority. Therefore, at the very least, security 
training should include how-to instructions, such as how to create strong passwords 
that are also easy to remember. 
There may be need for ongoing IS security training: This study shows that fear 
appeals can improve compliance with security policies, but only in the short-term. 
Immediately after the training provided in this study, the group that received the 
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password information and training were significantly more motivated to comply than 
the group that received no training. However, six weeks after the training, the two 
groups were equally likely to intend to comply, suggesting that the effects of the fear 
appeals diminished over time. The follow-up conducted in this study suggests that 
organizations may need to communicate security policies to users, including the reason 
for needing them, available security measures and how to respond using the available 
security measures, on an ongoing basis.  
7.5 Limitations 
This research set out to examine factors that contribute to Internet users’ motivation to 
comply with password security recommendations, and to determine if these factors can 
be manipulated to improve compliance. One of the strengths of this study is that it 
looked at online password behavior, not in general, but specific to high-value personal 
email accounts. This is important as, for instance, a user’s perception of severity may 
vary between a personal email account and a blog account, leading to different 
password behaviors across different websites (Zhang & McDowell, 2009). Thus, the 
results of this study can be generalized to password behaviors on high-value online 
accounts. 
There are however several limitations of this study that need to be considered. First, 
the data was obtained from one country, the USA. Future studies may consider 
potential differences in the effect of fear appeals across different cultures. A study by 
Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) in the IS security area, found significant cultural differences 
in the effect of some IS misuse deterrence mechanisms. Their results suggest that for 
users in the USA, severity of punishments is effective as a deterrent against IS misuse, 
while users from Korea are motivated by the likelihood of being caught. Although 
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their study examined compliance within an organizational setting, cultural differences 
may also apply in the context of personal protection. Nonetheless, the data used in this 
study represent a wide cross-section of demographics, age, gender and level of 
education (see Section 5.2), and the sample used was relatively large.  
Another limitation in this study relates to the measurement of perceived cost. In this 
study, perceived cost had no influence on users’ motivation to comply with password 
guidelines. This may be attributable to the fact that the measurement items focused on 
password memory issues, which are arguably one of the most important aspects of 
password use, and something that users find difficult. However, other cost factors that 
have been shown to contribute to poor password quality (e.g., Grawemeyer & Johnson, 
2011; Tam et al., 2009) could be considered in future studies. One aspect of perceived 
cost that could be considered is whether users believe that they have enough time to 
memorize passwords. When users have a short amount of time to memorize a 
password they tend to choose weak passwords that are easier to remember (Tam et al., 
2009). Usability is another aspect of perceived cost that future studies could consider. 
Authentication errors resulting from mistyped passwords, which Grawemeyer and 
Johnson (2011) found to affect password quality, should also be considered in future 
studies. 
This research explored the extent to which the effects of fear appeals are maintained 
over time. While this is a substantial contribution in the IS security domain where little 
is known about the long-term effects of fear appeals, the fear appeals in this study had 
no long-term effects on users’ compliance intentions. A potential limitation in this 
study is that a single application of fear appeals was used; this may not have been 
adequate to test the long-term implications of fear appeal exposure. Future longitudinal 
research could incorporate follow-up fear appeal rhetoric as reinforcement. 
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It is of interest to note that there was a significant increase in password strength for 
both the treatment group and the control groups. While the treatment group created 
significantly stronger passwords than the control group, the difference in password 
strength was small. This suggests that other factors may have led to the increase in 
password strength, a potentially critical limitation in this study. For example, just 
answering the survey questions may have sensitized the respondents’ awareness thus 
leading to stronger passwords. Additionally, both groups were instructed to create 
strong memorable passwords, which was expected to lead to both groups creating 
stronger passwords than they created initially when they were only asked to create a 
password with no additional instruction.  
Lastly, although PMT assumes that behavioral intentions can adequately predict 
behavior (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986; Weinstein, 1993), the model in this study 
was extended to determine how well intentions predict compliance in IS security 
policies. As the results of this study show, the relationship between intentions and 
compliance, particularly for the treatment group, was not strong. A potentially critical 
limitation of this part of the study is the fact that the measures of intentions related to 
intention to follow guidelines to protect my “important email account”, while the 
measure for actual compliance related to a different behavioral context, the passwords 
for the “study survey account”. Measures of intentions should be compatible with the 
measures of actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), such as 
examining intentions to comply with organizational password policies, and actual 
passwords for the organization.  
While this limitation may have affected the predictability of actual compliance, this 
study makes a significant contribution to the applications of PMT to IS security 
behaviors, as only a few studies (e.g., LaRose et al., 2008; Liang & Xue, 2010; 
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Siponen et al., 2014) have examined the link between intentions and actual behavior. 
This study draws attention to the need for more studies to be undertaken to determine 
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Appendix C Password security information and 
training materials    
Vulnerability Information 
The following information illustrates common risks associated with the use of passwords and 
the likelihood of being hacked into if weak passwords are used. Please read the following text 
carefully and answer the questions below.  
 Passwords are the most commonly used methods for logging into online accounts. Passwords 
are also considered the weakest login methods. This is because techniques for guessing or 
cracking passwords have become easier than in the past and software for hacking into online 
accounts is also freely available on the internet. Password guessing is even easier when 
passwords that are easy to guess are used. For example if your password contains any of the 
following characteristics your chances of being hacked into are high; 
Consecutive numbers such as 12345 – easily cracked using freely available software tools. 
Consecutive letters such as ABCD – easily cracked using freely available software tools. 
Consecutive keyboard letters such as QWERTY – easily cracked using freely available 
software tools. 
A word or words straight out of a dictionary - easily cracked using freely available password 
cracking software which searches through a database of dictionary words. 
Personal information such as names of your family members, birthdates, geographical location 
- through a quick internet search, a hacker can easily guess a password containing any 
personal information. 
Reports show that incidents of password hacking are on the rise as internet users continue to 
use passwords that are easy to guess. In addition, computers are becoming more powerful 
making it easier and faster to guess passwords. Therefore, if you continue to use weak 
passwords, it is highly likely that sooner or later your passwords will be cracked and online 
accounts will be hacked into. 
 
Severity Information 
The following information illustrates the consequences and severity of being exposed 
to password related threats such as hacking.  
If any of your passwords are cracked or any of your online accounts are hacked into, any 
information saved in your account including your personal information may be used by a 
hacker or exposed to the public. Depending on the information saved on your online account 
the consequences of hacking can be extremely severe, such as in the case of identity theft, 
where someone uses your personal information to obtain financial resources such as bank 
loans or to commit crime. Also, with a cracked password, a hacker can hack into your email 
account to send spam to your trusted friends. Although this may seem like a mere annoyance, 
it may also carry severe consequences, in particular, if the spam contains web links or 
attachments with computer viruses or other malicious software. This may also prompt your 
email provider to suspend your web account. 
The result of one hacked account can lead to additional undesirable consequences. Once one 
of your online accounts is hacked, a hacker can use information saved in the account to find 
clues to guessing your other passwords. Information, such as email communications from 
banks and online shopping stores, may also contain information such as account numbers that 
attackers may use to crack passwords and attempt to access such accounts. 
If any of your online accounts containing personal information such as date of birth, pet’s 
name, mother’s maiden name, employee number, driver’s license number, government ID 
number, passport number, credit/debit card number or insurance policy number was hacked 
into the consequences could be detrimental. 
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Password Effectiveness Information 
The following information describes how password related threats such as hacking can be 
prevented.  
Password related threats can be easily and effectively prevented. The following preventative 
measures have been shown to effectively prevent password related threats. 
Avoiding dictionary words: Password guessing tools work by searching through a list of 
dictionary words and other commonly used words in any language. Therefore, avoiding 
dictionary words would prevent your password from being guessed using such tools. 
Avoiding personal information in passwords: Passwords should not contain personal 
information such as date of birth or names of family members. Eliminating personal information 
from your password would prevent your password from being guessed by people you know or 
an attacker who may have access to your personal information. 
Use of complex passwords: Avoiding dictionary words alone is not enough to prevent 
successful password guessing attacks, passwords must also be complex. A complex 
password is long and contains a combination of upper and lowercase letters, numbers and 
symbols. A complex password is difficult to crack and therefore an effective way to discourage 
an attacker and make them move on to a less complex password. 
Changing passwords regularly and using different passwords for different login accounts is an 
effective way to prevent an attacker from attempting to access your other web accounts. 
Changing your password is only effective if the new password is different and not a variation of 
your other passwords or a compromised password. 
 
Password Training and Exercise 
The following information demonstrates how to create a strong password that is also easy to 
remember. Please read carefully then complete the interactive exercises below. 
The use of long complex passwords is a must to prevent password cracking or guessing. 
However, complex passwords are also difficult to remember. In fact, studies show that users’ 
inability to memorize long series of random characters often forces them to use weak 
passwords. Studies have also shown that human beings have a better ability to remember 
more meaningful items such as phrases or songs. 
The use of a mnemonic technique will not only help you create strong complex passwords but, 
most importantly, will help you create passwords you can easily remember. A mnemonic 
password is created from a sentence or familiar phrase using some letters of each word in the 
phrase. For example, the phrase, “Pat and I are going to Australia” can be used to create the 
password; “P&Irg2A”. 
Keep in mind that the longer the password the harder it is to guess.  Although the password 
“P&Irg2A” is more secure than a password that contains dictionary words or a variation of 
dictionary words, it does not meet the minimum recommended password length of 8 
characters. Furthermore, although a minimum of 8 characters is recommended on many web 
accounts, a password of 12 characters or more is advised. This is because password guessing 
software and computer hardware are becoming more powerful making short passwords very 
easy to crack. 
When you use a mnemonic technique, you can create a long, complex password with a 
combination of random characters and special characters such as “@”without difficulty. For 
example, using the same sentence “Pat and I are going to Australia”, a 12-character password 
such as “P@&!rg2Aust.” can be easily created. 
The sentence was transformed into a secure password through the following meaningful 
patterns, “Pat” was changed to “P@” because of similar sound, “and” to “&”, “I” to the symbol 
“!”, “are” to “r”, “going” to “g”, “to” was changed to the number “2” and “Australia” to “Oz” and 
finally the password has a period, “.”, at the end. Using this method you can create passwords 
that are difficult for an attacker to guess yet easy for you to remember. 
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Interactive exercises:  
 
It is important to practice creating passwords using the mnemonic technique as well as 
practice typing the passwords on your keyboard. The following exercises are aimed at helping 
you practice how to create your own mnemonic passwords.  
 
Using the mnemonic technique described in the information above create sample passwords 
from the sentences; 
 
1. "An Eye for an Eye a Tooth for a Tooth" in the first textbox. 
 
2. "Different Passwords for Different Login Accounts" in the second textbox.* 
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Appendix D Phase I survey instrument 
 
Participant Information 
We invite you to participate in a research study looking at factors that influence password 
security practices on the internet. This study is part of my Doctor of Philosophy in Information 
Technology, supervised by Dr. Mike Dixon and Associate Professor Dr. Tanya McGill at 
Murdoch University. 
Passwords remain the most commonly used method of authentication and are also regarded 
as the weakest form of authentication. Both technical and non-technical security measures 
have been developed to prevent password related threats such as hacking. However, 
researchers and information security practitioners have questioned the effectiveness of such 
methods in safeguarding users’ web accounts. The goal of this study is to investigate ways to 
develop more effective password guidelines and standards. The outcomes of this study should 
help us to develop more effective password guidelines and standards. 
It is estimated that the questionnaire and activities will take approximately 15/25 minutes to 
complete. Completion is entirely voluntary and you can decide not to participate at any time 
simply by closing the browser window. While we would be pleased to have you participate, we 
respect your right to decline. We do not ask you to provide your name, email address or 
other identifying data, so it will not be possible to identify you from your responses. 
Please note, you must be 18 years or older to participate in this study. 
Please, do not forget to bookmark this website. Once we have analyzed the information, we 
will be posting a summary of our findings on this website from June 17 2012 to July 15 2012. 
Also, after completing the questionnaire and activities, you will be redirected back to MyView to 
receive a reward for participating. 
We would like to thank you in advance for your assistance with this research project. 
Research contact information 
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about this research project, please feel free 
to contact either myself, Florence Mwagwabi (F.Mwagwabi@murdoch.edu.au), or my research 
supervisors, Dr Mike Dixon (M.Dixon@murdoch.edu.au) and Associate Professor Dr. Tanya 
McGill (T.McGill@murdoch.edu.au). 
This study has been approved by the Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Approval No. 2010/218).  If you have any reservation or complaint about the ethical conduct of 
this research, and wish to talk with an independent person, you may contact Murdoch 
University’s Research Ethics Office (Tel. +61 8 9360 6677 or e-mail ethics@murdoch.edu.au). 
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be 
informed of the outcome. 
Participation is entirely voluntary and you can decide not to participate at any time simply by 
closing the browser window. 
Please confirm you are 18 years or older.* 
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( ) I am 18 years or older. 
If you would like to participate in the survey, please select the box below. 
( ) Yes, I agree to participate in this study. 
( ) No, I do not want to participate in this study. 
 
***Page Break Here 
Create password 
Once the information collected from this study is analyzed the findings will be posted on this 
website. You will need a password to return to the website to view the findings and to complete 
a brief follow-up study and receive another reward from MyView.  
Create your password in the textbox below. 
Please note: It is advised that you do choose a password that is different from your 
other passwords. Create a password similar to the kind you would normally use. 
 
Type your password here:____________________________________ 
***Page Break Here 
Password and background information 
1. What is the longest password you have ever voluntarily used? 
( ) 6 characters or less 
( ) 7 characters 
( ) 8 characters 
( ) 9 characters 
( ) 10 characters 
( ) 11 character 
( ) Longer than 12 characters 
2) How many email accounts do you currently have? ____________ 
3) Have you ever voluntarily changed any of your email passwords? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
4) Have you ever shared any of your email passwords? 
( ) Yes 
( ) No 
 
  
Poor       Excellent 
5) How would you rate your computer skills? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6) How would you rate your computer security 
knowledge? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Exposure to hacking 
Many web users have email accounts set up for receiving important information such as email 
messages from friends and family members, online banking notifications and online shopping 
confirmation. For the purpose of this study, we classify such email accounts as 'important' 
email accounts. 
7. Have you ever had your important email account, online shopping account or online banking 
account hacked into? If yes, please indicate the degree to which that experience affected you 
(in terms of lost data, lost time, monetary losses, identity theft etc.) If no, please select 'no'. 
(0) No  (1) Low impact  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) High impact 
 
8) Has someone you know personally ever had their important email account, online shopping 
account or online banking account hacked into? If yes, please indicate the degree to which 
that experience affected them (in terms of lost data, lost time, monetary losses, identity theft 
etc.) If no, please select 'no'. 
(0) No  (1) Low impact  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) High impact 
 
***Page Break Here 
Perceived vulnerability 
Consider the passwords you use to log into your important email accounts and where you 
keep the password, for example on a piece of paper or saved on your computer etc.  




      
Strongly 
agree 
9) There is a chance that someone could successfully 
guess at least one of my passwords 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10) There is a chance that someone could successfully 
crack at least one of my passwords using password 
cracking software 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11) There is a chance that someone could hack into at 
least one of my important email accounts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12) If someone hacked into my important email account, 
there is a chance that they could guess my other important 
passwords 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
***Page Break Here 
 
Perceived severity 
Consider the type of information you have saved in your important email accounts and the type 
of passwords you use for logging into your important email accounts. How severe do you think 
the consequences would be if: 
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Not at all 
severe 
      
Very 
severe 
13) Someone successfully guessed any of your important 
email passwords 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14) Someone hacked into any of your important email 
accounts 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 
15) Someone used any of your important email accounts to 
send messages to your contact list without your knowledge 
1  2 3 4 5 6  7 
16) Someone obtained your personal information from your 
important email accounts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17) Someone changed the password to your important email 
accounts without your knowledge 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18) Someone stole the password to one of your important 
email accounts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
***Page Break Here 
Perceived threat 




      
Strongly 
agree 
19) The thought of someone guessing the password to any 
of my important email accounts makes me worried 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20) The thought of someone hacking into any of my 
important email accounts makes me worried 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21) The thought of someone using any of my important 
email accounts without my knowledge makes me worried 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22) The thought of someone using my personal information 
from any of my important email accounts makes me 
worried 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23) The thought of someone changing or deleting 
information obtained from any of my important email 
accounts makes me worried 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24) The thought of someone using password monitoring 
software to record my important passwords makes me 
worried 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
***Page Break Here 
Perceived Password Effectiveness 




      
Strongly 
agree 
25) Making sure that my passwords contain a combination 
of numbers, letters and symbols will prevent my passwords 
from being guessed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
26) Making sure that my passwords do not contain any 
dictionary words will make them more difficult to guess 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27) Making sure that my passwords do not contain 
personal information such as my date of birth will make 
them more difficult to guess 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28) I can protect my online accounts better if I use a 
different password for each of my online accounts 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29) I can protect my online accounts better if I change my 
passwords regularly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30) I can protect my online accounts better if I use a long 
complex password 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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***Page Break Here 
Perceived Cost 




      
Strongly 
agree 
31) Remembering a password that contains a combination 
of numbers, letters and symbols would be difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32) Remembering a password that is long and complex 
would be difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33) Remembering a password that does not contain any 
dictionary words would be difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34) Remembering a password that does not contain 
personal information such as date of birth would be difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35) If I use different passwords for each of my web 
accounts, it would be difficult for me to remember them all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36) If I change my passwords regularly, it would be difficult 
for me to remember them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
***Page Break Here 
 
Password Self-efficacy 
Consider the following scenario. Due to an increase in password hacking incidents, the 
password requirements for your email account have been changed. You have been asked to 
change your password immediately and to make sure that your new password follows strict 
password guidelines provided by the system. Please indicate how confident you are that you 
would be able to create a password that is strong enough to protect your email account from 
being hacked into. 
I would be able to create a strong password that is difficult to hack... 
  
Not at all 
confident  
      
Totally 
confident 
37) If I had instructions on how to create a strong 
password 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
38) If I had step-by-step instructions on how to memorize a 
strong password 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39) If I had a lot of time to create a strong password 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40) If I had used strong passwords before 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Intentions to comply with password guidelines 
If you were required to change the password for one of your important email accounts, to what 
extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
  
Not at all 
Likely 
      
Very 
likely 
41) I would choose a password that follows the password 
length requirement suggested by the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42) I would choose a password with a combination of 
numbers, letters, and symbols as suggested by the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43) I would choose a password that is difficult to guess 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44) I would choose a password that follows all the guidelines 
provided by the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45) I would choose a password that is different from my old 
password 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
46) I would choose a password that is different from my 
other online passwords 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
***Page Break Here 
 
Demographics 
47) Please select your gender. 
( ) Male 
( ) Female 
 
48) How old are you? _________________________________ 
 
49) What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
( ) Less than high school 
( ) Graduated high school or equivalent 
( ) Some college, no degree 
( ) Bachelor's degree 
( ) Post-graduate 
 
50) Comments/Questions: _____________________________  
***Page Break Here 
 
Change your Password 
Please change your previously selected password. Make sure your new password is strong 
and easy to remember. 
Please note: It is advised that you do choose a password that is different from your 
other passwords. 
Don't forget you will use the password to return to this website to access the study results. You 
will also need the password to return to the website and answer a few brief follow-up questions 
and receive another reward from MyView. 
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You old password is: ________  
Please create a new password as required: ________ 




Thank you for taking our survey. Your response is very important to us. 
Please, do not forget to bookmark this website. Remember to keep your password safe so that 
you can use it to return to this website to access the study results. You will also need the 
password to return to the website and complete a brief follow-up study and receive another 
reward from MyView. 
You will be redirected to MyView in a few seconds. 
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about this questionnaire or our research, 
please feel free to contact either myself, Florence Mwagwabi (F.Mwagwabi@murdoch.edu.au) 
or my research supervisors, Dr Mike Dixon (M.Dixon@murdoch.edu.au) and Associate 
Professor Dr. Tanya McGill (T.McGill@murdoch.edu.au).  
  
 234   
       




 235   
       
Appendix F Phase II survey instrument 
 
Participant Information 
Thank you for your previous participation and for returning to view the results and to answer a 
few further questions. This research study seeks to investigate factors that influence password 
security practices on the internet and is part of my Doctor of Philosophy in Information 
Technology, supervised by Dr. Mike Dixon and Associate Professor Dr. Tanya McGill at 
Murdoch University. The outcomes of this study should help us to develop more effective 
password guidelines and standards. 
It is estimated that the questionnaire will take approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
Completion is entirely voluntary and you can decide not to participate at any time simply by 
closing the browser window. While we would be pleased to have you participate, we respect 
your right to decline. We do not ask you to provide your name, email address or other 
identifying data, so it will not be possible to identify you from your responses. 
After completing the questionnaire, you will be redirected back to MyView to receive a reward 
for participating. 
We would like to thank you once again for your assistance with this research project. 
Research contact information 
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about this research project, please feel free 
to contact either myself, Florence Mwagwabi (F.Mwagwabi@murdoch.edu.au), or my research 
supervisors, Dr. Mike Dixon (M.Dixon@murdoch.edu.au) and Associate Professor Dr. Tanya 
McGill (T.McGill@murdoch.edu.au). 
This study has been approved by the Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee 
(Approval No. 2010/218).  If you have any reservation or complaint about the ethical conduct of 
this research, and wish to talk with an independent person, you may contact Murdoch 
University’s Research Ethics Office Tel. (+61 8 9360 6677 or e-mail ethics@murdoch.edu.au). 
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be 
informed of the outcome. 
Participation is entirely voluntary and you can decide not to participate at any time 
simply by closing the browser window. 
If you would like to participate in the follow-up survey, please select the box below. 
If you would like to participate in the survey, please select the box below.* 
( ) Yes, I agree to participate in this study. 
( ) No, I do not want to participate in this study. 
***Page Break Here 
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Login 
To view the findings and to complete this brief follow-up study, please enter the password 
created in the previous study. After completing the questionnaire, you will be redirected back to 
MyView to receive a reward for participating. 
Enter password to view the findings and to complete a few follow-up questions. If you 
have forgotten your password click the 'next' button below to receive a new password. 
 
Password :_________________________________________ 
***Page Break Here 
Perceived password memorability  
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
1. It was easy for me to remember the password I created for this study. 
(1) Strongly disagree (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) Strongly agree 
***Page Break Here 
Intentions to comply with password guidelines (time 2) 
If you were required to change the password for one of your important email accounts, to what 
extent would you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
  
Not at all 
Likely 
      
Very 
likely 
2) I would choose a password that follows the password 
length requirement suggested by the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3) I would choose a password with a combination of 
numbers, letters, and symbols as suggested by the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4) I would choose a password that is difficult to guess 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5) I would choose a password that follows all the guidelines 
provided by the system 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6) I would choose a password that is different from my old 
password 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7) I would choose a password that is different from my other 
online passwords 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
***Page Break Here 
 
Summary of Findings (Download) 
Please click here to download the summary of the previous study’s findings. 
Click the next button below to be redirected back to MyView. 
***Page Break Here 
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Thank You! 
Thank you once again for participating in this follow-up study. Your response is very important 
to us. 
You will be redirected to MyView in a few seconds. 
If you have any questions, comments or concerns about this questionnaire or our research, 
please feel free to contact either myself, Florence Mwagwabi (F.Mwagwabi@murdoch.edu.au) 
or my research supervisors, Dr Mike Dixon (M.Dixon@murdoch.edu.au) and Associate 
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Appendix G Summary of demographic and 
computer background of respondents 
 
Table G.1: Summary of demographic and computer background of respondents 
  Control group Treatment group 
  n % n % 
Gender         
Male 89 43.2% 85 41.1% 
Female 117 56.8% 122 58.9% 
Age         
18 - 24 27 13.0% 29 13.9% 
25 - 34 41 19.6% 39 18.7% 
35 - 44 37 17.7% 40 19.1% 
45 - 54 48 23.0% 46 22.0% 
55 - 64 35 16.7% 36 17.2% 
65 and over 21 10.0% 19 9.1% 
Number of online email accounts         
3 or less 168 81.6% 178 86.0% 
4 to 6 33 16.0% 25 12.1% 
4 or more 5 2.4% 4 1.9% 
Password management practices         
Longest password ever voluntarily used         
6 characters or less 10 4.8% 3 1.4% 
7 to 10 characters 122 58.4% 141 67.1% 
11 characters or more 77 36.8% 66 31.5% 
Have change passwords voluntarily 141 68.4% 146 71.2% 
Have shared passwords 32 15.7% 42 20.1% 
Self-reported computer skills         
Below average 18 8.6% 13 6.2% 
Average 51 24.4% 44 21.0% 
Above average 140 67.0% 153 72.8% 
Self-reported computer security knowledge         
Below average 32 15.3% 26 12.4% 
Average 69 33.0% 76 36.2% 
Above average 108 51.7% 108 51.4% 
Level of education         
Less than high school 4 1.9% 2 1.0% 
High school or equivalent 43 20.8% 43 20.7% 
Some college, no degree 74 35.7% 68 32.7% 
Bachelor’s degree 61 29.5% 65 31.2% 
Post-graduate 25 12.1% 30 14.4% 
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Appendix H Analysis of measurement model 
This section is organized around each measurement model, as follows:  
1. Modification Indices (covariances) 
2. Standardized Residuals  (covariances) 
3. Squared Multiple Correlations 
4. Measurement model for each group, showing items that were allowed to covary 
and the corresponding correlations. 
 
H.1 Threat perceptions model 
 
Table H.2: Threat perceptions model – Modification indices 
Modification Indices Control  Modification Indices Treatment 
ePSEV1 <> ePSEV6 12.176   ePSEV1 <> ePSEV5 20.100 
ePSEV1 <> ePSEV5 8.461   ePSEV1 <> ePSEV6 13.055 
ePSEV1 <> ePTHR2 6.828   ePSEV1 <> ePTHR1 5.330 
ePSEV2 <> ePSEV1 93.892   ePSEV2 <> ePSEV1 97.987 
ePSEV2 <> ePSEV5 36.287   ePSEV2 <> ePSEV5 24.132 
ePSEV2 <> ePTHR2 17.891   ePSEV2 <> ePSEV6 10.071 
ePSEV2 <> ePTHR5 5.830   ePSEV3 <> ePSEV2 38.729 
ePSEV2 <> ePTHR1 5.736   ePSEV3 <> ePSEV1 25.642 
ePSEV4 <> ePTHR1 10.470   ePSEV3 <> ePSEV5 24.364 
ePSEV4 <> ePTHR2 7.634   ePSEV3 <> ePTHR4 6.559 
ePSEV4 <> ePTHR4 7.202   ePSEV4 <> ePSEV5 19.756 
ePSEV4 <> ePSEV3 7.019   ePSEV4 <> ePSEV3 11.231 
ePSEV4 <> ePTHR5 5.157   ePSEV4 <> ePSEV2 10.045 
ePSEV4 <> ePSEV1 4.332   ePSEV4 <> ePTHR4 9.081 
ePSEV5 <> ePSEV6 30.471   ePSEV4 <> ePSEV1 6.159 
ePSEV5 <> ePTHR1 11.104   ePSEV4 <> ePTHR6 4.337 
ePSEV5 <> ePTHR6 7.415   ePSEV5 <> ePSEV6 25.739 
ePTHR2 <> ePTHR1 70.282   ePSEV5 <> ePTHR4 6.052 
ePTHR2 <> ePTHR5 9.953   ePTHR1 <> ePTHR6 12.064 
ePTHR2 <> ePTHR6 7.885   ePTHR1 <> ePTHR5 4.514 
ePTHR4 <> ePTHR1 7.337   ePTHR2 <> ePTHR1 41.229 
ePTHR5 <> ePTHR6 16.397   ePTHR2 <> ePTHR5 14.282 
ePVUL1 <> ePSEV2 5.155   ePTHR2 <> ePTHR6 5.745 
ePVUL1 <> ePTHR1 4.524   ePTHR4 <> ePTHR1 6.228 
ePVUL2 <> ePSEV2 8.684   ePTHR5 <> ePTHR6 20.288 
ePVUL2 <> ePSEV4 4.977   ePVUL2 <> ePSEV6 5.629 
ePVUL3 <> ePSEV4 9.271   ePVUL3 <> ePSEV5 8.157 
ePVUL4 <> ePSEV5 10.151   ePVUL4 <> ePSEV4 7.548 
ePVUL4 <> ePTHR6 7.508   ePVUL4 <> ePTHR6 6.726 
ePVUL4 <> ePTHR1 5.962   ePVUL4 <> ePTHR2 5.085 
 
  
    




Table H.3: Threat perceptions model – Standardized residuals 
  PTHR06 PTHR05 PTHR01 PTHR02 PTHR03 PTHR04 PSEV06 PSEV05 PSEV01 PSEV02 PSEV03 PSEV04 PVUL01 PVUL02 PVUL03 PVUL04 
Control 
PTHR06 0.000                               
PTHR05 0.331 0.000                             
PTHR01 -0.208 -0.207 0.000                           
PTHR02 -0.226 -0.246 0.994 0.000                         
PTHR03 0.021 -0.083 -0.131 0.042 0.000                       
PTHR04 -0.037 0.092 -0.271 -0.043 0.071 0.000                     
PSEV06 0.228 0.558 -0.124 -0.047 -0.221 -0.173 0.000                   
PSEV05 0.149 0.396 -1.295 -0.596 -0.444 -0.540 0.624 0.000                 
PSEV01 0.164 0.625 0.277 0.681 0.133 0.209 -0.386 -0.548 0.000               
PSEV02 0.067 0.548 0.463 0.843 0.154 0.206 -0.114 -0.978 1.539 0.000             
PSEV03 -0.299 0.317 -0.499 -0.553 -0.369 -0.789 0.007 0.032 -0.229 -0.252 0.000           
PSEV04 -0.075 0.674 -0.956 -0.417 -0.264 0.027 -0.050 0.269 -0.321 -0.130 0.436 0.000         
PVUL01 0.002 0.126 0.790 0.375 -0.187 -0.149 -0.256 -0.585 0.318 0.694 -0.475 -0.387 0.000       
PVUL02 0.061 -0.371 -0.444 -0.355 -0.244 -0.336 0.111 0.278 -0.340 -0.356 -0.742 0.020 -0.078 0.000     
PVUL03 -0.058 -0.176 -0.180 -0.220 -0.313 -0.281 -0.042 0.185 -0.084 0.124 -1.016 -0.971 -0.008 0.090 0.000   
PVUL04 0.547 1.131 1.899 1.243 0.941 1.222 1.176 0.056 1.550 1.685 0.599 1.103 0.182 -0.086 -0.124 0.000 
Treatment 
PTHR06 0.000                               
PTHR05 0.722 0.000                             
PTHR01 -0.527 -0.300 0.000                           
PTHR02 -0.296 -0.435 0.700 0.000                         
PTHR03 -0.113 -0.012 0.038 0.050 0.000                       
PTHR04 0.321 0.259 -0.288 -0.113 -0.001 0.000                     
PSEV06 0.149 0.431 -0.480 -0.527 -0.368 -0.244 0.000                   
PSEV05 0.533 0.838 -1.059 -0.319 -0.212 0.270 0.580 0.000                 
PSEV01 0.462 0.365 0.093 -0.018 -0.098 -0.706 -0.511 -0.853 0.000               
PSEV02 0.049 0.278 -0.262 0.023 0.023 -0.257 -0.441 -0.919 2.307 0.000             
PSEV03 0.697 0.438 0.507 0.372 0.566 -0.167 -0.184 -1.152 1.473 1.779 0.000           
PSEV04 1.038 0.579 -0.366 0.051 0.056 0.611 0.162 0.602 -0.418 -0.524 -0.692 0.000         
PVUL01 -0.216 -0.288 0.155 -0.034 0.038 -0.307 -0.476 -0.256 0.818 1.050 1.337 0.146 0.000       
PVUL02 0.594 -0.730 -0.411 -0.336 -0.509 -0.498 -1.871 -1.412 0.099 0.020 0.962 -0.720 -0.144 0.000     
PVUL03 0.497 -0.446 0.863 0.029 0.243 -0.300 -0.718 -0.924 0.828 1.010 1.731 0.179 0.022 0.057 0.000   
PVUL04 -0.199 -0.119 0.815 0.830 0.488 -0.231 0.827 1.234 2.176 2.352 2.042 0.593 0.214 0.209 -0.220 0.000 
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Table H.4: Threat perceptions model – Squared multiple correlations 
Squared Multiple Correlations Control Treatment 
PTHR06    0.872 0.761 
PTHR05    0.878 0.787 
PTHR01    0.755 0.805 
PTHR02    0.881 0.859 
PTHR03    0.926 0.894 
PTHR04    0.909 0.846 
PSEV06    0.880 0.852 
PSEV05    0.733 0.773 
PSEV01    0.743 0.682 
PSEV02    0.796 0.690 
PSEV03    0.715 0.565 
PSEV04    0.805 0.811 
PVUL01    0.622 0.764 
PVUL02    0.731 0.748 
PVUL03    0.786 0.884 
PVUL04     0.532 0.542 
 





        





        
H.2 Efficacy perceptions model 
Table H.5: Efficacy perceptions model – Modification indices 





eCOST5 <> eCOST6 95.351   eCOST5 <> eCOST6 114.082 
eCOST1 <> eCOST5 10.423   eCOST1 <> eCOST6 33.799 
eCOST2 <> eCOST6 20.108   eCOST1 <> eCOST5 10.291 
eCOST2 <> eCOST5 5.757   eCOST2 <> eCOST6 9.231 
eCOST2 <> eCOST1 27.338   eCOST2 <> eCOST5 11.455 
eCOST4 <> eCOST3 21.471   eCOST2 <> eCOST1 55.434 
ePEFF5 <> eCOST6 4.078   eCOST3 <> eCOST5 12.613 
ePEFF5 <> eCOST2 4.382   eCOST4 <> eCOST5 4.550 
ePEFF1 <> ePEFF6 7.971   eCOST4 <> eCOST3 33.360 
ePEFF1 <> ePEFF5 11.234   ePEFF6 <> eCOST6 4.485 
ePEFF2 <> ePEFF1 26.326   ePEFF6 <> eCOST5 4.735 
ePEFF3 <> ePEFF1 4.917   ePEFF6 <> eCOST4 5.578 
ePEFF3 <> ePEFF2 4.827   ePEFF1 <> eCOST1 4.419 
ePEFF4 <> ePEFF6 16.893   ePEFF1 <> eCOST4 6.811 
ePEFF4 <> ePEFF5 7.525   ePEFF2 <> ePEFF5 6.226 
ePEFF4 <> ePEFF2 17.355   ePEFF2 <> ePEFF1 6.749 
ePSEF1 <> eCOST5 6.993   ePEFF3 <> eCOST3 14.484 
ePSEF2 <> ePEFF2 5.172   ePEFF3 <> ePEFF1 4.600 
ePSEF2 <> ePSEF1 8.230   ePEFF3 <> ePEFF2 4.795 
ePSEF3 <> eCOST4 6.739   ePEFF4 <> eCOST3 7.613 
ePSEF3 <> ePEFF6 12.746   ePEFF4 <> ePEFF5 36.963 
ePSEF3 <> ePEFF5 4.198   ePEFF4 <> ePEFF1 19.212 
ePSEF3 <> ePEFF1 5.663   ePSEF2 <> eCOST6 4.537 
ePSEF3 <> ePSEF1 5.457   ePSEF2 <> ePEFF2 6.316 
ePSEF4 <> eCOST1 4.294   ePSEF3 <> eCOST6 4.949 
ePSEF4 <> eCOST4 5.508   ePSEF3 <> eCOST1 7.802 
ePSEF4 <> ePSEF2 7.500   ePSEF3 <> eCOST2 6.588 










Table H.6: Efficacy perceptions model – Standardized residual 
  COST06 COST05 COST01 COST02 COST03 COST04 PEFF06 PEFF05 PEFF01 PEFF02 PEFF03 PEFF04 PSEF01 PSEF02 PSEF03 PSEF04 
Control 
COST06 0.000                               
COST05 2.913 0.000                             
COST01 -0.484 -0.765 0.000                           
COST02 -0.940 -0.447 0.878 0.000                         
COST03 -0.422 -0.531 -0.282 0.207 0.000                       
COST04 -0.487 -0.061 -0.585 -0.256 1.947 0.000                     
PEFF06 1.599 1.175 1.114 1.350 1.780 0.887 0.000                   
PEFF05 -0.595 0.583 -0.025 1.555 0.888 -0.220 0.505 0.000                 
PEFF01 -0.953 -1.016 -0.803 -0.319 -0.806 0.296 -1.135 -1.297 0.000               
PEFF02 -0.790 -0.430 -0.441 0.458 0.343 0.542 -0.530 -0.452 1.875 0.000             
PEFF03 -0.764 -0.776 -0.637 0.529 -0.296 0.058 -0.462 -0.465 0.841 0.768 0.000           
PEFF04 -0.386 -1.507 -0.982 -0.384 -0.816 -1.441 1.526 0.980 -0.460 -1.406 -0.344 0.000         
PSEF01 0.374 0.570 0.265 0.381 -0.207 -0.845 -1.236 0.832 -0.305 -0.953 -1.085 -0.035 0.000       
PSEF02 -0.121 -0.465 0.235 0.055 -0.282 -0.955 -0.674 1.313 -0.147 0.302 -0.795 -0.026 0.360 0.000     
PSEF03 0.199 -0.282 0.615 0.877 0.683 1.227 1.159 1.956 -0.945 -0.119 -1.194 -0.019 -0.526 -0.210 0.000   
PSEF04 -0.763 -1.510 -1.217 -0.580 0.478 0.416 0.623 1.834 0.784 0.071 0.117 1.208 -0.421 -0.484 1.768 0.000 
Treatment 
COST06 0.000                               
COST05 2.385 0.000                             
COST01 -1.429 -0.869 0.000                           
COST02 -0.535 -0.655 1.585 0.000                         
COST03 -0.200 -0.932 0.047 0.155 0.000                       
COST04 -0.448 -0.765 0.072 -0.393 2.208 0.000                     
PEFF06 1.356 1.639 1.959 1.029 0.081 -1.095 0.000                   
PEFF05 -0.498 -0.347 0.750 0.590 -0.531 -0.241 -0.038 0.000                 
PEFF01 -0.711 -0.652 1.196 -0.043 -1.411 0.012 0.053 -0.294 0.000               
PEFF02 -1.273 -0.710 0.130 -0.260 -1.352 -1.180 -0.478 -0.611 0.730 0.000             
PEFF03 -0.379 -0.008 0.494 0.226 -2.059 -1.881 0.034 -0.304 0.411 0.411 0.000           
PEFF04 0.308 0.435 0.872 0.740 0.348 -0.957 0.032 1.272 -1.052 -0.175 -0.201 0.000         
PSEF01 -0.039 0.124 0.639 0.234 0.514 -0.802 0.763 -0.224 0.767 0.487 -0.047 -0.064 0.000       
PSEF02 -0.619 -0.214 0.609 0.191 -0.201 -0.413 0.549 -0.232 0.834 0.997 -0.560 -0.158 -0.072 0.000     
PSEF03 0.066 0.148 -0.695 -0.780 0.091 -0.968 0.353 -1.153 0.091 -0.236 -1.110 -0.837 -0.013 0.160 0.000   
PSEF04 0.482 0.612 0.646 0.470 0.275 -0.473 1.768 -0.059 0.675 0.214 0.365 0.384 0.034 -0.212 0.018 0.000 
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Table H.7: Efficacy perceptions model – Squared multiple correlations 
Squared Multiple Correlations Control Treatment 
COST06     0.568 0.702 
COST05     0.638 0.657 
COST01     0.690 0.605 
COST02     0.778 0.756 
COST03     0.590 0.624 
COST04     0.375 0.409 
PEFF06     0.489 0.688 
PEFF05     0.515 0.694 
PEFF01     0.499 0.625 
PEFF02     0.552 0.636 
PEFF03     0.528 0.792 
PEFF04     0.551 0.712 
PSEF01     0.730 0.715 
PSEF02     0.828 0.725 
PSEF03     0.610 0.772 










        





H.3 Intention to comply congeneric model 
Table H.8: Intentions to comply congeneric model – Modification indices 
Covariances: Modification Indices  Control Treatment 
eINT5 <--> eINT6 86.019 33.329 
eINT4 <--> eINT6 7.453 4.661 
eINT4 <--> eINT5 5.127 7.796 
eINT3 <--> eINT5 14.881 4.050 
eINT2 <--> eINT6 4.977 6.269 
eINT2 <--> eINT5 5.477 5.072 
eINT1 <--> eINT6 12.751 10.930 
eINT1 <--> eINT5 21.685 18.362 
eINT1 <--> eINT4 14.123 49.625 
eINT1 <--> eINT3 5.798 9.626 





        
Table H.9: Intentions to comply congeneric model – Standardized residual 
  INTC06 INTC05 INTC04 INTC03 INTC02 INTC01 
Control 
INTC06 0       
INTC05 3.810 0      
INTC04 -0.703 -0.477 0     
INTC03 0.498 1.136 -0.151 0    
INTC02 -0.664 -0.569 0.139 -0.173 0   
INTC01 -1.379 -1.472 0.744 -0.665 0.767 0 
Treatment 
INTC06 0       
INTC05 1.766 0      
INTC04 -0.706 -0.704 0     
INTC03 0.781 0.750 -0.410 0    
INTC02 -0.699 0.071 -0.294 0.021 0   
INTC01 -1.091 -1.091 1.915 -1.002 0.675 0 
 
Table H.10: Intentions to comply congeneric model – Squared multiple correlations 
Squared Multiple Correlations Control Treatment 
INTC06 0.426 0.509 
INTC05 0.570 0.660 
INTC04 0.779 0.627 
INTC03 0.647 0.523 
INTC02 0.731 0.654 
INTC01 0.608 0.622 
 




        









Appendix I Analysis of structural model 
Table I.11: Structural model – Correlations between latent variables (control group) 
 Latent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Exposure to hacking 1.000                 
2. Perceived vulnerability 0.395 1.000               
3. Perceived threat 0.171 0.339 1.000             
4. Perceived severity 0.237 0.189 0.573 1.000           
5. Perceived password effectiveness 0.036 0.123 0.447 0.346 1.000         
6. Password self-efficacy -0.015 0.045 0.303 0.308 0.562 1.000       
7. Perceived cost 0.145 0.282 0.264 0.199 0.169 0.136 1.000     
8. Intentions to comply -0.055 0.109 0.426 0.340 0.551 0.665 0.135 1.000   
9. Actual password compliance 0.007 0.018 0.106 0.187 0.277 0.246 0.038 0.345 1.000 
 
Table I.12: Structural model – Correlations between latent variables (treatment group) 
 Latent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Exposure to hacking 1.000                 
2. Perceived vulnerability 0.308 1.000               
3. Perceived threat 0.035 0.436 1.000             
4. Perceived severity 0.018 0.289 0.629 1.000           
5. Perceived password effectiveness -0.118 0.193 0.532 0.524 1.000         
6. Password self-efficacy -0.044 0.119 0.442 0.466 0.630 1.000       
7. Perceived cost 0.169 0.365 0.256 0.145 0.266 0.209 1.000     
8. Intentions to comply -0.110 0.184 0.471 0.405 0.602 0.769 0.197 1.000   
9. Actual password compliance -0.203 -0.102 0.096 0.170 0.285 0.274 -0.108 0.137 1.000 
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